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Abstract 
European labour markets are increasingly divided between insiders in full-time 
permanent employment and outsiders in precarious work or unemployment. Using 
quantitative as well as qualitative methods, this thesis investigates the determinants 
and consequences of labour market policies that target these outsiders in three separate 
papers.  
The first paper looks at Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) that target the 
unemployed. It shows that left and right-wing parties choose different types of 
ALMPs depending on the policy and the welfare regime in which the party is located. 
These findings reconcile the conflicting theoretical expectations from the Power 
Resource approach and the insider-outsider theory. 
The second paper considers the regulation and protection of the temporary work 
sector. It solves the puzzle of temporary re-regulation in France, which contrasts with 
most other European countries that have deregulated temporary work. Permanent 
workers are adversely affected by the expansion of temporary work in France because 
of general skills and low wage coordination. The interests of temporary and permanent 
workers for re-regulation therefore overlap in France and left governments have an 
incentive to re-regulate the sector.  
The third paper then investigates what determines inequality between median and 
bottom income workers. It shows that non-inclusive economic coordination increases 
inequality in the absence of compensating institutions such as minimum wage 
regulation. The deregulation of temporary work as well as spending on employment 
incentives and rehabilitation also has adverse effects on inequality. Thus, policies that 
target outsiders have important economic effects on the rest of the workforce. 
Three broader contributions can be identified. First, welfare state policies may not 
always be in the interests of labour, so left parties may not always promote them. 
Second, the interests of insiders and outsiders are not necessarily at odds. Third, 
economic coordination may not be conducive to egalitarianism where it is not 
inclusive. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
THE DETERMINANTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
LABOUR MARKET POLICIES 
 
 
 
“Outsiders have become a significant part of the political economy of industrialised 
nations. The emergence of outsiders… is the result of political factors and, in turn, 
has political consequences” 
Rueda (2007: 220) Social Democracy Inside Out. 
 
 
What determines what workers get in contemporary capitalist societies? More 
specifically, what explains the continuing differences in labour market policies and 
outcomes across European countries? These questions are central to the comparative 
political economy research agenda and the organisation of capitalism in Western 
Europe.  
During the post-war period, advanced industrial capitalism was organised to 
solve three recurrent problems concerning the level of wages, work and productivity 
(Hall, 2007: 42, 43). First, the ‘wage problem’ entailed striking the right balance 
between wage moderation to retain competitiveness and sufficient wages to support 
aggregate domestic demand. Second, solving the ‘work problem’ required maximising 
employment rates while guaranteeing workers’ livelihood when in unemployment. 
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Third, the ‘productivity problem’ concerned the efficient use of workers and capital, 
which required endowing workers with sufficient and adequate skills. 
With the shift to a post-industrial economy and the advent of mass 
unemployment and precarious work,1 labour markets have become more dualised as 
the “rights, entitlements, and services provided” to insiders in permanent full-time 
employment and outsiders in precarious work or unemployment are increasingly 
differentiated (Emmenegger et al., 2012: 10). This trend has profoundly altered the 
ability – and preferences – of governments to solve the three problems that all 
advanced economies face. 
Mass unemployment has challenged the ability of welfare states to guarantee 
the livelihood of unemployed workers. The expansion of precarious work also means 
that countries with lower unemployment rates are not necessarily more conducive to 
labour’s interests. While temporary work provides flexibility at the margin for 
companies, it also discourages both the worker and the employer from investing 
sufficiently in skills. Precarious work may also undermine workers’ bargaining power 
and result in excessively low wage growth with potentially adverse effects on 
domestic aggregate demand.  
Although labour market dualisation is not a new phenomenon (e.g. Piore and 
Doeringer, 1984; Piore and Berger, 1980), its empirical prevalence and theoretical 
relevance has increased tremendously in the last three decades. Indeed, unemployment 
                                                 
1
 I use ‘precarious work’ for simplicity to refer to non-standard forms of employment which include 
both temporary and involuntary part-time work. 
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and temporary work has evolved from being a marginal phenomenon to being a major 
feature of nearly all Western European countries. Therefore, labour market policies 
that target outsiders are increasingly salient given the rise of outsiders in Western 
Europe and the wide implications these policies have for the whole workforce.  
As a result of labour market dualisation, the answer to the question of what 
workers get and how to make sense of the diversity in labour market policies and 
outcomes across Western Europe needs to be reconsidered. Therefore, the starting 
point of this thesis is the increased dualisation of European labour markets between 
insiders and outsiders, which means the answers to these questions can no longer be 
assumed to be the same for all workers. While the main approaches in comparative 
political economy explain a great deal about the conditions of workers in standard 
employment and the policies that target them, we still know comparatively little about 
labour market outsiders.  
This thesis provides an answer to these questions for the case of labour market 
outsiders: the unemployed and workers in non-standard forms of employment such as 
temporary work. It also shows that policies that target outsiders have significant 
implications for labour market insiders. More specifically, this thesis demonstrates 
that labour market policies that target different groups of outsiders have distinct 
political and institutional determinants and important consequences for wage 
inequality among insiders. 
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The background: European labour markets under pressure 
Western European countries have faced a number of exogenous and 
endogenous structural shifts during the last four decades. First, two supply side oil 
shocks hit Western European economies in the 1970s leading to a rise in non-labour 
costs in a context where workers’ productivity growth was slowing down (Blanchard, 
2006). Second, the composition and sectoral distribution of employment in the 
economy was drastically altered as the share of workers in the industrial sector fell 
while women’s labour market participation rose.  
Third, the demise of Fordism and the process of deindustrialisation weakened 
complementarities between various workers and as a result generated a conflict 
between the interests of skilled and unskilled workers (Iversen and Soskice, 2009). 
Lastly, technological progress and greater trade openness led to a rise in the demand 
for skilled workers relative to unskilled workers. As a result, the market premium for 
skill rose generating greater inequality between these workers (Wood, 1994; Burtless, 
1995; Freeman and Katz, 1995; Acemoglu, 2002; Goldin and Katz, 1996).  
Deindustrialisation, greater openness, technological change and the expansion 
of labour supply have resulted in a profound reconfiguration of European labour 
markets. The share of outsiders - understood here as including both precarious and 
unemployed workers - in the total workforce of Western European countries has risen 
drastically since the 1970s. Explaining the determinants and consequences of labour 
market policies that target outsiders is therefore increasingly theoretically and 
empirically relevant. 
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While these shifts have led to significant pressures and problems in the labour 
market, policy makers have been increasingly constrained in their ability to tackle 
these problems. The adhesion to the European Union (Zeitlin and Pochet, 2005; 
Leibfried and Pierson, 2000; Scharpf, 1997) and the increased globalisation of trade 
and finance (Goodman and Pauly, 1993; Andrews, 1994; Notermans, 1993) have 
generated significant budgetary and competitive pressures which have severely 
restricted governments’ policy choices.  
As economic liberalism spread (Simmons et al., 2006), the scope of policies 
available to governments has also been restricted by the demise of Keynesianism as a 
guiding policy paradigm, alongside its replacement by monetarism (Hall, 1986). 
Whereas in the post-war period unemployment was seen as the responsibility of 
macroeconomic authorities, since the 1980s unemployment became the responsibility 
of social partners in the labour markets (Notermans, 2000: 14). With respect to labour 
market policies, instruments that were designed to insure workers against labour 
market risks increasingly had adverse effects on employment rates (Nickell and 
Layard, 1999). 
Notwithstanding these common trends in Europe, the ability of different 
systems to adapt existing policies and institutions to new problems in the labour 
market varies a great deal (Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000; Esping-Andersen, 1996; Hall, 
2007; Rhodes and van Apeldoorn, 1998). Indeed, European countries are characterised 
by different welfare and production regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hall and 
Soskice, 2001; Kitschelt et al., 1999; Soskice et al., 2000). As labour market policies 
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and institutions remain diverse across Europe, inequality, poverty and precarious 
employment do not affect all countries to a similar extent. 
Point of departure: The dualisation of labour markets 
The broad theme of this thesis is the determinants of cross-national differences 
in labour market policies and outcomes. Existing scholarship in comparative political 
economy tends to approach this topic by identifying a constant set of factors, such as 
left-wing and union strength or economic coordination, which arguably determine 
workers’ employment conditions and benefit entitlements across the board.  
For proponents of the Power Resource approach (e.g. Korpi, 1983; 2006; 
Huber and Stephens, 2001; Korpi and Palme, 2003), labour’s interests are 
homogenous and their representatives - whether in left parties or trade unions - best 
serve these interests by expanding the welfare state, which in turn fosters egalitarian 
wage outcomes. The strength of labour determines the generosity of welfare state 
policies, how egalitarian society is, and also affects subsequent welfare state reform 
dynamics (e.g. Allan and Scruggs, 2004).  
By contrast, the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature (Hall and Soskice, 
2001; Soskice et al., 2000; Kitschelt et al., 1999) contends that the degree of non-
market coordination between different actors, especially firms, is a key determinant of 
welfare state policies and outcomes. Firms need to solve coordination problems in five 
spheres of the economy: vocational training and education, corporate governance, 
inter-firm relations, internal management and structure of the firm, and industrial 
relations. 
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In Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs), firms rely on non-market 
coordination to solve these problems. Firms develop production strategies based on 
incremental innovation that require workers with specific skills. For employers to 
invest in these specific skills, in turn, necessitate guarantees that firms do not poach 
high-skilled workers from their competitors. Similarly, workers need to know that 
they are unlikely to be dismissed after having invested in those non-transferable skills. 
As a result, CMEs are characterised by high employment protection legislation and 
more egalitarian wage bargaining. In sum, for the VoC literature, the type of 
coordination ultimately determines what workers get.2 
However, both theories implicitly agree that the factors they identify can be 
systematically associated with a set of policies which are beneficial or detrimental to 
the whole of labour. Thus, these theories assume that labour is a homogenous actor 
with common interests and preferences and that welfare state policies and economic 
coordination are conducive to these interests. Both theories provide convincing 
explanations of the cross-national variation in labour market policies such as passive 
unemployment benefits and Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) of permanent 
workers that were historically created for labour market insiders.  
However, they are less able to explain the cross-national variation in policies 
that concern outsiders such as EPL of temporary workers and Active Labour Market 
Policies (ALMPs). In line with recent dualisation literature, I argue this is due to 
labour interests and preferences becoming increasingly divided (Rueda, 2007; Iversen 
                                                 
2
 Though note that the theory can accommodate additional factors – see Hancké et al. (2007). 
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and Soskice, 2009; Häusermann and Schwander, 2009; Emmenegger, 2009). 
Mirroring these divisions within labour, welfare state policies and institutions are also 
becoming more dualised by generating systematic differences in the entitlements and 
policies that accrue to insiders and outsiders (Palier and Thelen, 2008; Palier and 
Thelen, 2010; Eichhorst, 2010; Emmenegger et al., 2012).  
As a result, the conditions of different outsider groups and the labour market 
policies that target them are driven by distinct political and institutional dynamics. 
Studies of labour market policies must therefore distinguish between workers in full-
time permanent employment: the insiders; and those in precarious work or 
unemployment: the outsiders.  
Building on this literature, I argue further that we need to look at specific 
groups of outsiders separately, given the heterogeneity of this category of workers. 
The conditions and interests of unemployed, temporary and low income workers 
cannot be assumed a priori to be the same. Also, each outsider group has a different 
degree of economic and political salience. Policies that target different types of 
outsiders are therefore not necessarily driven by the same political and institutional 
determinants. As a consequence, it is necessary to look at different outsider groups 
separately and to develop different explanations for the conditions of each outsider 
group. 
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Research question and brief summary of argument  
In this thesis, the ‘black box’ of labour market outsiders is unpacked by 
separately considering different outsider groups. The thesis unfolds in three separate 
papers that address distinct questions. The articles are related through their common 
focus on the comparative political economy of labour dualisation in Western European 
countries and are united by the broad question of what accounts for the cross-national 
variation in outsiders’ conditions and in turn, how these affect the rest of the 
workforce. 
More specifically, in the first two articles, this thesis analyses the political and 
institutional determinants of outsiders’ welfare by looking at two groups of outsiders: 
the unemployed and temporary workers. Each group of outsider is treated in a separate 
and self-contained article. The third paper then investigates the effects of policies that 
target distinct groups of outsiders on inequality between low income and median 
income insiders. The overall structure of the thesis is summarised in Figure 1. 
The first article looks at ALMPs targeted at unemployed workers. There are 
currently contradictory theoretical expectations concerning the political determinants 
of ALMPs. The Power Resource approach contends that the left always prefers to 
spend more on ALMPs (e.g. Huo et al., 2008; Boix, 1998) whereas the insider-
outsider literature (Rueda, 2006; Rueda, 2007) argues that left parties do not 
necessarily care about the potential fate of outsiders, and hence may not spend more 
on ALMPs.  
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Figure 1: Outline of thesis 
 
To solve these conflicting expectations, I argue that ALMPs encompass 
distinct policies that have very different effects on insiders and outsiders. The choice 
of ALMPs by political parties is determined by both the impact of the policy and the 
welfare regime in which it is located. Specifically, I show that left-wing parties spend 
less on policies that have adverse effects on insiders, such as employment incentives 
and rehabilitation. By contrast, left parties in Continental Bismarckian welfare regimes 
spend more on direct job creation. Finally, spending on training is not driven by 
partisanship but rather by the welfare and production regimes in which governments 
make policy choices.  
The second paper investigates the political and institutional determinants of 
changes in EPL of temporary workers. Most of the comparative political economy 
literature has so far focused on EPL of permanent workers (e.g. Algan and Cahuc, 
ImplicationsConsequencesDeterminantsFramework
Introductory 
chapter
Dualisation 
of European 
Labour 
Markets
Paper 1 
Active 
Labour 
Market 
Policies
Paper 3 
Wage 
Inequality 
Between 
Median and 
bottom 
income 
workers
Contributions
Further 
Research
Concluding 
Chapter
Summary of 
each paper
Paper 2 
Temporary 
Work 
Regulations
26 
 
2004; Emmenegger, 2011). While most countries have deregulated their temporary 
work sector, France went in the opposite direction despite sharing many of the 
conditions that are presumed to lead to deregulation.  
I argue that in France, permanent workers are adversely affected by the 
expansion of temporary work because they are particularly replaceable.3 As a result, 
permanent workers have overlapping interests with temporary workers and the left in 
France seeks to regulate temporary work. Replaceability is in turn higher in countries 
where wage coordination is low, workers’ skills are general and temporary and 
permanent workers have a more similar educational profile.  
The third paper looks at gross earnings inequality between median income full-
time permanent workers and those located in the bottom decile of the income 
distribution. Previously egalitarian countries that have coordinated market economies 
or social democratic welfare regimes have in some cases become more unequal than 
countries with Bismarckian welfare regimes and the British liberal market economy. 
To solve this puzzle, I investigate the effect of labour market dualisation and revisit 
the impact of economic coordination and welfare state policies on inequality. 
The findings suggest that increased labour market dualisation - in the form of a 
more deregulated and larger temporary work sector - increases inequality among 
insiders. Second, while decommodifying labour market policies do indeed reduce 
inequality, recommodifying policies, such as employment incentives increase 
                                                 
3
 Replaceability can be defined as the ability of employers to replace permanent staff by temporary 
workers (see paper 2 for more information). 
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inequality. This article thereby uncovers the impact of the dependent variables of my 
first two papers on inequality among insiders. Third, economic coordination can have 
adverse effects on inequality in the absence of an inclusive union movement or 
national minimum wage regulations.  
The remainder of this introductory chapter begins by more extensively 
documenting the broad trends in labour markets and policies that target insiders and 
outsiders. The second section briefly investigates the strengths and weaknesses of the 
existing literature in explaining labour market policies. In the third section, each 
paper’s puzzle, argument and contribution is then discussed in more detail. 
 
1. Trends in labour markets and policies 
The problem load in the labour markets of most Western European countries 
has risen tremendously in the last three decades. Unemployment and inequality have 
been rising in most countries and welfare state policies have become increasingly 
unable to cope with the emergence of new social risks (1.1). In addition, a number of 
new constraints on policy makers’ margin of manoeuvre have appeared (1.2). As a 
result, new policy prescriptions and instruments were introduced in the 1990s, 
however certain labour market problems nevertheless persist (1.3). 
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1.1. The rise of labour market outsiders 
After the two golden decades of sustained European economic growth and low 
unemployment (1950-1973), mass unemployment became a large scale and long-term 
phenomenon. This threatened to undermine the economic efficiency and social 
stability of European capitalism. In the period 1960-1964, the standard unemployment 
rate was inferior to 2.5% in the vast majority of Western European countries. By 2002, 
only four European countries had an unemployment rate under 5% (Layard et al., 
2005: xxi). This rise in unemployment is partly explained by broader structural and 
exogenous factors such as deindustrialisation and globalisation but was also driven by 
the policy choices of various governments, for instance the shift from Keynesianism to 
the low inflation regime of monetarism.4 
As shown in Figure 2, unemployment was a marginal phenomenon in Western 
Europe in 1970. The unemployment rate of most European countries was under 4% 
and was under 6% in all Western European countries. Unemployment rates started 
rising from the mid-1970s in most continental European countries, and in the 1990s it 
began to rise in Scandinavia. By 1997, many countries’ unemployment had risen 
above 10% and almost all European countries had unemployment rates above 5%. 
The contractual position of those participating in labour markets has also 
undergone profound changes. Part-time and temporary employment, as a share of total 
dependent employees, has been rising significantly across Europe since 1980. This is 
                                                 
4
 See sections 1.2 and 1.3 for details on the exogenous and endogenous factors that account for the rise 
of unemployment. Labour market dualism therefore cannot be seen as being completely exogenous of 
governments’ policy choices. 
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particularly the case among “women, low skilled workers, ethnic minorities and young 
people” (Daguerre, 2007: 7). This significant increase in non-standard forms of 
employment was in many cases driven by governments’ reforms that deregulated the 
labour markets at the margin. These reforms have facilitated the hiring of workers on 
non-standard contracts by firms seeking to increase employment flexibility in the 
context of strict labour market regulations of permanent contracts. By 2007, 15% of 
dependent employees were in temporary contracts, and about 18% were in part-time 
contracts in Europe.5  
Figure 2: Unemployment in Western Europe between 1970 and 1997 
 
Source: OECD Annual Labour Force Statistics database (2000). 
                                                 
5
 Source: OECD Annual Labour Force Statistics database (2010). Note: Europe is an average of all 
European countries who are also members of the OECD. 
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By 2005, many countries had more than 20% of their workforce either in 
unemployment or in temporary contracts. Some countries such as Spain had more than 
30% of dependent employees in temporary contracts. 6  The prevalence of 
unemployment and temporary work among young workers was even higher. The 
increase in the number of precarious workers raised novel policy challenges because 
these workers bear most of the so-called new social risks (Armingeon and Bonoli, 
2006).  
Resilient unemployment, rising wage inequality and deregulation at the margin 
of the labour market have contributed to divisions within the labour movement. This 
has generated strategic issues for both left-wing political parties and trade unions. 
Long-term unemployment means that sections of labour have become permanently 
disconnected from the labour market leading to political apathy. Workers with 
discontinuous and unstable employment patterns are neither well-represented by trade 
unions, which find it hard to organise them (Ebbinghaus, 2006), nor well-integrated in 
“cross-class coalitions” (Daguerre, 2007: 9).  
Wage inequality has also polarised high skill and low skill workers, potentially 
undermining the traditional coalition between these workers (Iversen and Soskice, 
2009). The interests and preferences of full-time workers and those at the margin or 
outside the labour markets have as a result become distinct (Rueda, 2007). In turn, 
dualisation of labour force preferences and interests is increasingly reflected in the 
dualism of welfare state policies (Häusermann and Schwander, 2009; Eichhorst, 2010; 
Palier and Thelen, 2010). 
                                                 
6
 Source: OECD Annual Labour Force Statistics database (2010). 
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1.2. Constraints on labour market policies 
The 1973 and 1979 oil shocks led to a fourfold increase in the price of oil 
while total factor productivity growth experienced a marked slowdown (Blanchard, 
2006). Thus, while the productivity of labour fell, non-labour production costs were 
increasing. In addition, governments had to address the “double threat of cost-push 
inflation and demand-gap unemployment” (Scharpf, 2000: 190). These shocks had 
adverse effects on unemployment, though it is contested whether these effects have 
been temporary or permanent (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Nickell et al., 2001). In 
this context, three sets of constraints on European policy makers emerged: (1) 
ideological developments and discredited policies; (2) economic internationalisation 
and Europeanisation, and; (3) deindustrialisation as well socio-economic changes. 
The apparent inability of Keynesianism to deal with the stagflation of the 
1970s marked an important turning point. Fiscal policy as an expansionary policy tool 
to ensure full-employment was at least partly abandoned (Pierson, 2006). The new 
paradigm, New Classical Economics, introduced the notion of rational expectations7 in 
the perfect market clearing assumptions of classical economics. Fiscal policy could at 
best have a short run impact on the economy. In the long run, agents would adapt their 
inflationary expectations upwards. Unemployment would return to its natural rate and 
be determined by institutional fundamentals, but the economy would be at a higher 
natural rate of inflation. In its most restricted version, the new theory argued that a 
perfectly benevolent government could not improve upon the market clearing outcome 
                                                 
7
 Rational expectations are “expectations based upon an accurate knowledge of the parameters 
describing the economy and all available information” (Hillier, 2004: 174). 
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even in the short-run. Any fiscal or monetary intervention aimed at the macro 
management of aggregate demand would be fully anticipated and hence neutralised by 
private agents in the economy (Hillier, 2004).8  
Meanwhile, the monetarist revolution emphasised the importance of low 
inflation and the primacy of monetary policy (Hall, 1986). Central banks became 
independent from elected politicians (Marcussen, 2005). As a result, governments 
became more limited in their ability to manage aggregate demand through both fiscal 
and monetary policy to deal with labour market problems.  
Moreover, some policy options were discredited by their perceived failure to 
succeed in solving policy problems. For instance, the promotion of older workers’ 
early exit from the labour market as a solution to unemployment has not been a 
success. In fact, the reliance on early retirement schemes in the 1980s has drastically 
reduced employment rates in continental Europe while also significantly increasing 
social contributions costs (Huo, 2009; Layard et al., 2005). Similarly, unemployment 
benefits have been criticised for their detrimental effects on unemployed workers’ 
incentives to return to work (Nickell et al., 2005). 
A number of broader structural changes in the labour market have further 
limited policy options. First, changing gender roles (Castles, 2004; Esping-Andersen 
et al., 2002) generated new pressures in labour markets and novel needs for welfare 
                                                 
8
 However, see Buiter (1980) for an early rebuttal of this argument. Contradicting New Classical 
Economics, more recent New Keynesian literature has also demonstrated that the ineffectiveness of 
government policy is not determined by rational expectations but by the assumption that prices are not 
rigid (Iversen and Soskice, 2006; Carlin and Soskice, 2006). 
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state policies. Indeed, female labour force participation increased in most countries 
leading to a marked increase in total labour supply (Jaumotte, 2003). For instance, 
between 1956 and 2006, the share of women in civilian employment increased from 
33% to 47% in France, from 36% to 45% in Germany, and from 32.9% to 46% in the 
UK.9 
Second, the transition from an industrial to a service-oriented economy 
(Iversen and Cusack, 1998: 346) has eroded the stable full-time employment 
relationship and undermined the ability of welfare state institutions to address the new 
risks atypical workers face (Armingeon and Bonoli, 2006; Esping-Andersen et al., 
2002; Bonoli, 2007). Indeed, between 1985 and 2005, all western European countries 
experienced falls in the share of their workforce employed in the manufacturing sector 
(see Figure 3). 
While new problems in the labour market have emerged, policy makers have 
been increasingly constrained in their ability to tackle these problems. The increased 
globalisation of trade and finance (Goodman and Pauly, 1993; Andrews, 1994; 
Notermans, 1993; Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000; Garrett, 1998) has generated significant 
budgetary, as well as competitive pressures, and severely constrained governments’ 
policy choices. Between 1985 and 2005, only Norway experienced a drop in its Trade 
to GDP ratio (see Figure 4). 
                                                 
9
 See the OECD Annual Labour Force Statistics database (2007). 
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Figure 3: Deindustrialisation in Western Europe 
 
Source: OECD Structural Analysis Database (2007). 
 
Figure 4: Openness in Western Europe 
 
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators database (2007). 
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The adhesion to the European Union (Zeitlin and Pochet, 2005; Leibfried and 
Pierson, 2000; Scharpf, 1997; Scharpf, 1999) also had an impact on labour market 
policies because certain policy options have been ruled out by the constraints imposed 
by the EU while certain policy reforms have been promoted. For instance, certain 
policies, such as state subsidies to companies, were prohibited under articles 92-94 of 
the Rome Treaty while other policies, such as Active Labour Market Policies, are 
being promoted (van Vliet and Koster, 2011). 
At least initially, these changes have led to more, not less spending on welfare 
state policies (Iversen and Cusack, 1998; Rodrik, 1998). Most studies contend welfare 
state spending increases as governments attempt to tackle the risks generated by 
openness (Katzenstein, 1985; Cameron, 1978: 71; Garrett, 1998; Rodrik, 1998: 997). 
Between 1985 and 2005, only the Netherlands and Ireland experienced significant 
falls in total social expenditure (see Figure 5). 
However, higher unemployment rates (Swank, 2001), pension spending 
commitments (Myles and Pierson, 2001) and health-related expenditure (Giaimo, 
2001) are straining public budgets. On the financing side, all OECD countries, apart 
from the UK and the US, experienced marked increases in their level of taxes and 
social contributions (Scharpf, 2000: Table 3, 199). Thus, European governments 
increasingly operate in a context of heightened fiscal austerity where the politics of 
welfare state retrenchment cannot be assumed to mirror those of welfare state 
expansion in the post-war period (Pierson, 2001).  
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Figure 5: Total Public Social Expenditures in Western Europe 
 
Source: OECD Social Expenditures database (2010). 
 
1.3. New policy recommendations 
While European governments cannot easily retrench their welfare state 
arrangements (Pierson, 1996), they cannot easily increase the financing of their 
welfare state either, because higher payroll taxes may undermine employment 
(Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000). Therefore, European welfare states have to tackle new 
social risks while operating under conditions of austerity and facing significant 
resistance to reforming pre-existing social policies (Pierson, 1994; 1998; 2001). 
Countries increasingly seem to be faced with a policy trilemma, where they 
can only achieve two out of the following three objectives: equality, high employment 
and budget stability. Anglo-Saxon countries have overall achieved higher employment 
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rates but this has been at the cost of much higher inequality. Scandinavian countries 
have achieved high employment rates and equality but this may generate 
unsustainable debt levels. Continental Europe has high equality and budget stability 
but this results in low employment rates which may undermine the long-term viability 
of the system (Iversen and Wren, 1998). 
Moreover, as a result of the apparent inability of existing policy paradigms to 
deal with unemployment, new policy prescriptions were devised by both economists 
and international organisations. In the 1994 Jobs Study, the OECD advocated more 
flexible wages, lower employment protection and a higher emphasis on active labour 
market policies (OECD, 2006: 6). Employment policy being promoted at the EU level 
also reflects this trend. For instance, the 1994 Essen European Council emphasised the 
need to have “more flexible work organisation” and promote the “reduction of non-
wage labour costs to encourage hiring”.10 
Thus, in the field of labour market policies, reforms were mostly about 
‘recalibration’ rather than cost containment (Pierson, 2001). Most labour market 
policies were reformed towards a ‘workfarist’ or ‘activating’ welfare state (Peck, 
2001; Torfing, 1999; Clasen and Clegg, 2006). Activation increases the incentives of 
unemployed workers to return to work while workfare imposes stricter conditions to 
benefit recipients. Notwithstanding this common trend across European countries, 
                                                 
10
 See EU online summaries of legislation (accessed on the 26th of November 2012) at: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/amsterdam_treaty/a13000_en.htm 
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different paths of reforms that follow existing welfare regimes can still be delineated 
(Dingledey, 2007; Barbier, 2004; Barbier and Ludwig-Mayerhofer, 2004). 
In sum, as labour markets have undergone profound changes, enduring 
problems in the labour market have since emerged. Meanwhile, previous policies were 
challenged, ideological paradigms were overhauled and new constraints on policy 
making appeared. The emergence - and unanticipated effects - of new policies as well 
as significant changes in existing labour market policies raise the question of various 
governments’ policy responses.  
 
2. Diversity and change in European labour markets 
Labour market policies have important implications for unemployment and 
inequality (2.1). Despite common pressures and policy problems, Western European 
governments have responded in very different ways (2.2). The Power Resource 
approach and the VoC literature are the two main comparative political economy 
literatures to explain the cross-national variation in labour market policies and 
outcomes (2.3). 
 
2.1. The effects of labour market policies 
By solving various market failures, welfare state policies can increase 
efficiency (Barr, 2005). However, debates remain which concern the optimal design of 
specific welfare state policies such as unemployment benefit systems and EPL. There 
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is a large portion of literature looking at the determinants of labour market 
performance (Siebert, 1997; OECD, 1994; Bruno and Sachs, 1985; Armstrong et al., 
1991). Prima facie, there seems to be a slightly negative relation between 
unemployment rates on the one hand and the replacement rate and duration of 
unemployment benefit systems on the other (Scarpetta, 1996; Elmeskov et al., 1998; 
Nickell, 1997; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Nickell et al., 2005; IMF, 2003; Bertola 
et al., 2001).  
However, there is still disagreement concerning the effects of unemployment 
benefit systems on the level of unemployment (Layard et al., 2005; Howell et al., 
2006; Howell, 2005; Baccaro and Rei, 2007). Some studies even find that higher 
replacement rates are associated with lower unemployment (Belot and van Ours, 2004: 
Table 7, 635). 
Similarly, the effects of EPL on unemployment are unclear. Some authors find 
that it is associated with higher unemployment (IMF, 2003; Blanchard and Wolfers, 
2000; Scarpetta, 1996; Lazear, 1990; Grubb and Wells, 1993; Di Tella and 
McCulloch, 1998). There is also evidence that the effects of high EPL are more 
marked on young workers’ access to the labour market. Due to the idea that EPL may 
reduce flows out of unemployment, high EPL also tends to be associated with a higher 
incidence of long-term unemployment (Salvanes, 1997; Nickell, 1998). On the other 
hand, high EPL also mitigates job destruction and inflows into unemployment 
(Bertola, 1992).  
40 
 
Moreover, the presumed adverse impact of EPL on labour market performance 
has been widely challenged (Esping-Andersen et al., 2000; Bentolila and Bertola, 
1990; Oesch, 2010; Freeman, 2005). Deregulation of employment protection at the 
margin has been a partial success at best: while it increased turnover, the reduction in 
unemployment duration was limited (Blanchard and Landier, 2002). Deregulating 
employment protection at the margin may also have accentuated the existing 
segmentation or dualisation of labour markets (Gordon et al., 1982; Piore, 1983; 
Lindbeck and Snower, 2002). 
Even overall lower employment protection reduces both the outflow and the 
inflow into unemployment. Therefore the net effect on unemployment is unclear and 
empirical studies yield conflicting results (OECD, 2004: Chapter 2, 63). Amable et al. 
(2011) find that EPL actually improves employment performance. If high EPL is 
necessary to sustain institutional complementarities in CMEs, reducing it may also 
have adverse consequences on incremental innovation in these economies (Bassanini 
and Ernst, 2002). 
There are also mixed findings concerning the impact of ALMPs on 
unemployment and employment (Card, 2010; Martin and Grubb, 2001; Nickell and 
Layard, 1999; Oesch, 2010; Boone and van Ours, 2009; Estevão, 2003; Heckman et 
al., 1999). The effectiveness of ALMPs is also contingent on macroeconomic 
conditions. More specifically, to be effective these programmes require “a reasonably 
buoyant supply of job vacancies in order to be effective” (Martin and Grubb, 2001: 
107).  
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In addition, current research yields contradictory findings concerning which 
ALMP is most likely to enhance labour market performance. Some studies conclude 
that job search and training schemes are most effective in reducing unemployment 
whereas direct job creation programmes have no effect (Card, 2010). Layard et al 
(2005: xvi) notes that “job search assistance tends to have consistently positive 
outcomes but other types of measures, such as employment subsidies and labour 
market training, must be well-designed if they are to be effective”. By contrast, 
considering instead the impact of ALMPs on private sector employment, Estevão 
(2003) finds the most successful programme is direct creation.  
Despite the on-going debates concerning the effects of labour market policies 
on employment performance, what is not contested is that the design of these policies 
has important efficiency implications. In addition, labour market and welfare state 
policies more generally also have important distributional implications.  
Figure 6 displays the cross-national variation in total welfare state expenditure 
as a percentage of GDP and wage inequality between the top and bottom income 
deciles for full-time dependent employees across Western European countries in 2005. 
Countries with more developed welfare states tend to decommodify workers to a 
greater extent. Greater decommodification leads to higher reservation wages and 
hence generates lower patterns of inequality. Thus, social democratic welfare regimes 
in Denmark, Sweden and Finland produce more egalitarian outcomes, while the liberal 
welfare regimes in the UK and Ireland tend to have more inequality (cf. Esping-
Andersen, 1990). 
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Figure 6: Wage inequality and welfare state expenditures in Western Europe in 2005 
 
Source: OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics and CEPS-OECD data (2005). 
 
Figure 7: Wage inequality and unemployment benefit replacement in 2000 
 
Source: OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics and CEPS-OECD data (2005). 
Note: Data on wage inequality in the year 2000 is missing for Austria, Greece, Portugal, and Spain. 
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Figure 7 displays the relation between wage inequality and unemployment 
benefit replacement rates in the first year of unemployment. The shorter duration of 
unemployment benefit eligibility may increase the incentives of unemployed workers 
to accept lower wages (Gangl, 2004; Addison and Blackburn, 2000; Petrongolo, 
2009). There is evidence that stricter EPL as well as unemployment benefit’s 
replacement rates and duration ultimately reduce inequality (Koeniger et al., 2007). 
Labour market policies are but one set of factors that influence inequality. 
Other relevant institutional and political factors include the tax system, union strength, 
wage bargaining centralisation and coverage, and minimum wage regulations 
(Checchi et al., 2007; Wallerstein, 1999; Freeman, 1980; Freeman, 1982; Fortin and 
Lemieux, 1997; Traxler and Brandl, 2009; Card et al., 2003). Countries with a larger 
share of their employees working for the public sector also leads to lower inequality 
because the wage distribution of government employees tends to be more egalitarian 
(Pontusson et al., 2002; Garrett and Way, 1999). 
 
2.2. The diversity and determinants of labour market policies 
European countries exhibit a wide diversity in the design of their 
unemployment benefit systems (Clasen and Clegg, 2003; Clasen, 2000). In the past 
three decades, the generosity of unemployment benefit systems has evolved along 
different paths across Europe. Figure 8 displays the evolution of the unemployment 
benefit replacement rates in the first year of unemployment in different countries. Two 
features stand out. First, countries have responded to labour market challenges in 
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vastly different ways in the last two decades. Second, countries continue to exhibit 
various arrangements in their labour market policies. The continued cross-national 
diversity in labour market policies is also apparent when considering EPL of regular 
workers (see Figure 9) and spending as a percentage of GDP on active and passive 
labour market policies in 2005 (see Figure 10). 
Two main literatures in comparative political economy have attempted to 
explain this cross-national diversity in labour market policies and institutions. The 
Power Resource approach explains developments in welfare state policies by 
analysing the strength of labour and its representatives (Korpi, 1978; Korpi, 1983; 
Korpi, 2006; Stephens, 1979). Where unions were historically stronger and the left 
controlled the government, the welfare state has become increasingly generous and 
universalistic (Huber and Stephens, 2001; Castles, 1982; Korpi and Palme, 1998). 
Figure 8: The evolution of unemployment benefits replacement rates 
 
Source: OECD-CEPS database (2005). 
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Figure 9: The evolution of employment protection legislation of regular workers 
 
Source: OECD Employment database (2007). 
 
Figure 10: Spending on active and passive labour market spending in 2005 
 
Source: OECD Employment outlook (2007). 
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For instance, the origins of high EPL can also be traced back to the strength of 
labour (Emmenegger and Marx, 2011: 192; Emmenegger, 2011; Korpi, 2006). 
Looking at recent changes in unemployment benefit systems, Allan and Scruggs 
(2004) show that left-wing governments were less likely to retrench unemployment 
benefit replacement rates. Given the relevance of the strength of labour, one can also 
observe distinct clusters of countries exhibiting systematically different welfare states.  
The welfare state literature has emphasised the distinct clustering of countries 
into three distinct types of welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990; 1999). Liberal 
welfare regimes entail low decommodification and a strong emphasis on targeted and 
means-tested benefits. Bismarckian welfare regimes are more decommodified but also 
more stratified because social insurance principles mean different groups of workers 
have systematically distinct entitlements. Lastly, social democratic welfare regimes 
have universalistic and strongly decommodifying benefit systems based on 
citizenship.  
Consistent with this literature, the reform paths of labour market policies have 
also been different across regimes (Kvist, 2003; Palier and Martin, 2007; Palier, 
2006). The extent to which recent welfare state reforms have entailed cost containment 
and retrenchment, recalibration or re-commodification of existing policies, for 
instance, has been partly regime-dependent (Pierson, 2001): cost containment and re-
commodification have been most prevalent in liberal welfare regimes, whereas social 
democratic and Bismarckian welfare regimes have focused on containing costs and 
recalibration. 
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In Esping-Andersen’s work (1999: 27), a country with a Bismarckian welfare 
regime was in the worst of both worlds, achieving neither efficiency nor equity. 
Similarly, Sapir (2007) argued that the continental European social model is 
inefficient while the southern European social model is both inefficient and unequal. 
The specific clustering of countries into Esping-Andersen’s welfare regimes has been 
challenged and amended (Ferrera, 1996; Leibfried, 1992; Castles and Mitchell, 1993; 
Bonoli, 2007; Arts and Gelissen, 2002; Scruggs and Allan, 2006) but it remains an 
influential reference point for comparative research. 
A second strand of literature has argued that the power resource account 
underplays the centrality of firms to explain differences between distinct types of 
capitalism in Europe (Hall and Soskice, 2001). The VoC literature explains policies by 
considering how they are embedded in broader institutional complementarities. 
Institutions across several spheres of the economy complement themselves thereby 
maximising efficiency and solving various coordination problems that firms face. 
Generous unemployment benefits and high EPL may be required to protect the 
investments in specific skills that workers make in CMEs. Also, because workers may 
lose the wage premium associated with firm specific skills when they lose their job, 
they will only make such risky investments if they are unlikely to become unemployed 
and if they receive generous benefits when that happens. By contrast, workers with 
more general skills in Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) may not require such a high 
level of social insurance and employment protection (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Estevez-
Abe et al., 2001).  
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The VoC literature also suggests that distinct institutional complementarities in 
LMEs and CMEs make some changes more likely in some economies than others 
(Hancké et al., 2007; Hall and Soskice, 2001). Specifically, heightened competitive 
pressures arising from economic internationalisation will push both CMEs and LMEs 
to reinforce their pre-existing institutional complementarities: the former will 
therefore retain generous welfare states and high EPL whereas the latter will have 
incentives to retrench and deregulate. 
For VoC, a number of European countries such as France and Spain, did not fit 
easily in the initial dichotomy between CMEs and LMEs. Mixed Market Economies 
(MMEs) were later introduced as a third type of capitalism (Hancké et al., 2007). The 
economy of MMEs in many respects underperformed those in CMEs and LMEs (Hall 
and Gingerich, 2004). While CMEs and LMEs can be expected to react to pressures 
by reinforcing their institutional complementarities, the expectations for MMEs are 
therefore unclear. 
 
3. Starting point and plan of thesis 
3.1. The starting point: labour market dualisation and policies that target outsiders 
Both theories do a good job at explaining labour market policies such as 
passive labour market benefits and EPL of permanent workers that were created when 
most of the labour force was homogenous. Indeed, despite their diverging emphasis on 
the causal primacy of labour or firms, both theories implicitly posit that the factors 
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they identify can be systematically associated with a set of policies which are 
beneficial or detrimental to the whole of labour. In other words, these theories assume 
that labour is a homogenous actor with common interests and preferences and that 
welfare state policies and economic coordination are conducive to these interests. 
Contradicting the ‘homogenous labour’ assumption, European labour markets 
have become increasingly dualised. One can distinguish between the process of 
dualisation, the extent of dualism in policies that target different groups of workers, 
and the resulting divide between insiders and outsiders (Emmenegger et al., 2012). 
There is growing evidence that the interests and preferences of labour are becoming 
increasingly divided (Rueda, 2007; Iversen and Soskice, 2009; Häusermann and 
Schwander, 2009; Emmenegger, 2009). Mirroring these divisions within labour, 
welfare state policies and institutions are also becoming more dualist as they entail 
systematic differences in the entitlements and policies that accrue to insiders and 
outsiders (Palier and Thelen, 2008; Palier and Thelen, 2010; Eichhorst, 2010; 
Emmenegger et al., 2012). 
As dualisation has increased, the economic and social effects of different 
labour market policies and institutions on insiders and outsiders have become more 
differentiated. The political and institutional determinants of labour market policies 
that target outsiders and insiders are therefore unlikely to be uniform. As a result, 
theories that were developed to explain labour market policies and outcomes without 
explicitly taking into account dualisation are hard-pressed to explain novel policy 
developments targeted towards outsiders.  
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Two policy domains are noteworthy in this respect: ALMPs targeted at 
unemployed workers and the EPL of temporary workers. Existing literature suggests 
that various ALMPs have distinct economic and social effects on insiders and 
outsiders, and hence should have different political and institutional determinants. As 
Figure 11 makes clear, countries choose very different types of ALMPs and it is not 
the case that those countries which spend more on one programme necessarily spend 
more on other ALMP schemes. The relation between left-wing control of the 
government and aggregate spending on all ALMPs does not appear straightforward 
(see Figure 12). As I will argue in the next section, the existing literature using 
aggregate spending on ALMPs as their dependent variable has therefore, not 
surprisingly, yielded contradictory empirical findings.  
Figure 11: Disaggregating spending on ALMPs in Western Europe 
 
Source: OECD Employment outlook (2007). 
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Figure 11 (continued): Disaggregating spending on ALMPs in Western Europe 
 
Source: OECD Employment outlook (2007). 
 
Figure 12: Spending on ALMPs in 2005 and control of the cabinet by the left (1970-2007) 
 
Source: OECD Employment outlook for ALMPs and Armingeon et al. (2011) for Left data. 
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Figure 13: EPL for regular and temporary workers in Western Europe 
 
Source: OECD Employment database (2007). 
With respect to EPL, the expansion of temporary work means it becomes 
increasingly problematic to aggregate EPL of regular and temporary workers into an 
overall EPL index. Recent research has looked at the determinants of overall EPL 
(Bonoli, 2003; Emmenegger, 2011; Esping-Andersen, 1996; Siegel, 2007). However, 
comparatively fewer studies to date have looked systematically at the determinants of 
the evolution of EPL of temporary workers. This is problematic because the pattern of 
EPL for regular and temporary workers respectively, is very diverse across European 
countries (see Figure 13) and hence one cannot expect the EPL of temporary and 
regular workers to be determined by similar political or institutional drivers.  
A similar problem occurs for labour market outcomes such as inequality, 
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similar political economy processes. The relative inability of mainstream economics’ 
explanations to account for the existing diversity of wage inequality has prompted new 
research in comparative political economy (Rueda and Pontusson, 2000; Rueda, 
2008). However, whereas inequality between the top and bottom deciles of income 
distribution conforms fairly well to the expectation that social democratic welfare 
regimes and CMEs have lower inequality (see Figure 14); inequality between median 
and bottom income deciles does not (see Figure 15). 
In sum, I argue that we need to look at specific groups of outsiders separately, 
given the heterogeneity of this category of workers. The conditions and interests of 
unemployed, temporary and low income workers cannot be assumed a priori to be the 
same. Each outsider group also has a different degree of economic and political 
salience. Therefore the policies that target different types of outsiders are not 
necessarily driven by the same political and institutional determinants. As a result, it is 
necessary to look at different outsider groups separately and to develop different 
explanations of the conditions and policies that target each outsider group.  
Following Rueda (2007), the underlying conception of outsiders adopted in 
this thesis is categorical in the sense that where an individual is seen as an outsider, or 
insider depending on their contractual position in the labour market: workers in 
permanent contracts are insiders whereas those in temporary contracts or 
unemployment are outsiders. By contrast, some authors conceptualise outsiders along 
a continuum where the degree of ‘outsiderness’ is determined by the occupational risk 
of unemployment that a particular individual faces (e.g. Häusermann and Schwander, 
54 
 
2012).11  Workers employed in occupations with high unemployment are therefore 
seen as outsiders regardless of their contractual position. This is problematic because 
it collapses permanent and temporary workers within a given occupation as being 
influenced by the level of unemployment in their occupation to the same extent. Such 
a premise is fundamentally at odds with the starting point of the insider-outsider 
theory that links insider’s job security to the size and welfare of the outsider group. 
The rest of this section outlines in more detail the question and argument of the 
three papers that examine the determinants of ALMPs, EPL for temporary work and 
wage inequality between the median and the bottom income deciles, respectively. 
Figure 14: Inequality between top and bottom income deciles in 2000 
 
Source: OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics (2005). 
                                                 
11
 Outside of the dualisation literature, other authors also posit that individual preferences for policies 
are crucially shaped by the unemployment rate in their occupation (e.g. Cusack, et al., 2006; Rehm, 
2011). 
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Figure 15: Inequality between median and bottom income deciles in 2005 
 
Source: OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics (2005). 
3.2. Paper 1: The determinants of active labour market policies 
The first paper investigates the political and institutional determinants of 
ALMPs. There are currently contradictory theoretical expectations and empirical 
findings concerning the effect of partisanship on ALMPs. Following the Power 
Resource approach, some studies emphasise that the strength of the left is a key 
determinant of cross-national differences in spending on ALMPs (Huo et al., 2008; 
Swank, 2007; Swank and Martin, 2001; Boix, 1998; Huo, 2009).  
By contrast, Rueda (2005; 2006; 2007) has forcefully argued that insiders and 
outsiders have different preferences for labour market policies because they face 
systematically distinct risks of becoming unemployed. Because insiders face a low 
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probability of becoming unemployed, they will not want ALMPs that need to be 
financed out of taxation and may push the unemployed back into work with 
potentially adverse effects on wages and work conditions. As a result, “insiders care 
about their own employment protection much more than about labour market policies 
aimed at promoting the interests of outsiders” (Rueda, 2007: 212). In turn, social 
democratic parties should promote employment protection much more than ALMPs 
because insiders constitute their core constituency. 
However, both the power resource and the insider-outsider approaches share 
the implicit assumption that ALMPs entail programmes that have similar effects on 
insiders as well as outsiders. By contrast, welfare state and economics literature has 
shown that ALMPs incorporate programmes with different aims and effects. Some 
ALMPs aim to upgrade the skills of the unemployed, while others raise incentives for 
the unemployed to take up jobs and yet others directly create jobs (Bonoli, 2010). The 
varying degree of emphasis on different types of ALMPs across Europe documented 
earlier in Figure 11 remains to be fully explained.  
The first paper of this thesis asks how partisanship affects different ALMPs 
across welfare regimes in Europe. I argue that one should distinguish between distinct 
ALMPs because they have various functions and effects on insiders and outsiders. 
Employment incentives and rehabilitation programmes incentivise the unemployed to 
accept jobs. Direct job creation reduces the supply of labour by creating non-
commercial jobs. Training schemes raise the human capital of the unemployed. Party 
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preferences for ALMPs also crucially depend on the welfare regime in which political 
parties are located. 
Using regression analysis this paper confirms that the positions of political 
parties towards these three types of ALMPs are different. Specifically, the findings are 
threefold. First, in Scandinavia left-wing parties support neither employment 
incentives nor direct job creation schemes. Second, in continental and Liberal welfare 
regimes left-wing parties also oppose employment incentives and rehabilitation 
programmes but they support direct job creation. Third, there is no impact of 
partisanship on training which is exclusively driven by the type of welfare regime in 
which the particular government is located. 
By disaggregating ALMPs, the paper therefore reconciles the contradicting 
expectations and findings of previous literature. Moreover, there are three broad 
implications of this paper. First, political parties are particularly important to 
understand the labour market policy mix. Second, different political parties continue 
to favour different policies. However, ‘more’ is not necessarily better and there is not 
a unified position of the left on different types of labour market policies. Third, 
welfare regimes affect the preference of similar political parties towards labour market 
policies. 
 
3.3. Paper 2: The determinants of temporary work (de)regulation 
The second paper investigates the political and institutional determinants of 
temporary work (de)regulation. The existing literature contends that, faced with rigid 
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labour markets and unemployment problems, governments choose to reduce the EPL 
of temporary workers. Labour market flexibility is thereby increased while insiders in 
permanent employment remain unaffected. Most countries with high EPL for 
permanent employees have indeed lowered regulations of temporary work.  
However, France went systematically in the opposite direction. Despite having 
both high EPL and high unemployment, by 2007 French temporary work regulations 
had become the highest in Western Europe. To solve this puzzle, I argue that the 
French left has attempted to tackle the high replaceability of permanent workers. This 
higher replaceability is the result of a greater ability of French employers to replace 
permanent staff by temporary workers.  
Employers have an incentive to replace permanent workers by temporary 
workers in rigid labour markets but their ability to do so is contingent on two factors, 
which are most present in France. First, temporary workers must be able to do the job 
of a permanent worker which in turn depends on skill specificity and the temporary 
workers’ level of education. Second, where wage coordination is high, the labour 
representatives have more control over the use of temporary employees at company 
level which makes it harder for companies to replace permanent by temporary 
workers. 
Using large N regression analysis I show that workers with more general skills 
in countries where wage coordination is low feel the most replaceable. As a 
consequence, reforms that reduce temporary work regulations are most likely where 
coordination is high. While partisanship has no consistent overall effect, the left is 
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more likely to tighten EPL of temporary workers in low coordination settings but 
more likely to deregulate it in high coordination settings. In-depth analysis of EPL 
reforms of temporary work regulations in France reveals that the left has indeed 
tightened regulations to compensate a particularly high degree of replaceability. 
 
3.4. Paper 3: The effects of labour market policies on inequality 
The third paper focuses on distributional labour market outcomes. One of the 
most profound changes of the past three decades in the developed world is the 
significant rise in inequality after its relative decline in the post-war years (Kenworthy 
and Pontusson, 2005). These trends in inequality have motivated important new 
research in economics (Atkinson and Piketty, 2007; Leigh, 2007). So far, standard 
economic explanations fail to fully account for existing inequality and the cross-
national variation in wage inequality therefore requires an institutional and political 
explanation (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997).  
However, wage inequality between median and bottom income deciles workers 
still constitute an under-analysed phenomenon. In addition, inequality between these 
workers represents a puzzle for existing political economy theories. Indeed, the latest 
data on wage inequality reveals that Germany, the archetype of the CME, now has 
higher inequality than the UK; the classic case of an LME. Similarly, inequality is 
now higher in Denmark which is characterised by a social democratic welfare regime 
than in France or Belgium that have Bismarckian welfare regimes. 
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I argue that to solve this puzzle one must uncover the increasingly adverse 
effects of labour market policy developments analysed in the first and second paper of 
this thesis as well as economic coordination. Specifically, certain ALMPs such as 
employment incentives increasingly recommodify labour and therefore put downward 
pressure on the wages of low income workers. The deregulation of temporary work 
and the subsequent expansion of this sector have also entailed adverse effects on the 
wage distribution, even among full-time workers. 
Lastly, economic coordination has become increasingly non-inclusive, where 
core workers remain covered whereas low income workers are left unprotected. As a 
result, economic coordination is only associated with lower inequality where union 
density is high, such as Sweden, or where there are countervailing minimum wage 
regulations, such as in France. This argument is tested using large N regression 
analysis on a panel of fifteen Western European countries. 
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Abstract 
There are competing theoretical expectations and conflicting empirical results 
concerning the impact of partisanship on spending on Active Labour Market Policies 
(ALMPs). This paper argues that one should distinguish between different ALMPs. 
Employment incentives and rehabilitation programmes incentivize the unemployed to 
accept jobs. Direct job creation reduces the supply of labour by creating non-
commercial jobs. Training schemes raise the human capital of the unemployed. Using 
regression analysis this paper shows that the positions of political parties towards 
these three types of ALMPs are different. Party preferences also depend on the welfare 
regime in which parties are located. In Scandinavia, left-wing parties support neither 
employment incentives nor direct job creation schemes. In continental and Liberal 
welfare regimes, left-wing parties oppose employment incentives and rehabilitation 
programmes to a lesser extent and they support direct job creation. There is no 
statistically significant impact of partisanship on training. These results reconcile the 
previously contradictory findings concerning the impact of left-wing control of the 
government on ALMPs. 
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Introduction 
What drives the evolution of welfare states has been a central question in 
comparative political economy for more than three decades (Wilensky, 1975; Korpi, 
1983). Attention has increasingly shifted to explaining more specific welfare state 
policies. This is best exemplified by Active Labour Market Policies12 (ALMPs) which 
aim to reduce unemployment and raise labour market participation. ALMPs include 
spending on public employment services, employment incentives, training, and direct 
job creation. These programmes have been promoted by both the OECD in its 1994 
Jobs Study and the EU in its 1997 European Employment Strategy.  
In the early 1990s, Janoski and Hicks declared that “despite two decades of 
use, ALMP is still a new term … and few analyses exist on this policy” (1994: 62). 
Since then, three streams of literature have studied ALMPs from different angles. 
First, the welfare state literature analyses how these programmes work. This literature 
also assesses the extent to which the introduction of these policies changed the welfare 
state (Clasen and Clegg, 2006; Daguerre, 2007). Second, the economics literature 
studies the impact of ALMPs on unemployment and employment levels across 
countries (Nickell and Layard, 1999; Estevão, 2003). Third, comparative political 
economy investigates the determinants of ALMPs (Boix, 1998; Rueda, 2007; Bonoli, 
2008; Huo et al., 2008; Armingeon, 2007). 
However, important debates remain concerning the role and effect of political 
parties on ALMPs. Two seminal studies on the impact of partisanship on ALMPs 
                                                 
12
 Note that I use the word ‘programmes’ and ‘policies’ interchangeably. 
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reach opposite conclusions and generate contradictory theoretical expectations. On the 
one hand, Boix (1998) argues that social democratic parties promote ALMPs more 
than conservative parties. On the other hand, Rueda (2007) argues that social 
democratic parties will at best be indifferent towards ALMPs and at worst be against 
them. Both authors find strong empirical support for their theories. As a result, there 
are competing theoretical expectations concerning the effect of partisanship on 
ALMPs. This paper investigates the impact of partisanship on ALMPs. 
The next section reviews the existing literature in greater depth. I argue that 
contradictory theoretical expectations are the result of two fundamental issues. As 
shown in the second section, the first issue is an inappropriate aggregation of ALMPs 
into a single conceptual category whereas different ALMPs are promoted differently 
by distinct political parties.  
The second issue concerns the omission of welfare regimes which, as the third 
section shows, are likely to influence the impact of partisanship on different ALMPs. 
The fourth section describes the data and presents the empirical model and estimation 
strategy. In the fifth section, the results are discussed with a focus on how the control 
of governments by social democratic parties affects spending on three groups of 
ALMPs in different welfare regimes: employment incentives and rehabilitation, direct 
job creation and training schemes. The last section concludes and draws some 
implications for further research. 
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1. The impact of partisanship 
Partisanship has been a particularly important focus of the comparative 
political economy literature examining government policies and economic outcomes. 
Previous studies have looked at the impact of partisanship on economic performance 
(Alvarez et al., 1991; Hibbs, 1977),  inequality (Pontusson et al., 2002; Bradley et al., 
2003), welfare state reform and generosity (Allan and Scruggs, 2004), and public 
spending more generally (Cusack, 1997). 
The power resource theory posits that strong labour movements push for 
greater welfare state expansion. One way they do so is in the “electoral arena in which 
politicians, answerable to voters, make the key decisions” (Pierson, 2001: 7). There is 
then a direct impact of political parties on public expenditure through new legislation 
and budgetary decisions (Janoski and Hicks, 1994). Social democratic parties are key 
initiators of social policies (Korpi, 2006). This implies that the control of governments 
by the left results in more spending on welfare state policies (Korpi, 1983). 
The earliest quantitative analysis of ALMPs was carried out by Janoski (1990). 
He argues that left-wing parties undertake ALMPs to address economic problems 
“important to the working class” such as unemployment (ibid: 263). Time-series 
analysis of West Germany provides support for his hypothesis (ibid: 236). In a similar 
vein, Huo et al (2008) as well as Iversen and Stephens (2008) find social democratic 
control of government an important determinant of ALMPs. This is because ALMPs 
increase employment which is conducive to labour’s interests. These arguments are 
consistent with Esping-Andersen’s (1990: 168) work on welfare regimes. He shows 
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that “active labour market policy…became…the instrument through which an 
accommodation to full employment was pursued.”  
Other authors have stressed the possibility that left-wing parties support 
ALMPs only under certain conditions. For instance, Bonoli (2008) has argued that 
left-wing parties will only support ALMPs in open economies. In relatively closed 
economies, left parties favour decommodification and high employment protection for 
their core constituents. However, in open economies, this would hinder 
competitiveness. Thus, ALMPs represent a way to achieve the twin objective of 
promoting the interests of workers and retaining competitiveness. 
Bonoli’s (2008) study echoes that of Boix (1998). He showed that left-wing 
parties will support ALMPs because this allows them to achieve the objectives of 
equality and economic growth. This is because growth mostly depends on the supply 
side of the economy. By raising the physical and human capital of the economy, 
supply side policies increase the productivity of workers. Higher human capital makes 
it possible for the unemployed to command wages that are higher than the social 
wage. These higher wages make it worthwhile for them to enter employment. Thus, 
this strategy reduces unemployment. It also increases equality since the unemployed 
now earn a wage which is superior to the social wage. 
On the other hand, Rueda’s seminal work (2007) shows that labour is divided 
between insiders and outsiders. Insiders are workers in full-time permanent 
employment while outsiders encompass the unemployed and some workers in 
temporary or part-time contracts. Insiders represent the core constituents of social 
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democratic parties. If they are well insulated from the risk of unemployment, they will 
not support ALMPs. Outsiders are relatively unimportant for both trade unions and 
political parties. Social democrats will therefore at best leave ALMPs unchanged and 
at worst reduce spending on them.  
There are two cases where this prediction should be qualified. If insiders have 
very low employment protection, their exposure to the risk of unemployment 
increases. In such a case, their preferences for ALMPs may change as they are more 
likely to benefit from these policies by becoming unemployed. Second, if many 
outsiders are members of unions, the latter may support ALMPs more than would 
otherwise be the case. Rueda finds conclusive evidence for his insider-outsider theory 
of ALMPs. In sum, there are contradicting theoretical expectations and empirical 
evidence concerning the impact of partisanship on ALMPs spending.13 
 
2. Disaggregating Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) 
A significant part of political economy literature reviewed earlier assumes it is 
appropriate to subsume these different programmes under a common heading. For 
instance, Huo (2009: 103) argues that “ALMPs do share the common characteristic of 
making an offer to the unemployed”. This section challenges the assumption that 
ALMPs can be considered as a unified category. This is in line with literature that has 
                                                 
13
 Note that there are contradictory findings elsewhere in the literature. For an exhaustive summary 
Table of existing findings concerning the determinants of ALMPs, see Table A1.5 in the appendix. 
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emphasised that there are different types of activation (Barbier, 2001; Barbier and 
Ludwig-Mayerhofer, 2004).  
More recently, Bonoli (2010) also argues in favour of differentiating between 
types of ALMPs. This qualitative evidence thus calls for an analysis of what ALMPs 
include and which political parties support different ALMPs. Note that for reasons of 
space, the discussion of the official rationale for introducing the various reforms that 
underpin spending on ALMPs in each country is necessarily limited and where it 
occurs it is mostly for illustrative purposes (For more on this see Dingledey, 2007; 
King, 1995; Bonoli, 2010).  
Following the OECD classification one can distinguish between seven types of 
programmes that are counted as spending on ALMPs. In this section, I first argue that 
three out of these seven programmes are not appropriate to test for the impact of 
partisanship on ALMPs: start-up incentives, public employment services, and job 
rotation (section 2.1). Concerning the remaining programmes counted as ALMPs, I 
then show that one should distinguish between three types of programmes (section 
2.2). Direct job creation schemes create jobs for the unemployed. Two programmes, 
employment incentives and rehabilitation, incentivise the unemployed to take up jobs 
through various measures (section 2.3). Training schemes are a last programme in 
ALMPs which attempt to increase the productivity of the unemployed (section 2.4). I 
conclude with some implications for how political parties support different ALMPs in 
distinct ways. 
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2.1. Public employment services, job rotation schemes and start-up incentives 
The first programme is Public Employment Services and administration (PES) 
which includes placement and related services and the administration of benefits. 
Spending on PES includes the cost of employing people to administer benefits and 
organise the placement services. It is entirely unclear whether this benefits the 
unemployed or whether PES is used to monitor benefit recipients more closely. For 
instance, the 2001 plan to help people return to employment made it compulsory for 
the unemployed in France to “take an ‘acceptable’ job” (Barbier, 2009: 178). The 
impact of this programme on unemployment and employment is also contested. 
Estevão  (2003: 15) for instance finds that spending on PES is associated with lower 
employment rates.  
Spending on job rotation and job sharing is a second programme that is not an 
appropriate case to test the impact of partisanship on ALMPs. This programme was, 
for instance, used by Germany, which increased spending on Kurzarbeit schemes 
during the recent economic crisis. This is a way to prevent redundancies rather than to 
reduce unemployment or increase employment rates. Lastly, expenditure on start-up 
incentives entails helping the unemployed starting their own business and becoming 
self-employed. The promotion of self-employment has little to do with the interests of 
labour or with worker-employer relationships. Note that spending on job rotation and 
start-up incentives represent a very small share of aggregate ALMPs. 
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2.2. Direct job creation 
‘Direct job creation’ is a fourth type of ALMP. This sort of programme has a 
much longer history than ALMPs as an integrated conceptual category. Germany was 
implementing “national job creation policies” as early as the 1920s (Janoski, 1990: 
63). In the 1970s, Sweden expanded public sector employment and used ALMPs to 
provide an occupation for unemployed workers. This included “temporary jobs 
arranged mostly in the public sector” (Bonoli, 2010: 18). These job creation schemes 
were therefore classic interventions on the demand side of the labour market. In 1979, 
the Danish left created a Job Offer Scheme guaranteeing a job for seven months to the 
long-term unemployed (Huo, 2009: 105). The Dutch Partij van de Arbeid’s left party 
also offered government subsidised jobs in the public sector. For instance, the so-
called ‘Melkert job schemes’ directly created jobs (ibid: 124, 125). 
In France, the left-wing government introduced ‘Collective Utility Work’ in 
1984 (Lødemel and Trickey, 2000). Similarly, it was the socialists who, in 1997 
introduced the Nouveaux Services Emplois Jeunes providing 18-30 year olds with 5 
years’ full-time employment (Daguerre, 2007: 116). The impact of this initiative on 
spending on direct job creation in France, where the Socialists were in power from 
1988 to 1992 and 1997 to 2002, can be seen in Figure 16. In France, the underlying 
public rationale of these schemes was both to create jobs in the context of large 
unemployment and to address “unmet needs in the public sector” (Lødemel and 
Trickey, 2000: 60). Governments that initiated these schemes did so with the official 
objective to deal with mass unemployment through demand side programmes to “keep 
jobless people occupied” (Bonoli, 2010). 
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Figure 16: Spending on direct job creation as % of GDP in France 
 
Thus, direct job creation involves the use of public funds to directly create 
employment. Most often these jobs are created in the public or non-commercial sector. 
Therefore, this measure directly reduces unemployment. There is evidence that direct 
job creation was effective in increasing employment in the 1990s (Estevão, 2003: 15). 
By reducing unemployment while not putting pressure on workers in private sector 
jobs, direct job creation may therefore be in workers’ best interest. As a result, this 
measure is consistent with the interest of both the employed and unemployed workers.  
Spending on direct job creation is associated with lower inequality which 
represents an important policy objective of social democrats. Using survey data to 
analyse the preferences of left-wing constituents allows me to derive some micro-
foundations. Specifically, I find evidence that left-wing respondents are more 
favourable towards job creation than respondents that are not left leaning. The detailed 
analyses of the determinants of inequality and preferences for job creation (not 
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included here for reasons of space) can be found in the appendix A1.2. I therefore 
argue that social democratic parties can be expected to support direct job creation both 
because this allows them to reduce unemployment as well as inequality, and because 
this is consistent with the preferences of their core constituents. 
 
2.3. Employment incentives and rehabilitation 
Spending on ‘employment incentives’ constitutes the fifth type of ALMP. This 
includes both recruitment incentives and employment maintenance incentives. This is 
part of a broader agenda that reinforces incentives for the unemployed to take up jobs. 
Economists (Snower, 1997; Phelps, 1997) have stressed the role of (targeted) 
employment subsidies in reducing unemployment and making low wage workers 
better off.  
However, this type of ALMP may also put downward pressure on wages in 
private sector employment. This occurs through two mechanisms. First, by subsidising 
low wage work in the private sector, this makes it more appealing for employers to 
offer low wage jobs. Such a substitution effect is consistent with some of the empirical 
literature (Calmfors et al., 2001). Second, this programme rewards the acceptance of 
any jobs by the unemployed. This makes it more likely that the unemployed will take 
up jobs that they would otherwise not accept. Regression analysis of the effect of 
employment incentives on inequality does suggest it is associated with higher 
inequality (for reasons of space, the results are discussed in full in appendix A1.2). 
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Thus, employment incentives may promote low wage work and make 
employers substitute non-subsidised labour by subsidised labour. This means that 
ALMPs may become “financial subsidies that firms exploit for hiring cheap labour” 
(Huo, 2009: 111; Martin and Swank, 2004). This is not likely to be popular with core 
social democratic voters. This concern of a potentially detrimental effect of 
employment incentives on the type of employment has been voiced by French trade 
unions (Naton, 2009). Similarly in Sweden, the social democratic position was that 
“the state should not subsidise or encourage low wage employment” (Huo, 2009: 116).  
Liberals as well as Conservatives have supported the reinforcement of 
incentives (Bonoli, 2010). This type of programme promotes market mechanisms and 
reduces unemployment by raising incentives, which is consistent with Liberal and 
Conservative ideology. Survey analysis of individual preferences for policies that 
incentivise unemployed to accept jobs reveals that left-wing constituents are less 
favourable to these schemes than non-left respondents. For reasons of space, the 
analyses of the determinants of inequality and preferences for job creation can be 
found in the appendix A1.2. 
The historical evidence also supports the contention that conservative parties 
have supported this policy. For instance, in 1990, the Danish centre right government 
introduced a scheme that promoted the young unemployed to participate in activation 
(Huo, 2009: 104). The impact of this initiative on spending on employment incentives 
in Denmark, where a liberal conservative coalition ruled from 1982 to 1993 and after 
2001, can be seen in Figure 17 above. Similarly, the centre right government in the 
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Netherlands introduced a programme, the Loonsuppletie, which granted the 
unemployed a temporary wage supplement. This was only awarded where the wage of 
the new job was inferior to that of the previous job (ibid: 123). 
Figure 17: Spending on Employment incentives as % of GDP in Denmark 
 
The programme ‘supported employment and rehabilitation’ promotes mobility 
on the part of the unemployed to get into employment. This is done, for instance, by 
providing mobility grants to unemployed workers who accept to move to another 
region to seize an employment opportunity. It also consists of “subsidies for the 
productive employment of persons with … a long-term … reduced capacity to work” 
(OECD, 2010). This programme makes it more likely that a job seeker in a given 
region would move to another region. 
Thus, supported employment and rehabilitation has a similar effect to 
employment incentives. Most often the stated aim of these programmes is to promote 
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re-entry into the labour market (Bonoli, 2010). Both measures incentivise the 
unemployed to take jobs, thereby potentially putting downward pressure on wages. 
This is in line with recent work by Rueda (2007: 74) who argues that ALMPs 
“promote entry into the labour market of outsiders who will underbid insiders’ wage 
demands”. Note however that in contrast to employment incentives and rehabilitation, 
direct job creation does not lead to outsiders underbidding insiders’ wages, as revealed 
by their opposite effects on inequality (see appendix A1.2).  
 
2.4. Training schemes 
Training schemes in ALMPs aim to raise human capital. This was the main 
reason for the promotion of ALMPs by Swedish social democrats in the early 1950s. 
The Rehn Meidner model involved a solidaristic wage system which priced out low 
productivity industries. The resulting unemployed could then be retrained and 
incorporated into high productivity industries (Huo, 2009). Thus, contrary to measures 
that incentivise the unemployed to take up jobs, training schemes aim to enable the 
unemployed to re-skill, thereby increasing their chances of successfully attaining their 
preferred employment position.  
It is precisely because training ALMPs raise human capital that Boix (1998) 
argues that the left would support these programmes. By raising the productivity of the 
unemployed, this allows social democrats to raise both economic growth and equality. 
On the contrary, the conservatives may see publically funded training as unnecessary. 
For instance, when the centre right party took power in Sweden in 1991, they reduced 
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spending on “skill and competence development” in ALMPs (Huo, 2009: 113), and it 
was a left-wing government that introduced the ‘vocational training programme’ in 
Norway (ibid: 120). Consistent with this expectation, I do find evidence that left-wing 
respondents are more favourable to providing training to the unemployed and that 
training schemes are associated with lower inequality (for reasons of space, the full 
analysis can be found in the appendix A1.2). 
However, some historical evidence partly contests Boix’s argument. In 1963, 
the Gaullist party in France attempted to introduce training schemes in the 
unemployment benefit system. This was partly opposed by unions who resented 
additional state involvement in unemployment insurance (Clegg, 2005; Bonoli, 2010). 
The promotion of vocational training to address unemployment also occurred around 
the same time in Germany. This took the form of the 1969 ‘Employment Promotion 
Act’ which was proposed by the coalition composed of the Christian Democratic 
Union and Social Democratic Party (Bonoli, 2010). 
As Bonoli (2010: 17) concludes, training was supported by very different 
political parties: “Swedish Social democrats, the French Gaullists, Italian Christian 
democrats and a coalition government in Germany”. In addition, training may not be 
relevant for unemployment or employment levels. This claim is consistent with 
Estevao’s (2003: 15) findings that “training programmes for unemployed … adults 
seemed irrelevant” for employment. 
One possible explanation for this mixed historical evidence for the effect of 
partisanship on training schemes, as I discuss in more detail in section 3, is that the 
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type of capitalism has implications for business preferences, which might in turn be 
taken up by conservative parties. In addition, if training has some important efficiency 
implication for production, both left and right parties might be expected to spend more 
on training. 
 
2.5. Partisanship and different ALMPs 
This section shows that there are important differences between ALMPs, and I 
have identified three distinct types: employment incentives and rehabilitation, direct 
job creation and training schemes. From this discussion, my argument is that social 
democratic parties, all other things being equal, support direct job creation but do not 
support employment incentives and rehabilitation. This is because direct job creation 
benefits the unemployed without putting pressure on employed workers, whereas 
employment incentives and rehabilitation may have adverse consequences for 
employed workers. 
Historically, both social democratic and conservative parties have supported 
training schemes. Training also matters to employers and hence these schemes are 
more likely to be driven by the coordination regime than partisanship. I therefore 
derive the following hypothesis and three observable implications: 
H1: The control of the government by social democratic parties (a) is 
positively related to spending on direct job creation; but (b) negatively related 
to spending on employment incentives and rehabilitation; and (c) There are 
mixed expectations concerning the effect of partisanship on training schemes. 
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3. ALMPs in different welfare regimes 
This section shows that the type of welfare regime and variety of capitalism in 
which ALMPs are located can be expected to affect the amount that is spent on 
different ALMPs. The welfare state literature has shown that countries cluster in three 
distinct welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The possibility that ALMPs may 
cluster in different regimes is a well-supported empirical and theoretical phenomenon 
(Dropping et al., 1999; Barbier and Ludwig-Mayerhofer, 2004). 
 
3. 1. The potential impact of welfare regimes and varieties of capitalism 
Welfare regimes may affect the preferences of political parties for different 
ALMPs. There are three sets of reasons why welfare regimes affect political parties’ 
choice of labour market policies. First, there are enduring historical differences in the 
sorts of problems different regimes have faced. Long-term unemployment was 
traditionally much higher in Continental Europe than in the Nordic cluster (Esping-
Andersen, 1990: 152). Norway and Sweden were among the few countries to achieve 
unemployment rates of around 2 to 3% during the post-war era (ibid: 163). More 
generally, Scandinavian countries have much lower poverty and inequality rates than 
other European countries (Häusermann and Palier, 2008).  
The second reason is that the ability to undertake policies may also be regime-
dependent. Political parties also choose policies in the context of existing policy tools 
which may differ significantly in different regimes.  Scandinavian social democratic 
parties can expand public sector employment more than on the continent. Their tax 
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revenues are larger which allows them to spend much more on all welfare state 
policies. Similarly, the introduction of ALMPs in the 1960s in Scandinavia was made 
easier by the expansion of the welfare state at that time. Today, the long history of 
ALMPs in Sweden makes them an easy policy tool to expand. Later retrenchment may 
be prevented by the popular support these programmes have created. This is what 
Armingeon (2007: 913) calls the “regime specific predisposition of expanding 
ALMP”. The logic of the welfare state becomes partly independent of “temporal 
political power distribution” (ibid: 914). 
Third, there are different coalitions and ideologies behind left-wing parties in 
different welfare regimes. For instance, the Scandinavian left drew its strength from a 
coalition between labour and the peasant movement. Subsidies for farmers were 
granted in exchange for a “full employment welfare state” (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 
30). The labour movement was therefore much more encompassing in Scandinavia 
than in Continental Europe. The labour movement may also be more divided because 
of religious cleavages, as in the Netherlands, or between different left-wing parties, as 
in France (Clegg et al., 2010). This could imply that left-wing parties may promote 
different types of ALMPs in continental European countries than in Scandinavia. 
The main contender to the Power Resource approach is the Varieties of 
Capitalism literature (Hall and Soskice, 2001), which underscores the importance of 
the type of capitalism for the sort of social policy and social protection that emerges 
(Estevez-Abe et al., 2001). Recall that the previous section suggested there were no 
clear partisan drivers of training. This does not imply that training is irrelevant in other 
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respects. Given the importance of skills for the industry, spending on these types of 
ALMPs is likely to be driven more by the type of capitalism than by partisanship (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001; Estevez-Abe et al., 2001). If employers need workers to acquire 
specific skills, political parties may support training schemes for the unemployed.  
For instance, Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) have “high levels of 
vocational educational and … industry specific and firm specific skills” (Iversen and 
Stephens, 2008: 31). This is consistent with historical evidence that most political 
parties in CMEs supported training measures for the unemployed. There is also 
evidence that employers in Sweden had a strong interest in the development of 
training schemes (Swenson, 2002). Similarly, Danish employers were heavily 
involved in the extension of training schemes (Martin and Thelen, 2007: 24). Indeed, 
the drastic expansion of training programmes in the post-world war II period was at 
least partly driven by a need to address important skills shortages (Bonoli, 2010).  
In line with this theory, Continental and Scandinavian welfare regimes may 
have fewer different preferences or needs for training because both these regimes have 
broadly similar coordination structures compared to Liberal Market Economies 
(LMEs) such as the UK. This logic is only convincing in the case of CMEs, where 
employers may push conservative parties to also spend more on training, which might 
be important for their production strategies. In LMEs, partisan differences could, in 
principle, still be expected. However, running a survey analysis of individual 
preferences for providing training to the unemployed in different regimes suggests that 
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there is no statistically significant difference between left and right wing respondents 
in European liberal market economies (see appendix A1.2). 
As a result, we should not expect partisan differences in LMEs because left-
wing constituents do not have stronger preferences for training schemes than right-
wing constituents. We should not find partisan differences in CMEs because 
conservative parties may want to support training schemes, despite their constituents 
having weaker preferences for this program, to meet the need of companies. Whether 
constituents’ preferences or the type of capitalism have stronger explanatory power in 
explaining expenditures on training for the unemployed is ultimately an empirical 
issue. 
 
3. 2. Mapping ALMPs in different welfare regimes 
Ferrera (1996) distinguishes between four types of welfare regimes: 
Scandinavian, Continental, Liberal, and Southern. For simplicity, liberal and southern 
regimes can be put together under the label ‘minimalist labour market policy’ welfare 
regimes. Their welfare regimes are smaller and less decommodifying than in the rest 
of the Continent. Thus, the Scandinavian welfare regime comprises of Sweden, 
Denmark and Finland. The Continental cluster includes France, Germany, Austria, 
Belgium, and the Netherlands. The minimalist category includes the UK, Ireland, 
Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy. 
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Social democratic parties in Scandinavia are stronger than in other regimes. 
We should therefore expect the difference between spending on employment 
incentives and rehabilitation under a left-wing and under a right-wing government to 
be more significant in Scandinavia. In addition, if left-wing parties in Continental 
Europe are less inclusive, they may care less about the adverse effects of employment 
incentives and rehabilitation. Workers in precarious employment may also be less 
important to social democrats in Continental Europe than in Scandinavia. 
The ability to expand public sector employment in Scandinavia is higher than 
in the other two regimes. If social democrats are able to expand standard permanent 
public employment, they may not promote direct job creation. This is because direct 
job creation schemes are more temporary and precarious than standard public sector 
employment. The more inclusive nature of the labour movement in Scandinavia means 
that social democrats may want to offer standard public sector jobs to the unemployed. 
The recent opposition of unions and social democrats towards a work scheme 
introduced by the centre right government in Sweden best illustrates that the left may 
be strongly opposed to certain types of ALMPs (Kullander and Bjornberg, 2011). This 
is ultimately an empirical matter. 
As argued in the previous section, the effect of partisanship on training is 
historically unclear and theoretically less important than the type of capitalism in 
which government policy making takes place. This is because training is particularly 
important to employers and economic performance more generally in CMEs (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001; Swenson, 2002). Thus, one can expect training spending to be higher 
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in the two welfare regimes that encompass more coordinated market economies, such 
as the Scandinavian and, to a lesser extent, the Continental welfare regime. From this 
discussion, the following hypothesis is posited: 
H2: (a) The negative correlation between left parties in government and 
employment incentives and rehabilitation will be stronger in Scandinavia; (b) 
the control of government by left-wing parties is positively correlated with 
direct job creation in Continental and minimalist welfare regimes, and; (c) 
training spending is higher in non-minimalist welfare regimes. 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
One important limitation of studies focusing on welfare state spending is that 
“the existence of a social programme and the amount of money spent on  it may be 
less important than what it does” (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 2). Relying on total social 
expenditure for comparing welfare states has entailed a significant “dependent 
variable problem” (Clasen and Siegel, 2007). This problem partly goes beyond the 
remit of this paper. While acknowledging that this is a valid limitation, this paper 
follows Castles’ contention (2009: 46) that “if the problem is the aggregation of unlike 
categories of spending, the … way forward is to avoid an inappropriate elision of 
spending categories.”  
Recent literature shows that disaggregating social expenditures yields 
important insights into welfare state policy (Kuitto, 2011). Indeed, this is precisely the 
rationale for disaggregating ALMPs. Moreover, to the extent that the rights and duties 
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as well as the extent of decommodification associated with spending levels follow 
Esping-Andersen’s typology, controlling for the welfare state regimes in which 
spending is located, may also further alleviate this limitation. The rest of this section 
describes the data that is used for my dependent and independent variables (4.1). It 
finally presents the empirical model used to test the hypotheses and explains the 
appropriate estimation strategy (4.2). 
 
4. 1. Description of data 
Throughout, I rely on panel data for fourteen European countries (EU15 minus 
Luxembourg) over the period 1990 to 2007, though data availability varies depending 
on variables and countries. The analysis starts in 1990 because of data availability but 
is also pertinent since most countries outside of Scandinavia did not undertake 
significant ALMPs prior to the 1990s. The period under consideration stops in 2007 to 
avoid the bias that the recent economic and financial crisis would introduce. 
With respect to my dependent variables, I rely on the OECD statistics 
database. The OECD provides annual data on spending as % of GDP on these three 
types of ALMPs. My first dependent variable is constructed by summing employment 
incentives and supported employment and rehabilitation. The second dependent 
variable is training measures in the database; and the third concerns the ‘Direct Job 
Creation’ category. More details on the definitions and average values of the 
dependent variables for each country can be found in Tables A1.1 to A1.3 in the 
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appendix. Definitions and sources of independent variables are discussed in A1.4 in 
the appendix. 
ALMPs aim to address problems that are driven by labour market and 
macroeconomic developments (cf: Bonoli, 2010). It is therefore particularly important 
to control for the performance of the labour market and the economy. To control for 
the labour market, the analysis includes annual harmonised unemployment rates 
defined as the number of unemployed people as a percentage of the civilian labour 
force. The state of the economy is controlled by including annual GDP growth in 
percentages because higher growth of GDP may affect both the cyclical and the 
discretionary components of policies. Further, controlling for the degree of 
deindustrialisation or trade openness does not alter the results.14 
The measure of the impact of partisanship is an updated version of the Schmidt 
index taken from the Comparative Political Data Set III, 1990-2009 (Armingeon et al., 
2011). This calculates the political composition of the Cabinet. The original coding is 
from (1) hegemony of right-wing (and centre) parties through to (5) hegemony of 
social democratic and other left-wing parties. I have rescaled this variable to take 
values from -2 to +2. 
 
                                                 
14
 These results can be found in Tables A1.21 to A1.23 in the appendix. 
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4. 2. Empirical model and estimation strategy 
I construct two dichotomous variables to capture the impact of welfare 
regimes. The dummy ‘MIN’’ is equal to 1 when the country has a minimalist welfare 
regime, zero otherwise. Similarly, the dummy ‘CONT’ is equal to 1 when the country 
is a continental welfare regime, and zero otherwise. When both dummy variables are 
zero, the intercept then captures the impact of the Scandinavian welfare regime on the 
dependent variables. 
The mediating effect of welfare regimes on the impact of partisanship on 
different ALMPs is captured by introducing an interaction term between my measure 
of partisanship and the set of dichotomous regime variables. Panel data regression 
analysis of the three dependent variables is used to test my hypotheses. More 
specifically, the general regression model that is tested is as follows: 
, =	 +	
, + , ∗  +	, ∗  +	
+  + ,
 +	 !,
 +	" +	#, 
where yi,t is the dependent variable in country i at time t. There are three 
dependent variables expressed in levels: spending on direct job creation, employment 
incentives and rehabilitation, and training as a percentage of GDP. With respect to the 
explanatory variables, PARTY is the index measure of partisanship that was explained 
earlier. MIN and CONT are dummy variables measuring the intercept effect of 
belonging to minimalist and continental welfare regimes, respectively.  
In addition, the interaction terms PARTY*CONT and PARTY*MIN capture 
how welfare regimes influence the impact of partisanship on the dependent variable. 
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For instance, to assess the effect of left-wing power in Continental Europe one should 
look at β1+ β3. Unemployment (HU) and GDP growth (GDP) are lagged one period. 
Lastly, the αt’s are t-1 year dummies and εi,t is the residual. Time dummies are 
included to capture time effects but a Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) and F-tests (see 
Tables A1.7 and A1.8 in the appendix) confirmed that random effects should be used 
to estimate this model. Note further that including fixed effects would rule out any 
investigation of the effect of my independent variables on the cross-national variation 
in my dependent variables and that the welfare state dummies would be collinear with 
fixed effects. 
As my dependent variables are time-series data expressed in levels, it is 
necessary to test for stationarity. The Im-Pesaran panel data unit root stationarity test 
is used to test for non-stationarity (see Table A1.6 in appendix). Only spending on 
direct job creation is found to be non-stationary at the 10% significance level. This 
problem is hard to address because taking the first difference is not an option since we 
are interested in explaining the levels of different ALMPs, not their change. To the 
extent that partisanship is not trended (see figure A1.1 in the appendix), my main 
independent variable will not be spuriously related to the dependent variables. 
The regression method that was initially used was the Feasible Generalised 
Least Square (FGLS). However, the LR test of heteroskedasticity and the Woodridge 
test for autocorrelation revealed that the residuals using FGLS were both 
heteroskedastic and auto-correlated (see Tables A1.9 and A1.10 in appendix) thereby 
violating the assumptions of spherical disturbances. The errors are also 
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contemporaneously cross-sectionally correlated (see Table A1.11 in appendix). It is 
therefore inappropriate to rely on robust clustered errors, which assume that panels are 
independent (Hoechle, 2007). 
In sum, the diagnosis tests suggest that there is heteroskedasticity, 
contemporaneously cross-sectionally correlated and auto-correlated errors. The 
appropriate estimation method in such a case is to carry out OLS with Panel Corrected 
Standard Errors (PCSE) and Prais-Winston transformation (Hoechle, 2007: Table 1, p. 
4). PCSE was developed by Beck and Katz (1995) and is robust to the presence of 
heteroskedasticity. To eliminate serial correlation of errors, the Prais-Winsten 
transformation introduces an autoregressive process of order 1 in the estimated 
equation (Plumper et al., 2005: 349). 
 
5. Results and discussion 
This section discusses the results of the regression analysis for each dependent 
variable: (5.1) employment incentives and rehabilitation, (5.2) direct job creation and 
(5.3) training. These results are broadly robust. Jack-knife robustness checks, 15 
inclusion of competing variables, 16  running the regression with fixed effects, 17 
                                                 
15
 See Table A1.15 in the appendix for the results of the jack-knife analysis. 
16
 See Tables A1.12 to A1.14 in the appendix for results with the inclusion of employment protection 
legislation, wage coordination, union density and spending on passive labour market programmes as % 
of GDP. 
17
  See Tables A1.16 and A1.17 in the appendix for results of the regression with fixed effects. 
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distinguishing between employment incentives and employment rehabilitation,18 and 
using an alternative clustering of welfare regimes 19  (with four distinct regimes 
following Ferrera, 1996) did not fundamentally alter the results. 
Note that the effect of GDP growth on the dependent variables should be 
interpreted with caution. Given that the dependent variables are all expressed as 
percentages of GDP, there may be a spurious negative relation between GDP growth 
and the dependent variable. Consistent with this point, there is a significant negative 
relation between GDP growth and direct job creation and training (Tables 2 and 3). 
The effect of unemployment may, in principle, provide a better proxy for the 
macroeconomic context but the results suggest only training is positively related to 
unemployment (see Table 3). 
 
5. 1. The determinants of employment incentives and rehabilitation 
The results for employment incentives and rehabilitation are presented in Table 
1. Results suggest that left-wing control of the government and spending on 
employment incentives and rehabilitation are negatively related. This is in line with 
the qualitative evidence and with the hypothesis presented earlier. This contradicts the 
empirical results of the Power Resource approach that analysed the determinants of 
ALMPs. It also contradicts Boix’s (1998) contention that left leaning governments 
necessarily undertake a supply side strategy, whatever its nature or the domain in 
                                                 
18
 See Table A1.18 in the appendix. 
19
 See Table A1.19 in the appendix. 
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which it is applied. This finding is consistent with the notion that left-wing parties will 
not want to spend more on employment incentives and rehabilitation because this may 
be neither beneficial for workers nor for the unemployed. This result is stable and 
significant across specification. Note that including employment protection legislation, 
union density, an index of wage coordination, or spending on passive labour market 
policies did not affect this result.20 
Second, the coefficients of both regime dummies are negative and significant 
(Columns 2 and 3). This is consistent with the notion that both Minimal and 
Continental welfare regimes spend less on employment incentives and rehabilitation 
than Scandinavian regimes. Omitting regimes might spuriously attribute the higher 
spending to partisanship. This is because Scandinavian countries have on average been 
ruled by social democrats more so than in the rest of Europe. 
Third, the interaction terms between partisanships and the type of welfare 
regime is positive and significant. This suggests that the left in Scandinavia is indeed 
more negatively related to employment incentives and rehabilitation than is the case in 
Continental welfare regimes. This finding is also consistent with Jensen’s (2010: 282) 
argument that “in countries that have a tradition of left-wing incumbency … right-
wing governments compensate for the distrust of the public because of the popularity 
of the welfare state and strong vested interests.” As a result, there is a significant 
positive relation between “right-wing governments and social spending in traditionally 
left-wing countries” (ibid). Lastly, though significant and positive the coefficient’s net 
                                                 
20
 See Table A1.12 in the appendix. 
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effect of the left in minimal welfare regimes is not very large. This small positive 
coefficient is consistent with the adherence of the left to the third way in the UK 
(Giddens, 1998) thereby mitigating partisan differences. 
Last but not least, using an alternative measure of government control by the 
left, whether in cabinet or in parliament, does not alter the results. In addition, running 
two separate regressions for continental and Scandinavian welfare state regimes, 
respectively, also yields similar results. I also run a fully interactive model (no 
constant) between the left and welfare regimes on the first difference of my dependent 
variable. Again the results are unchanged (see appendix A1.3). 
Table 1: Determinants of spending on employment incentives and rehabilitation 
Columns (1) (2) (3) 
Government partisanship  
(from -2, right-wing, to +2, left-wing) -0.0098** -0.0097** -0.0324*** 
Dummy variable for Minimal welfare regime  -0.4459*** -0.4310*** 
Dummy variable for Continental welfare regime  -0.3010*** -0.2892*** 
Minimal welfare regime*Partisanship   0.0312** 
Continental welfare regime*Partisanship   0.0303** 
Harmonised Unemployment Rate (lagged one 
period) 
-0.0013 0.0021 0.006 
GDP growth (lagged one period) -0.001 -0.0006 0.001 
Constant 0.2580** 0.5417*** 0.5275*** 
Observations 242 242 242 
R-squared 0.1438 0.2743 0.3029 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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5.2. The determinants of direct job creation 
The results for the determinants of direct job creation are presented in Table 2. 
The coefficient for the Minimal welfare regime is negative but not significant, while it 
is positive but not significant for the Continental regime (column 2 and 3). This cannot 
conclusively confirm that the Continental welfare regime spends more on direct job 
creation than the other two regimes, regardless of partisanship. However, this would 
be consistent with earlier qualitative evidence that shows the tendency of the 
continental regime to reduce labour supply; early retirement schemes in the 1980s 
fulfilled such a role. The fact that the minimal welfare regime may spend less than the 
other two regimes would be in line with their smaller welfare states. 
Moreover, as shown in columns 1 and 2, the coefficient for partisanship is not 
significant. However, in the fully specified model (column 3) left power does have a 
significant negative coefficient in Scandinavia. This means that left-wing parties in 
Scandinavian countries are associated with less spending on direct job creation. By 
contrast, the impact of the left in Minimal and Continental welfare regimes is 
significant and positive. Both results are in line with the hypothesis that in Continental 
welfare regimes left-wing parties will favour direct job creation.  
It is important to recall that ALMPs have spending targeted at the unemployed. 
In Scandinavia, a large and expanding public sector may have played the role of direct 
job creation in the Continental regime. Iversen and Cusack (1998) have argued that the 
large public sector in Scandinavia made it possible for them to achieve the twin 
objectives of employment and equality. Consistent my logic, the left is indeed 
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associated with more public sector employees as % total employees in Scandinavian 
but not in continental welfare regime (see Table AA1.11 in appendix A1.3). Thus, 
while left-wing parties will not support employment incentives and rehabilitation, 
these results show that left-wing parties will not oppose all ALMPs in all regimes. In 
contradiction with Rueda’s (2007) findings, the left does support some ALMPs, 
provided that this does not hurt employed labour. 
To further check that the partisan effect on direct job creation does indeed 
depend on the welfare regime in which the left is located, I run two separate 
regressions on continental versus Scandinavian welfare regime. The results, shown in 
table AA1.10 in appendix A1.3, confirm that the left is indeed associated with an 
increase on spending in the Continental welfare regime but with a decrease in 
spending in Scandinavian welfare regime. 
Table 2: Determinants of spending on direct job creation 
Column (1) (2) (3) 
Government partisanship 
(from -2, right-wing, to +2, left-wing) -0.0039 -0.0043 -0.0217** 
Dummy variable for Minimal welfare regime  -0.0815 -0.0699 
Dummy variable for Continental welfare regime  0.0719 0.0814 
Minimal welfare regime*Partisanship   0.0236** 
Continental welfare regime*Partisanship   0.0235** 
Harmonised Unemployment Rate (lagged one 
period) 
0.0026 0.0044 0.0034 
GDP growth (lagged one period) -0.0074*** -0.0068*** -0.0055** 
Constant 0.0832*** 0.0823 0.0703 
Observations 242 242 242 
R-squared 0.1935 0.2266 0.255 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
93 
 
5.3. The determinants of training schemes 
The results for spending on training schemes are presented in Table 3. First 
and foremost, the coefficient of partisanship is not significantly related to training 
schemes, regardless of the specification. Table AA1.12 in appendix A1.3 confirms 
using an alternative measure of partisanship that the left is not associated with more or 
less spending on training, regardless of the welfare regime under consideration. Thus, 
spending on training schemes is not driven by left parties’ power. This contradicts 
Boix’s (1998) argument that left-wing parties will necessarily spend more on training 
as part of a broad supply side strategy. It is prima facie consistent with Rueda’s (2007) 
findings that social democratic parties have no overall statistically significant 
association with spending on ALMPs. 
A second reason for the statistically insignificant impact of partisanship on 
training is that the welfare regime could by itself fully determine the amount spent on 
training. This is partly consistent with the results presented here. Indeed, the 
coefficient of the dummy variable for the continental welfare regime is negative and 
significant. Moreover, the coefficient of the dummy variable for the Minimal welfare 
regime is much more negative than that of the Continental welfare regime. 
Governments in Scandinavian welfare regimes spend, all other things being 
equal, more than those in continental welfare regimes, which spend more than 
governments in Minimal welfare regimes. This is in line with the expectation that 
training should be higher in CMEs than in LMEs. To further investigate whether 
spending on training is driven by the degree of coordination, I have run a regression 
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with the Hall and Gingerich index of coordination (Hall and Gingerich, 2004). The 
coefficient for coordination is significant and positive while partisanship has no 
impact. The results thereby confirm that training is indeed driven by the degree of 
coordination of the economy, and not partisanship.21  
The differences in the effects of Scandinavian and Continental welfare regime 
require more explanation. The Continental regime encompasses economies such as 
France that are in fact closer to being a Mixed Market Economy (MME) than a CME. 
Training may hence be less important in MMEs than in CMEs, which is then captured 
by differences in the results for Scandinavian and Continental regimes. 
Another possibility is that differences in the way training systems are 
organised within CMEs have implications for the amount of spending that is 
channelled towards training the unemployed. While Scandinavian CMEs such as 
Sweden and Norway rely on vocational colleges, Continental CMEs rely instead on 
the dual apprenticeship system (Estevez-Abe et al., 2001: 170, 171). If much more of 
the training in Continental CMEs is provided privately by firms, this may explain why 
public spending on training for the unemployed may be lower in Continental CMEs 
than in Scandinavian CMEs. 
 
                                                 
21
 The results can be found in Table A1.24 in the appendix. 
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Table 3: Determinants of spending on training schemes 
Columns (1) (2) (3) 
Government partisanship  
(from -2, right-wing, to +2, left-wing) -0.003 -0.0031 0.0069 
Dummy variable for Minimal welfare regime  -0.2984*** -0.3111*** 
Dummy variable for Continental welfare regime  -0.1772*** -0.1923*** 
Minimal welfare regime*Partisanship   -0.0143 
Continental welfare regime*Partisanship   -0.012 
Harmonised Unemployment Rate (lagged one 
period) 
0.0074* 0.0108*** 0.0106*** 
GDP growth (lagged one period) -0.0070** -0.0060** -0.0066** 
Constant 0.1822*** 0.3528*** 0.3703*** 
Observations 241 241 241 
R-squared 0.2 0.2818 0.3081 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite significant insights, the comparative political economy literature has 
produced competing theoretical expectations concerning the role of partisanship in 
driving spending on ALMPs. To solve this puzzle, this paper has made four points. 
First, drawing on qualitative evidence in the welfare state literature, analysis of 
individual preferences for labour market policies and the effect of these policies on 
inequality, this paper contributes to this debate by arguing that ALMPs have distinct 
political determinants. The question for comparative political economy should 
therefore be what is driving spending on different types of ALMPs, rather than on 
aggregate spending on ALMPs. 
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Second, I argue that the importance of welfare regimes has been overlooked in 
existing quantitative studies of ALMPs. The findings confirm this contention: 
Scandinavian welfare regimes spend more on employment incentives and 
rehabilitation. Scandinavian and Continental welfare regimes also spend more, all 
other things equal, on training schemes than Minimal welfare regimes do, in line with 
the notion that training may be  less central to their production regimes. 
Third, the findings of this paper concerning employment incentives and 
rehabilitation contradict  both the traditional Power Resource approach and the 
argument advanced by Boix (1998). Left-wing parties spend less on employment 
incentives and rehabilitation than other parties, because of the adverse effects these 
programmes may have on workers. This invalidates the implicit claim in the welfare 
state literature that ‘more is better’. As a result, more welfare state spending may not 
always be driven by the strength of labour. More importantly, this negative relation is 
even stronger in Scandinavia. In other words, a shift to the left in Scandinavia is 
associated with a greater fall in employment incentives and rehabilitation than in 
continental Europe. 
Fourth, left-wing parties are positively associated with direct job creation in 
the Continent and negatively associated with these policies in Scandinavia. This is an 
important result in a number of respects. It confirms using regression analysis that 
different ALMPs have different partisanship dynamics, in line with what Bonoli 
(2010) argues through qualitative methods. It also suggests that parties of a similar 
ideology may behave in opposite ways in different welfare regimes. For instance, the 
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ability of Scandinavian left-wing parties to expand standard public employment may 
explain why they do not spend more on direct job creation. 
Moreover, this result shows that, contrary to what Boix (1998) argues, supply 
side policies are not the only arena where meaningful partisan differences remain. 
Direct job creation is a classic demand management policy tool. The evidence 
presented in this paper shows that left-wing parties do spend more on direct job 
creation. In addition, Rueda (2007) argues that social democratic parties do not spend 
more on ALMPs because these programmes do not benefit their core constituents. On 
the contrary, this paper demonstrates that social democrats do spend more on some 
ALMPs, provided that these are in line with the interests of both outsiders and 
insiders. 
This paper suggests further research into the political economy determinants of 
different ALMPs may prove fruitful. It also raises the possibility that left-wing parties 
may have vastly different preferences for distinct welfare state policies. These 
preferences may also be contingent on the institutional setting in which these parties 
operate. While this paper focuses on showing that even with a simple 
operationalization of welfare regimes, the effect of partisanship on distinct ALMPs 
may differ, more research would be instrumental in investigating which characteristics 
of welfare regimes drive this process.  
In addition, a question that was not investigated here concerns the possibility 
of changing social democratic positions towards ALMPs over time. For instance, the 
emergence of the ‘Third way’ entails a greater reliance on market mechanisms to 
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reach social objectives. Considering the case of employment incentives and 
rehabilitation and comparing the period 1990-1998 with that of 1999-2007 does 
indeed suggest this may be a worthwhile avenue for further research.22 Similarly, this 
paper did not systematically analyse the relationship between disaggregated ALMPs 
and Passive Labour Market Policies (PLMPs) or with the activation of labour market 
policies. Additional results23 show that there is a positive relationship between all 
types of ALMPs and PLMPs, suggesting that these policies seem to be complements 
rather than substitutes. Further research concerning the relation of different ALMP 
measures with more qualitative aspects of activation would prove valuable.  
  
                                                 
22
 While the basic regression results are the same for the whole period as from 1990 to 1998, for 1998 to 
2007 the effect of partisanship retains the same signs but loses statistical significance. Note that this 
may due to losing too many degrees of confidence by reducing the sample size. Hence, more research 
on this is needed. The results are presented in Table A1.20 in the appendix. 
23
 See Table A1.25 in the appendix for these regression results. 
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Abstract 
Temporary work has expanded over the last three decades with adverse implications 
for inequalities. Temporary workers are a constituency that is unlikely to impose 
political costs, meaning governments often choose to reduce temporary work 
regulations. While most European countries have indeed implemented such reforms, 
France went in the opposite direction despite having both rigid labour markets and 
high unemployment. My argument to solve this puzzle is that where replaceability is 
high, workers in permanent and temporary contracts have overlapping interests, and 
governments choose to regulate temporary work to protect permanent workers. In 
turn, replaceability is higher where permanent workers’ skills are general and wage 
coordination is low. Logistic regression analysis of the determinants of replaceability, 
and how this affects government reforms of temporary work regulations, supports this 
argument. In-depth qualitative analysis of French reforms also confirms that the left 
has tightened temporary work regulations to compensate for the high replaceability. 
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Introduction 
A growing literature documents the increased dualisation of welfare state 
policies and employment protection in Europe (Emmenegger et al., 2012). Welfare 
states have been reformed in ways that reduce the entitlements, protection and welfare 
of outsiders, understood here as precarious and unemployed workers (Eichhorst and 
Marx, 2011; Emmenegger et al., 2012). The literature argues that governments choose 
to preserve existing institutional arrangements for insiders while reducing the 
entitlements and employment protection of outsiders. In this paper I consider the case 
of temporary workers, which represents a good case of outsiders. The expansion of 
temporary work also has political implications as these workers have distinct political 
preferences (Lindvall and Rueda, 2012) and distinct preferences for labour market 
policies.24 More importantly, like other labour market outsiders, temporary workers 
have lower electoral turnout raising the risk of an increasingly large segment of the 
population being politically excluded (Rueda, 2007; Hauserman and Schwander, 
2012). 
The emergence of temporary work also has wide-ranging implications for 
inequality. Besides having lower objective and subjective employment security 
(Burgoon and Dekker, 2010; Erlinghagen, 2008; Gash, 2008), these workers also earn 
comparatively less, report lower job satisfaction and have less access to training 
(Appelbaum, 1992; Blanchard and Landier, 2002; Booth et al., 2002; Postel-Vinay 
and Cahuc, 2002; Kalleberg, 2003; D'Addio et al., 2007; Jahn et al., 2012). In Europe, 
                                                 
24
 For instance, they favour unemployment protection much more than permanent worker (See: 
Burgoon and Dekker, 2010). 
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temporary workers earn on average 20% less than their permanent counterparts and 
the pay gap remains when controlling for differences in seniority, skills and sector 
(Gash and McGinnity, 2007).  The OECD estimates that the pay penalty of working 
with a temporary contract may be as large as 25% when controlling for gender, age, 
working hours and education (Brown and Sessions, 2005; Comi and Grasseni, 2012; 
OECD, 2012). 
As a result, temporary workers are twice as likely to be in poverty than 
permanent workers (12% compared to 6%) (ETUI, 2012: 37). Wage inequality 
increases as the regulation of temporary work is reduced and the employment 
protection of regular workers is raised (OECD, 2012). They are also less often eligible 
for unemployment benefits and social insurance (ETUI, 2012: 36; Segal and Sullivan, 
1997; Armingeon and Bonoli, 2006; Emmenegger et al., 2012) and raise particularly 
acute challenges for private insurance systems (Kalleberg, 2006). Being employed on 
a temporary work contract also has adverse effects on health (Virtanen et al., 2005; 
Gash et al., 2007). 
To the extent that temporary work is not evenly distributed among different 
groups of the population, these contracts also exacerbate pre-existing inequalities 
between workers of different gender, age and educational level (Kahn, 2007; Hagen, 
2002). Women are more likely to be temporary workers thereby increasing gender 
inequality (Rani, 2008). Youth are particularly affected with 42% being on temporary 
contracts in the EU27 (ETUI, 2012: 35). More than 20% of those with low educational 
attainments are in the temporary work sector, twice as much as for those with high 
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educational attainments (ETUI, 2012: 36). Lastly, among low income workers, the pay 
gap between temporary and permanent workers is even larger (OECD, 2012). 
The evolution of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) for temporary 
workers in Europe (EU) has important implications for inequality and for the politics 
of labour market policies. Despite the adverse consequences of temporary work for 
inequality, poverty and economic efficiency, the ensuing politics of temporary work 
regulations holds a particular challenge for governments. Specifically, it is particularly 
difficult for governments to increase the protection of temporary workers because they 
are unlikely to impose political costs on governments that neglect their interests. To 
the extent that governments need to choose which group to protect or to focus on, they 
are unlikely to choose temporary workers. Thus, temporary work should be construed 
as a case of the political challenges that governments face to protect politically weaker 
groups. 
Most governments have indeed reduced the EPL of temporary workers in the 
last two decades (see Table 4). There are three important exceptions to this trend: the 
UK, the Republic of Ireland (henceforth Ireland), and France. Both the UK and Ireland 
are liberal market economies, with very flexible labour markets (Hall and Soskice, 
2001) and comparatively few temporary workers (see Table 4). Though they have 
slightly tightened the EPL for temporary workers, the resulting level in 2007 was still 
among the lowest in Western Europe. 
The case of France is much more puzzling as its EPL for temporary workers in 
2007 was the highest in Western Europe. This strongly suggests that France has been 
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moving in the opposite direction to other European counties. Whereas left-wing 
parties in other EU countries have deregulated temporary work when in government, 
the left in France has repeatedly increased regulations of temporary work. This is 
puzzling because France has all the conditions that the literature identifies for a 
reduction of outsiders' status, such as lower EPL for temporary workers, to occur. 
Regular workers in permanent employment, insiders, are well-protected. Unions have 
neither temporary workers among their members,25  nor are they strong enough to 
protect them. France also had as much ‘need’ as other countries (e.g. unemployment, 
trade openness) to deregulate temporary work. 
The question this paper addresses is: why has France tightened EPL for 
temporary workers in contrast to all other European countries? I argue that left-wing 
governments in France have systematically tightened EPL for temporary work because 
politically powerful workers in permanent contracts have overlapping interests with 
the relatively powerless group of temporary workers. This then allows temporary 
workers to benefit from the political strength of permanent workers. The degree of 
overlap in the interests of permanent and temporary workers depends on the extent to 
which firms can replace permanent staff by temporary workers. Where replaceability 
is low, the degree of overlap between temporary and permanent workers’ interests is 
more limited. As a result, the ability of temporary workers to benefit from the greater 
political strength of permanent workers disappears. In turn, this fear of replacement 
                                                 
25
 The estimate is that less than 0.8% of agency workers are unionised; see Francois Michon, France: 
Temporary Agency Work and Collective Bargaining in the EU (2008), available from 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/studies/tn0807019s/fr0807019q.htm. 
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stems from the incentives those companies have to replace their workforce in rigid 
permanent contracts by temporary workers.  
However, the ability of firms to replace permanent workers by temporary 
workers depends on three factors: skills specificity, ‘skill deviation’ and wage 
coordination. The higher the degree of skill specificity of regular workers the more 
difficult and unattractive it becomes for firms to replace them with temporary workers. 
Where firms have invested in workers’ skills, they are less likely to replace them with 
temporary workers. Firms are also more likely to prefer permanent contracts for 
workers with specific skills since workers will only invest in specific skills when their 
jobs are well-protected (Hall and Soskice, 2001). ‘Skill deviation’ between regular and 
temporary workers refers to the differences in skills that these two groups of workers 
have. Where they have more similar educational attainments, it becomes easier to 
replace permanent staff by temporary workers. Wage coordination enables labour to 
prevent both replaceability through its say on internal labour market organisation and 
the detrimental effects of replaceability on wages, through its bargaining power over 
wages. 
My argument encompasses two steps. First, I show that permanent workers feel 
the most replaceable where they have fewer specific skills and national wage 
coordination is low. Second, I argue that the left is more likely to tighten regulations 
of temporary work where replaceability is high and vice versa. Consistent with my 
argument, workers in France are much more likely to think it is very easy for firms to 
replace them because of the low skill specificity and low wage coordination as well as 
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similar skill profiles between temporary and regular workers. Replaceable workers 
represent an important constituency for left-wing parties in France. As a result, the 
French left has decided to tighten the protection of temporary work on numerous 
occasions during the last four decades with the explicit aim to prevent replaceability. 26 
This paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews existing 
explanations of policies that target outsiders and argues that they cannot explain the 
case of France. The second section tests the determinants of both replaceability and 
changes in the protection of temporary workers. Section three then shows how this 
argument solves the French puzzle. The final section concludes with some 
implications for the politics of pro-outsider reforms in France and beyond. 
 
1. The puzzle of temporary work regulations in France 
1.1. Temporary workers and employment protection legislation 
Following the convention of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), I define temporary employment to include both workers in 
interim agencies and those on fixed-term contracts. 27  Besides having lower 
employment protection than regular workers, temporary workers also earn on average 
                                                 
26
 While the puzzle is therefore why France was the only country to re-regulate significantly the 
temporary work sector, solving this puzzle requires making sense of why the French left made the 
policy choices that it did.  
27
 Throughout this paper temporary employment or temporary work refers to the sum of interim or 
agency contracts and workers on fixed term contracts. 
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less than regular workers, have lower eligibility to social benefits (Bazen et al., 2000; 
OECD, 1998; Schmid, 1994) and report having lower job satisfaction (Eurofound, 
2007: 11; Eurofound, 2007: 9).  
Temporary work has been on the rise in most European countries. The EU15 
share of temporary workers relative to total dependent employees increased from 10% 
in 1990 to 15% in 2007 (Burgoon and Dekker, 2010: 127) and the number of 
temporary contracts has increased by an annual rate of 15-20% in the EU since the 
1980s (Häusermann and Schwander, 2009: 5). This hides important cross-national 
variation (see Table 4). Between 1983 and 2007, temporary work fell in Greece by 
5.36 percentage points whereas it increased by 16 percentage points in Spain. The 
pattern in 2007 ranged from a low of 5.85% in the UK to a high of 31.66% in Spain. 
Among EU15 countries, France occupied the sixth highest position in terms of the size 
of its temporary work force in 2007, and the third highest increase in temporary work 
over the period. 
The OECD constructs a yearly index - EPL for temporary workers - that 
captures restrictions on the hiring and firing of temporary workers since 1985.28 The 
index is calculated through the weighting of different sub-components.29 An initial 
division can be made between the regulations of Temporary Agency Work (TAW) and 
those of Fixed Term Contracts (FTCs). The former includes three criteria: “types of 
work for which temporary work agency employment is legal”, “restrictions on number 
                                                 
28
 This refers to version 1 of the EPL OECD index which is available from 1985 to 2008. 
29
 The values of these sub-components for different countries in 2007 are shown in Table A2.2 in the 
appendix. 
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of renewals”, and “maximum cumulated duration of TAW contracts.” Regulations of 
FTCs focus on “valid cases for use of fixed-term contracts“, “maximum number of 
successive FTC”, and “maximum cumulated duration of successive FTC“.30 
Table 4: EPL for temporary workers and size of temporary work sector in the EU 
 EPL temporary workers 
Temporary workers  
(share of total dependent employees) 
Countries 2007-1985 2007 2007 2007 - earliest year Reference year 
France 0.57 3.63 15.08 11.74 1983 
Ireland 0.38 0.63 8.05 1.94 1983 
UK 0.13 0.38 5.85 0.35 1983 
Austria 0 1.5 8.89 2.9 1995 
Finland 0 1.88 15.96 -2.38 1997 
Spain -0.25 3.5 31.66 16.07 1987 
Portugal -0.63 2.75 22.36 7.96 1986 
Netherlands -1.19 1.19 18.08 12.26 1983 
Greece -1.62 3.13 10.88 -5.36 1983 
Denmark -1.75 1.38 9.05 -3.4 1984 
Belgium -2 2.63 8.65 3.26 1983 
Sweden -2.45 1.63 17.45 2.85 1997 
Germany -2.5 1.25 14.64 4.68 1984 
Italy -3.5 1.88 13.21 6.6 1983 
Source: OECD statistic website, own calculations. 
Note: EPL for temporary workers is a composite index created by the OECD. 
 
The steepest declines in the EPL for temporary workers occurred in 
coordinated market economies such as Germany, Sweden, Belgium and Denmark. A 
second group of southern European mixed market economies (e.g. Greece, Spain and 
Portugal) experienced drops which were slightly less important. Two countries did not 
                                                 
30
 See: http://www.oecd.org/employment/employmentpoliciesanddata/42740190.pdf. 
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experience a change in the overall index over the period under consideration: Austria 
and Finland. Only three countries saw an increase in the index. The UK and Ireland 
both tightened protection for temporary workers albeit from a very low level, so that 
they retained a comparatively flexible temporary work sector. 
By contrast, France tightened EPL for temporary workers the most and had by 
2007 the highest level of regulations on temporary work of Western Europe. There are 
three groups of potential explanations for the decline of EPL of temporary workers, 
none of which can satisfactorily account for what has happened in France: socio-
economic pressures; partisanship and unions; and political as well as economic 
institutions. I now consider each group of explanations in turn. 
 
1.2. Socio-economic pressures 
A first set of determinants for lowering EPL is a deteriorating socio-economic 
situation which raises the incentives of governments to undertake unpopular reforms 
(Vis, 2009). International organisations and academic scholarship alike have long 
voiced concerns about the detrimental effects of rigid employment regulations on 
labour market performance (Blanchard, 2006; Blanchard and Summers, 1986; OECD, 
1994). A number of studies have found that high EPL is associated with lower 
employment rates and higher unemployment rates (Di Tella and McCulloch, 1998; 
Lazear, 1990; Scarpetta, 1996). 
When faced with long standing high unemployment, governments may 
therefore attempt to deregulate temporary work regulations. Most labour market 
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reforms are indeed undertaken where there is poor economic performance(Tompson, 
2009) and this is particularly the case of two-tier labour market reforms that are often 
undertaken when unemployment is rising (Boeri et al., 2006; Ochel, 2008). This 
narrative is consistent with the decision to lower the protection of temporary workers 
in Spain and Italy, but if it were true this should also have occurred in France. Indeed, 
unemployment has increased from less than 5% in the early 1970s to more than 10% 
by the mid-1990s.31 The average unemployment rate in the period 1990-2000 was also 
higher in France than in some countries that deregulated at the margin such as 
Germany (see Table 5). 
A second type of pressure concerns competitiveness. Deregulation of EPL was 
seen as important to keep wage inflation under control, thereby retaining trade 
competitiveness (Nickell, 1997; Nickell and Layard, 1999). When faced with greater 
international competition and higher trade openness, governments may also be more 
likely to deregulate EPL (Fisher and Somogyi, 2011; Potrafke, 2010). Globalisation 
may result in regulatory competition between countries (Bhagwati and Hudec, 1996) 
or weaken the sectors that are more unionised (Boulhol, 2009), thereby reducing the 
ability of labour to prevent deregulation. However, trade openness was similar or 
higher in France than in other southern European countries that deregulated their 
temporary work sector (see Table 5). 
 
                                                 
31
 Statistics taken from the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies, INSEE, 
accessible at: http://www.insee.fr/en/ 
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1.3. Partisanship and unions 
All governments face important electoral costs of reducing insiders’ 
advantages, as policies create their own constituencies (Pierson, 2001). By protecting 
most existing employees, reforms of temporary work are less likely to generate 
significant opposition (Saint-Paul, 2000). Consistent with this, more than half the 
reforms in Europe since the 1980s have been ‘two-tier’ in the sense that they 
concerned only some portion of the workforce (Boeri, 2010).  
The ideology of the political party in power may also affect a government’s 
decision to deregulate EPL. Following the ‘Nixon goes to China’ logic (Cuckierman 
and Tommasi, 1998; Ross, 2000), it could be politically easier for the left to undertake 
deregulatory labour market reforms, for instance, because it is easier for left 
governments to elicit union agreement for a reform. While it may indeed be easier for 
the left to pass labour market reforms, it has strong electoral and ideological reasons 
not to do so. Indeed, the Power Resource approach has long shown that more stringent 
EPL is conducive to wage earners’ interests and so should be supported by left-wing 
parties to improve the bargaining power of wage earners relative to employers (Korpi, 
1983). As Botero et al (2004: 1344) argue, “regulations protecting workers…are 
introduced by socialist, social-democratic, and more generally leftist governments to 
benefit their political constituencies”. The working class has strong preferences for 
higher employment protection and represents a major constituency of the left 
(Emmenegger, 2009; Dalton, 2006). Therefore the left has clear electoral incentives to 
increase – or at least not reduce – EPL. 
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While the left has in a very limited number of cases, passed labour market 
reforms reducing EPL (Tompson, 2009), the historic evidence shows that the labour 
movement has played a key role in pushing for EPL in Switzerland, Germany, 
Denmark, Italy and Sweden (Bonoli and Emmenegger, 2010; Emmenegger, 2009; 
Emmenegger and Marx, 2011). The vast majority of large N regression analyses of 
EPL also suggest the left is less likely to reduce the protection of permanent workers. 
Some econometric analyses find support for the claim that liberalising reforms in 
general are less frequent when governments are left leaning (Høj et al., 2006). 
In an analysis of EPL in eighty five countries, Botero et al. (2004: 1339) 
conclude that the power of the left is associated with higher levels of labour 
regulation. Rueda (2007: 90) finds significant empirical support for the claim that in 
the long run the left is associated with higher EPL in a sample of sixteen industrialised 
countries. Similarly, Fisher and Somogyi (2011) find that left-wing governments are 
more likely to support higher EPL. Conversely, an IMF (2004) study and Algan and 
Cahuc (2004) show that conservative governments are more likely to reduce EPL. 
Only one study by Potrafke (2010) finds no evidence that left-wing parties were 
associated with changes in EPL. 
The expectations concerning the impact of partisanship on EPL for temporary 
workers are less straightforward. The insider-outsider literature suggests that insiders 
may only care about their own employment protection while being indifferent to the 
fate of the unemployed and precarious workers (Rueda, 2007). Faced with the need to 
increase labour market flexibility, deregulating temporary work may be the only 
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viable electoral choice for left-wing parties that are reluctant to reduce the protection 
of regular workers. While this literature does not directly speak to left-wing parties’ 
preferences with respect to EPL of temporary workers, the expectation should be that 
more protected regular workers have less probability of becoming unemployed and are 
less affected by a weakly protected temporary work sector. As a result, where insiders 
are well-protected, left-wing parties should not care about temporary workers and they 
should have higher incentives to find flexibility at the margin. 
Left governments have indeed reduced the regulations of temporary work in a 
number of EU countries (e.g. the Sozialdemokratische Partei in Germany in 2004, the 
reform of workers’ statutes by Partido Socialista Obrero Español in Spain in 1984 – 
see Table 5). However, the problem with this explanation is that countries with low 
indices of EPL for regular workers (e.g. Denmark and Belgium – see Table 5) have 
also lowered the protection of temporary workers, while France which has a 
comparatively high EPL for regular workers has gone in the opposite direction. 
The inclusiveness and strength of unions should also matter for EPL. Union 
density has traditionally been used by power resource scholars to gauge the strength of 
unions (Bradley et al., 2003; Korpi, 1989; Korpi and Palme, 2003). Unions with larger 
membership are expected to be stronger, and are in turn expected to be better able to 
protect existing employment protection regulations. French unions are particularly 
weak according to this measure, and in any case, high union density countries have 
also reduced EPL for temporary workers (see Table 5). The low union density for 
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temporary workers in France32 also rules out the possibility that unions in France were 
more inclusive of temporary workers and hence took their interests into account more 
than elsewhere. 
 
1.4. Political institutions and varieties of capitalism 
Governments of all political stripes may be constrained by political and 
economic institutions. Fragmented states or coalition governments should be less able 
to undertake reforms (Tompson, 2009).33 If anything, France’s majoritarian electoral 
system and centralised political system (Lijphart, 2012) should therefore increase the 
government’s ability to reduce EPL for temporary workers. Where the role of social 
partners is institutionalised, for instance in corporatist countries (Schmitter, 1974), 
governments should also be more limited in their abilities to implement reforms 
(Ochel, 2008). However, France is closer to a pluralist than a corporatist system, and 
in any case, certainly less corporatist than many other European countries (Keeler, 
1985; Siaroff, 1999) as interest groups mostly influence policy-making through 
lobbying and protests (Wilson, 1983). 
Moreover, governments operate in distinct varieties of capitalism characterised 
by systematically different degrees of non-market coordination in key spheres of the 
economy such as training system, industrial relations, financial markets, and internal 
                                                 
32
 The estimate is that less than 0.8% of agency workers are unionised (see: Michon, France: Temporary 
Agency Work, 2008). 
33
 Similar arguments have been made regarding the ability of governments to curtail deficits (see for 
instance Alesina and Drazen, 1991). 
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management (Hall and Soskice, 2001). In liberal market economies, flexible labour 
markets are needed to ensure wage moderation. Labour mobility is also conducive to 
knowledge transfer and hence to the radical innovations characteristic of liberal 
production systems (ibid). 
By contrast, in coordinated market economies a high EPL is seen as necessary 
to incentivise employees to invest in the specific skills on which their firms’ 
production strategies rely (Estevez-Abe et al., 2001; Wood, 2001; Hall and Soskice, 
2001). As a result, employers and regular workers in large companies may have a 
common interest in deregulating temporary work. Employers may see in temporary 
workers the flexibility necessary to adjust to variations in economic activity while 
retaining the institutional complementarity necessary for their diversified production 
strategy (Hassel, 2011).  
Governments in coordinated market economies may therefore have a greater 
incentive to facilitate the hiring and firing of temporary workers. Deregulation of 
temporary work promotes employment creation while retaining the institutional 
complementarities of the system. This narrative is consistent with the experience in 
Germany, but the expectations are less clear for France since it has been categorised as 
a mixed market or statist economy (Hancké et al., 2007; Schmidt, 2003). The 
expectation should be that France follows a similar path to other mixed market 
economies and statist countries. However, while Spain and Italy have indeed reduced 
EPL for temporary workers significantly over the past three decades, the reverse 
occurred in France (see Table 4). 
115 
 
Table 5: Changes in the protection of temporary workers across Europe 
Countries  Unemployment 
rate  
Openness  Reform direction (∆EPL temporary worker) by year 
and party in power when reform occurred 
Union 
density 
EPL regular 
workers  
Index of wage 
coordination 
Austria 3.82 75.38 No changes 41.26 2.92 4.11 
Belgium 10.88 131.48 Fall (1997): coalition Christian democrat – left dominant (53.3%) 54.00 1.68 4.43 
Denmark 7.43 72.96 Fall (1995): coalition liberal - left dominant (75%) 76.03 1.65 3.46 
Finland  11.71 62.19 No change in index 77.89 2.42 3.68 
France 9.63 46.41 Rise (1990): left (70%) 8.92 2.34 2.11 
Germany 7.84 51.92 Fall (1994): right CDU-CSU-FDP (76%) Fall (1997): right (83.3%) 29.37 2.65 
4.00 
 
Greece 9.74 47.93 Fall (2003): left (100%) 31.68 2.25 4.00 
Ireland 11.50 138.47 Rise (2003): right (100%) 44.48 1.60 3.86 
Italy 11.27 43.55 
Fall (1997): centre left coalition (50%) 
Fall (1998): centre left coalition (49.6%) 
Fall (2000): centre left coalition (57.9%) 
Fall (2001): centre right coalition (40%) 
Fall (2003): centre right coalition (70%) 
37.44 1.77 3.36 
 
Netherlands 5.81 114.81 Fall (1999): grand coalition 24.75 3.07 4.11 
Portugal 5.43 62.24 Fall (1996): left (77.78%) Fall (2004): right (94.69%) 25.26 4.38 
2.82 
 
Spain 19.29 45.32 Fall (1994): left (100%) 
Rise (2001): Right (100%) 16.04 3.12 3.42 
Sweden 7.37 69.49 Fall (1993): right (61.90%)  Fall (1997): left (100%) 81.56 2.87 
3.54 
 
UK 7.85 53.28 Rise (2002): left (100%) 33.91 1.16 1.00 
Sources: EPL regular workers (average 1990-2000), openness (average 1990-2000), unemployment rate (average 1990-2000) and union density 
(average 1990-2000) taken from the OECD statistic website. Note: Reforms to change the EPL temporary work index developed by the OECD, 
party in power follows the comparative political dataset coding of % of cabinet seats held by the left, centre and right (% in brackets refers to right or 
left parties, excluding centre) and wage coordination index (average 1980-2007) taken from Visser (2009). 
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2. Replaceability and the regulation of temporary work 
2.1. Do regular workers benefit from lower protection of temporary workers? 
Insiders in permanent full-time employment have incentives to ask for higher 
than market-clearing wages where employment protection is high. The higher wage 
settlements restrict the access of the unemployed to the labour market (Lindbeck and 
Snower, 1988; Solow, 1985). High EPL increases the market power of insiders, who 
therefore are the main defenders of the status quo, when the latter is defined by high 
levels of EPL (Lindbeck and Snower, 2001). Support for high levels of EPL will be 
higher where the bargaining power of insiders is high (Saint-Paul, 1999). There is 
some evidence that insiders do indeed favour higher levels of job security than 
outsiders (Rueda, 2006), though this is contested by other authors who argue that 
insiders and outsiders have similar preferences for employment protection 
(Emmenegger, 2010).  
To the extent that permanent employees are an important constituent for all 
political parties (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991; Rueda, 2007), this should result in a 
status quo bias among policy makers (Saint-Paul, 2000). Higher exposure of insiders 
to unemployment may push them to internalise the adverse effects of EPL on labour 
market re-entry and hence increase their support for EPL liberalisation (Saint-Paul, 
1996). The implications for the politics of employment protection of temporary 
workers are less straightforward, but most of the literature seems to assume that 
regular workers are unaffected by such reforms. Governments are seen as more likely 
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to reform EPL for temporary workers because regular workers will fight against 
reductions in their protection but are unaffected by changes in EPL for temporary 
workers. 
However, where regular workers have de jure high employment protection, 
employers will have an incentive to replace them with temporary workers. 
Conversely, if EPL for regular workers is very low, companies have no need to 
employ temporary workers. If this is true, lowering the EPL of temporary workers 
may make this process of substitution easier. In many respects, this is consistent with 
substitution effects between different types of jobs already documented in the 
economics literature (Kahn, 2007). Cross-national evidence shows that “policies 
making it easier to create temporary jobs on average raise the likelihood that wage and 
salary workers will be in temporary jobs” which may result in a ”substitution of 
temporary for permanent workers” (ibid: 1). As a result, decreasing protection for 
temporary contracts may raise incentives for firms to substitute permanent contracts 
by temporary jobs (Blanchard and Landier, 2002). 
Regular workers may therefore be adversely affected by lower protection of 
temporary workers. In the most extreme case, a company may be more willing to fire 
permanents worker and replace them by temporary workers as the regulations of 
temporary work are reduced. Permanent workers may also be affected through the 
pressures that the lower protection of temporary workers creates. For instance, a large 
temporary work sector may put pressure on regular permanent workers by forcing 
them to also increase their flexibility (Eichhorst and Marx, 2011). Similarly, the 
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substitution of permanent for temporary jobs in the economy has also been shown to 
reduce the welfare of the average worker (Postel-Vinay and Cahuc, 2002). I argue that 
the ability of employers to replace permanent staff by temporary workers is dependent 
on three factors: skill specificity, the educational profile of the temporary workers 
relative to permanent workers, and the degree of wage coordination.  
The first factor - skill specificity – matters because regular workers must have 
fairly general skills for the employer to replace them. The literature generally contends 
that workers with specific skills should be strong supporters of high EPL. Job security 
protects their investment in non-transferable assets which would be wasted in the 
event of job losses (Estevez-Abe et al., 2001). What is less often emphasised is that 
the reverse is also likely to be true. Where skills are general, the pool of labour from 
which employers can choose workers is more homogenous. As a result, “the 
individual members … are substitutable for each other without serious loss of 
productivity” (Goldthorpe, 2000: 216). 
Where skills are specific, long-term tenure is also required for the employee to 
acquire the necessary skills. Workers with specific skills are therefore more important 
to employers than those with general skills and employers are consequently both less 
willing and able to replace them with temporary workers. Consistent with this 
argument, workers with more general skills are more supportive of employment 
protection than those with specific skills: “employees who perform tasks that are easy 
to monitor and do not require specific skills demand more job security regulations” 
(Emmenegger, 2009: 424). 
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Moreover, for employers to hire temporary workers instead of regular workers, 
the former need to have a similar educational level as regular workers. Where skills 
are general and regular workers have similar educational profile as temporary workers, 
employers will be most able to replace regular workers by temporary workers. Their 
ability to do so may also depend on the degree of wage coordination in the economy, 
which grants workers and their representatives some say in how internal labour 
markets are organised. Coordination is important because in highly coordinated 
economies, unions are better able to segment temporary and regular work, so that 
insiders and unions should be less concerned about a growing unregulated temporary 
work sector. 
To sum up, I expect regular workers to feel more replaceable where skills are 
general and similar between regular and temporary employees, and wage coordination 
is low. Where replaceability is high, temporary and permanent workers may have 
overlapping interests as regulation of the temporary work generates externalities that 
affect permanent workers. The degree to which interests overlap in turn determines the 
politics of temporary work regulation. Where their interests overlap, temporary 
workers are able to benefit from the greater political strength of permanent workers. 
 
2.2. The determinants of replaceability 
The concept of replaceability is particularly difficult to operationalise. The 
2005 work orientation package of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP, 
2005) provides, to my knowledge, the most faithful representation of the concept of 
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replaceability. More specifically, variable v56 codes respondents’ answers to the 
question “how easy or difficult it is for firms to replace you” and covers 43,440 
respondents, including most Western European countries. As shown in Table 6, 
French respondents have the highest share (25%) of those that say it is “very easy” to 
replace them followed by Ireland, Spain and Italy, whereas East Germany and 
Denmark have the lowest degree of replaceability. Considering the ratio of the 
percentage of respondents that say it is “very easy” to replace them by those that say 
that it is “very difficult” yields a similarly high fear of replacement in France (see 
Table 6).  
 
Table 6: Perceived ease with which workers feel that firms can replace them 
Country 
% Respondents that say 
“very easy” 
% respondents that say “very easy” 
divided by those that say “very difficult” 
France 25 6.25 
Ireland 19.1 1.95 
Portugal 18.2 2.94 
Spain 13.9 1.56 
Flanders 12.5 1.51 
Finland 12.2 1.53 
Great Britain 11.9 1.23 
West Germany 11.8 1.76 
Sweden 11.5 1.72 
Norway 11.1 1.63 
Switzerland 11 1.39 
East Germany 10.5 2.23 
Denmark 10.2 0.99 
Source: ISSP 2005, work orientation package, own calculations by cross-tabulation of question on 
replaceability by country in the sample.  
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Iversen and Soskice (2001) and Cusack, Iversen and Rehm (2006) have 
undertaken the most thorough attempt to date to systematically measure the degree of 
skill specificity of individuals. They assign different degrees of skill specificity to 
different ISCO occupations in the following ways. Absolute skill specificity of an 
occupation is highest where: (1) it has the highest number of sub-occupations,34 and; 
(2) where it has the lowest empirical share in the labour force.35 Using this scheme, 
each occupation is assigned different degrees of skill specificity.36 Craft workers, plant 
and machine operators and technicians have the highest absolute skill specificity, 
while clerks and service workers and market sales workers have the least specific 
skills.  
To investigate the relation between skills and the fear of replaceability, I run a 
logistic regression using the 2005 ISSP survey. My dependent variable is binary: it is 
coded 1 if the respondent says it is “very easy for firms to replace them”, and zero 
otherwise. I control for a number of individual characteristics through the inclusion of 
dichotomous variables that take the value 1 if the respondent is young (under 25 years 
old), old (above 50 years old), female, working for the public sector,37  and zero 
                                                 
34
 They infer that the workers in an occupation have more specific skills when the occupation is broken 
down in many sub-occupations. 
35
 The smaller percentage of the workforce in an occupation makes the skill associated with that 
occupation harder to re-use should the worker seek another job. 
36
 See Table A2.3 in the appendix for the skill classifications Table reproduced here from Torben 
Iversen’s website available at: http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~iversen/SkillSpecificity.htm  
37
 The public sector dummy equals 1 when the respondent declares that they are “currently working for 
the government” 
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otherwise. My sample consists of eleven European countries 38  and I restrict my 
sample to respondents who are in full-time employment.  
In a first step, I test for the effect of belonging to the following occupations: 
professionals; legislators, senior officials and managers; technicians and associate 
professionals; plant and machine operators and assemblers; elementary occupations; 
craft and related trade workers; and agricultural workers. The reference category is 
composed of clerks and service workers, which are the two occupations with the two 
lowest indices of absolute skill specificity that also have low levels of skills. I expect 
workers in occupations with more specific skills to feel less replaceable. For a given 
degree of skill specificity, employers should also find it harder to replace workers with 
higher level skills (e.g. legislators and managers). I include fixed effects to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity and to identify which country has the highest fear of 
replaceability when controlling for an individual respondent’s characteristics.  
Column 1 in Table 7 shows the results for this logistic regression with robust 
standard errors clustered by country. Female and older respondents feel more 
replaceable, while working in the public sector (negative coefficient) and being a 
young worker (positive coefficient) has no significant effect. Employees working in 
professional, technical and legislative or managerial occupations feel less replaceable. 
This confirms that workers with high and specific skills feel less replaceable than 
those with low general skills (i.e.: my reference category - workers in service and 
                                                 
38
 My sample consists of all EU countries available in the ISSP sample: West Germany, Great Britain, 
Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Spain, France, Portugal, Denmark, Flanders and Finland. 
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clerical work). Workers with few specific skills in elementary occupations experience 
the same replaceability as my reference category. The archetype of the specific skill 
worker working in craft and related trades feels less replaceable than clerks and 
service workers. Thus, consistent with my expectations, workers with high and/or 
specific skills feel less replaceable than those with low and/or general skills.  
However, occupations alone do not capture the higher replaceability in France, 
since the French country dummy (not shown) has the largest value among country 
dichotomous variables. In the second step, I introduce a number of country level 
variables: EPL for temporary workers (defined earlier), a measure of wage 
coordination, and the unemployment rate as percentage of the labour force in each 
country for the year 2005. My measure of wage coordination, taken from Visser 
(2009), is a “five point classification of wage setting coordination scores”. The index 
gives a score of 5 to countries where there is “economy wide bargaining”, 4 where 
there is a combination of industry and economy wide bargaining, 3 where there is only 
industry bargaining, 2 where it’s a mix of industry and company level bargaining, and 
1 where bargaining is fragmented and mostly at company level.  
The results are shown in the second column of Table 7. Consistent with my 
expectations, respondents in countries with higher wage coordination feel less 
replaceable, controlling for individual level characteristics. The presence of a high 
unemployment rate also increases the fear of replaceability. Crucially, a higher 
protection of temporary workers is associated with a lower fear of replaceability of 
full-time workers. Thus, permanent and temporary workers may have overlapping 
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interests to push for higher regulations of temporary work in contexts where 
permanent workers are replaceable. 
In column 3, I include three additional relevant country level variables: the size 
of the temporary work sector, EPL for regular workers and a proxy for the difference 
between the educational level of temporary and regular workers. As the ISSP does not 
include a variable allowing me to identify who temporary workers are, I compute the 
standard deviation of educational attainment of respondents in each country as a proxy 
for the differences in educational attainments between temporary and permanent 
workers. The higher the standard deviation the more I expect temporary and regular 
workers to have different educational attainments.  
My results suggest that a larger temporary work sector increases the fear of 
replaceability, while higher protection of regular workers reduces the fear of 
replaceability. Consistent with my argument that differences in the educational 
backgrounds of temporary and permanent workers should matter, a larger standard 
deviation in the educational attainment of respondents is associated with a lower fear 
of replacement. In other words, where differences in educational attainments between 
respondents are larger, respondents on average have lower fears of replacement. 
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Table 7: The determinants of replaceability across Europe 
Columns (1) (2) (3) 
Reference: clerks and service 
workers 
   
Professionals -0.55698*** -0.55698*** -0.55698*** 
 (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) 
Technical / associate professionals -0.57816*** -0.57816*** -0.57816*** 
 (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) 
Legislators, senior officials/managers -0.99378*** -0.99378*** -0.99378*** 
 (0.283) (0.283) (0.283) 
Agriculture -0.35512 -0.35512 -0.35512 
 (0.437) (0.437) (0.437) 
Craft and related trade workers -0.46438*** -0.46438*** -0.46438*** 
 (0.174) (0.174) (0.174) 
Plant/machine operators/assemblers 0.15947 0.15947 0.15947 
 (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) 
Elementary occupations 0.15476 0.15476 0.15476 
 (0.159) (0.159) (0.159) 
Female respondent 0.31059* 0.31059* 0.31059* 
(dummy 0, 1) (0.181) (0.181) (0.181) 
Young respondent 0.47330 0.47330 0.47330 
(16-25 years old) (0.354) (0.354) (0.354) 
Old respondent 0.36940*** 0.36940*** 0.36940*** 
(>50years) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098) 
Public sector -0.06423 -0.06423 -0.06423 
(government or public company) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) 
National level variable    
Wage coordination index  -0.21901*** -0.22742*** 
  (0.026) (0.016) 
Unemployment rate  0.27236*** 0.21035*** 
  (0.015) (0.014) 
EPL temporary workers  -0.55514*** -0.07209*** 
  (0.046) (0.022) 
Temporary workers   0.01816*** 
(% of total dependent employees)   (0.002) 
Standard deviation education years   -0.04386*** 
   (0.003) 
EPL regular workers   -0.10508*** 
   (0.025) 
Constant -2.40318*** -2.40318*** -1.669493 
Observations 4,167 4,167 4,167 
Log pseudo-likelihood -1406.19 -1406.19 -1406.19 
Pseudo R2 0.0643 0.0643 0.0643 
Method Logistic regression (clustered standard errors) 
Note: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent 
variable is the share of respondents that say it is very easy for firms to replace them (coded 1, and 0 
otherwise).  
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2.3. Determinants of EPL for temporary workers across Europe 
I expect the tightening of EPL for temporary workers to be most likely where 
replaceability is high because it increases the degree of overlap between the interests 
of permanent and temporary workers. Interest overlap in turn affects the incentives of 
all political parties to regulate temporary work. However, this does not mean 
partisanship becomes irrelevant. Left political parties are much more responsive to the 
interests of their key electoral constituents: insiders. Where insiders in permanent 
employment share the interests of temporary workers to push for greater regulation of 
the sector, the left is therefore comparatively more likely to tighten temporary work 
regulations than conservatives. 
Replaceability is highest when workers’ skills are general, wage coordination 
is low and when educational attainment between temporary and permanent workers is 
most similar. Thus, tightening of EPL for temporary workers will not happen where 
coordination is high and skills are specific (e.g. Germany), where the temporary work 
sector is small (UK) or where temporary workers have very different skills to regular 
workers (e.g. Spain). France is the only country where all conditions were present 
which created a comparatively higher degree of overlap between the interests of 
permanent and temporary workers in France. In turn, this explains why left-wing 
parties tightened EPL for temporary workers much more in France than elsewhere. To 
test my argument more systematically, I carry out a large N regression analysis of the 
determinants of EPL for temporary workers in the rest of this section, while the next 
section looks at France specifically. 
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Three methodological challenges arise. First, data on workers’ perceived ease 
of replacement is only available in 2005 and for 13 EU countries (see Table 6), which 
makes any systematic large N investigation particularly challenging. Second, the level 
of the OECD index for EPL of temporary workers changes very little over time: for 
the EU15, there were only 20 cases of reductions and five cases of increases in EPL of 
temporary workers between 1985 and 2007. Third, I have shown that replaceability is 
affected by EPL of temporary workers, hence analysing how EPL of temporary 
workers is influenced by replaceability suffers from severe endogeneity problems. 
To address these limitations I test my argument by looking at how variables 
which affect replaceability in turn determine changes in EPL for temporary workers.39 
Investigating changes in EPL for temporary workers over time means I cannot directly 
test the impact of replaceability but this has the advantage of bypassing the problem of 
endogeneity. Given how little the OECD EPL of temporary work changes, my 
empirical strategy relies on a different dataset for my dependent variable: the 
Fondazione Rodolfo de Benedetti database (FRDB, 2007). This database has the 
advantage that it is much more refined in its inclusion of different reforms of 
temporary work, that it identifies which type of temporary work is affected by the 
reform, and that it starts as early as 1980. I code changes in the flexibility of 
regulations in three domains of temporary employment to construct the following 
                                                 
39
 Note however that running a cross-sectional regression of the level of EPL of temporary workers in 
2005 on replaceability and other relevant controls shows that replaceability is indeed positively 
associated with EPL of temporary workers (see Table A2.5: in appendix). 
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three dependent variables: temporary agency work, fixed term contracts and 
introduction of new types of temporary contracts.  
Note that a reform measure of temporary work in the FRDB dataset has a 
“positive sign … if it increases the flexibility of the system (i.e.: if it makes easier or 
cheaper for firms to dismiss workers)” and a negative sign if it increases regulations. 
Each dependent variable is therefore coded 0 where there are no changes in 
legislation, +1 where a reform increasing flexibility has occured and -1 where the 
reform reduced flexibility. I then construct a fourth dependent variable which is the 
sum of changes in the latter three domains of temporary employment in a given year 
and is therefore scaled from -3 to +3. 
My sample covers the period of 1980-2007 for 14 EU countries. I test the 
impact of variables that determine individuals’ fear of replaceability, as shown in 
section 2.2: EPL of regular workers and the size of temporary work (both lagged 
once). More importantly, I include a measure of wage coordination as discussed 
earlier, which I recode for simplicity into a dichotomous variable that takes value 1 
where wage coordination is high (i.e.: when the index is 3, 4 or 5), and zero otherwise. 
For partisanship, I create a dichotomous variable that takes value 1 if the left controls 
more than 50% of cabinet shares and zero otherwise (Armingeon et al., 2011). 
There are no accepted measures of national skill specificity for which there is 
data across time and countries. However, to the extent that the degree of skill 
specificity of an economy overlaps strongly with the degree of economic coordination 
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of each type of capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001), wage coordination is an 
appropriate proxy and indeed would have risked being collinear with skill specificity.  
Throughout, I control for socio-economic pressures (OECD statistics) such 
unemployment (lagged and expressed as a percentage of the labour force) and trade 
openness (lagged and defined as exports plus imports as a share of GDP). I run an 
ordered logistic regression with robust standard errors clustered by country. Country 
fixed effects are included to account for unobserved country heterogeneity in my 
sample. I also include a linear, squared and cubic trend, which has been shown to 
perform better than most alternatives to control for temporal dynamics (Carter and 
Signorino, 2010). 
The results are presented in Table 9. In line with my expectations, high 
coordination increases the likelihood of governments passing flexibilisation reforms, 
and low coordination reduces the probability of tightening regulations for all three 
dependent variables (columns 1 to 3). Higher overall EPL and higher unemployment 
also makes it more likely that governments flexibilise temporary agency work, 
consistent with the argument that more rigid labour markets that have higher 
unemployment incentivise governments to flexibilise at the margin (column 1). 
However, while unemployment also increases the probability to flexibilise fixed-term 
contracts and new contracts, overall EPL has no statistically significant effect on new 
contracts or on fixed term contracts (column 2 and 3).  
A larger temporary work sector increases the probability of tightening 
regulations on fixed-term and temporary agency contracts where no country effects are 
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included (not shown here), but the effect becomes insignificant when country effects 
are included. Interestingly greater trade openness has no effect on changing temporary 
work regulations (column 3). Lastly, the left has no statistically significant 
independent effect (columns 1 to 3) consistent with my argument that the left only has 
an incentive to regulate temporary work where permanent workers feel replaceable, 
and hence have overlapping interests with temporary workers. 
In columns 4 and 5, I investigate the determinants of my fourth dependent 
variable, total changes in EPL for temporary work, which is a sum of changes in my 
three dimension specific dependent variables. A rigid overall EPL and coordination 
increases the likelihood of introducing reforms that deregulate temporary work. To 
investigate whether the left has a different effect in high and low coordination 
countries, I interact coordination and left control of the government in column 5.  
Table 8 shows the marginal effect of the left at different levels of coordination. 
In both low and high coordination settings left-wing governments are more likely to 
tighten regulations than the right, and less likely to deregulate temporary work than 
the right. The left is much more likely to deregulate - and much less likely to re-
regulate - the temporary work sector in high coordination countries. 
Table 8: The effect of the left conditional on coordination 
Party Coordination Deregulating Re-regulating 
Right Low 0.056*** 0.128*** 
Left Low 0.006 0.379*** 
Right High 0.115*** 0.059*** 
Left High 0.108*** 0.064*** 
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Table 9: Determinants of changes in temporary work regulations in Europe 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable Temporary  Fixed term  New  Sum change in temporary work fixed  
Independent variables work contracts contracts term contracts and new contracts 
Coordination Dummy  1.13356* 1.15475*** 15.84202*** 1.31708*** 1.05191*** 
(0 low coordination, 1 high coordination) (0.661) (0.386) (0.754) (0.375) (0.313) 
Left Power  0.03174 -0.41369 -0.35977 -0.54269 -2.35864*** 
(1 if left controls > 50% of cabinet seats) (0.968) (0.390) (0.636) (0.460) (0.783) 
Strictness of employment protection 3.69201*** 0.57620 -0.42700 1.36507** 1.39009** 
(overall, lagged once) (0.922) (0.579) (0.645) (0.659) (0.674) 
Share of temporary employment -0.03951 -0.13637 -0.00527 -0.06649 -0.07715 
(% dependent employment, lagged once) (0.088) (0.099) (0.217) (0.102) (0.094) 
Rate of Unemployment  0.35190** 0.21170* 0.20869** 0.26694*** 0.26973*** 
(% of Civilian Labour Force, lagged once) (0.146) (0.124) (0.097) (0.092) (0.074) 
Total Trade -0.02588 0.01377 -0.13921 -0.01233 -0.01052 
(Trade-to-GDP-ratio, lagged once) (0.031) (0.028) (0.087) (0.023) (0.022) 
Coordination * Leftpower     2.25386** 
     (0.948) 
Constant cut1 2.27250 2.98431 -21.18828*** 0.14138 0.09893 
Constant cut2 11.29549** 8.77471** 32.97417*** 2.78725 2.78426 
Constant cut3    8.10290** 8.26309** 
Constant cut4    9.47446*** 9.63703*** 
Constant cut5    11.22124*** 11.38235*** 
Observations 269 269 269 269 269 
Fixed effects (i) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cubic trend (ii) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log pseudo-likelihood -72.72 -130.05 -39.76 -180.33 -177.62 
Pseudo R-squared 0.25 0.12 0.31 0.12 0.13 
 
Source: Dependent variables coded using the FRDB database.  Note: All dependent variables are scaled following the FRDB convention, that is 
increases in the dependent variable refer to reforms that introduce more flexibility (i.e.: reduce regulations and/or protection of temporary work). 
Ordinal logistic regression with robust standard errors (clustered by country) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (i) Fixed Effects 
not shown; (ii) Cubic trend refers to the inclusion of a trend, a squared trend and a cubic trend as recommended by Carter and Signorino (2010). 
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Stability of results and robustness checks 
A number of robustness checks and alternative specifications were tested to 
investigate whether this altered the results in Table 9. First, running a regression with 
an alternative estimation method (xtreg with robust clustered standard errors and time 
as well country fixed effects) on the same data yielded the same results (see Table 
A2.4 in the appendix). 
Second, testing the same model using EPL for temporary workers as my 
dependent variables also confirms my findings. A cross-sectional model is presented 
in Table A2.5 in the appendix. Note also that running a cross-sectional regression of 
the level of EPL of temporary workers in 2005 on replaceability and other relevant 
controls shows that replaceability is indeed positively associated with EPL of 
temporary workers. In Table A2.6 in the appendix, I test my claims using the first 
difference of EPL of temporary workers as my dependent variable, which again shows 
that coordination is positively associated with deregulation, and vice-versa (see Table 
A2.7 in the appendix calculating the marginal effects). 
Third, the results from Table 8 remain unchanged when excluding the cubic 
time controls (see Table A2.8 in appendix) or the country fixed effects (see Table 
A2.9 for the results without fixed effects and Table A2.10 in appendix for the 
marginal calculation). Fourth, as it could be argued that openness and unemployment 
take time to affect the decision of governments to deregulate, I include the 3 years 
moving average transformation of these variables in my regression. Table A2.11 in the 
appendix shows that my results for coordination and the left are the same. 
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Fifth, the decision of governments to deregulate the temporary work sector 
could be influenced by the strength of unions. To examine this possibility I tested the 
effect of three different measures of union strength in Table A2.12 in appendix: union 
density, bargaining coverage and union centralisation (see Table A3.3 in appendix for 
definitions). Union density has no effect, while both higher bargaining coverage and 
more centralised unions reduce the probability of deregulation. 
I also checked whether my results are unchanged when alternative measures of 
coordination are used. Table A2.13 in the appendix reports the results for the Hall and 
Gingerich (2004) index of coordination and a different scaling of wage coordination 
(from 1 to 5 instead of the dichotomous 0 to 1 version I used in Table 8). Results using 
both indices are unchanged. To the extent that my argument is about the control of 
permanent workers over the use of temporary work by their firm, the presence and 
influence of work councils might be relevant.  
Two measures of work councils by Visser (2009) are used. The status of work 
councils codes whether there are no work councils (0), whether they are voluntary and 
non-binding (1) or whether their existence and rights is mandated by law (3). Rights of 
work councils range from no rights, only information (0) to economic and social rights 
including codetermination (3). Both measures of work councils’ power show that in 
cases where they have more influence, the probability of temporary work deregulation 
is higher. A number of alternative measures of the left control of the government are 
presented in Table A2.15 in the appendix. 
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In addition, one could argue that a more direct proxy of skill specificity such as 
the share of craft workers should be used in lieu of coordination. There are three 
reasons why in my view coordination is more appropriate. First, note that coordination 
is a pre-requisite for a high share of skill specific workers to be present in an economy 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001). Second, actual skill specificity is notoriously difficult to 
properly measure, especially in a cross-national setting, where the same occupation 
such as craft workers might not have similar levels of skill specificity. Measurement 
problems are further compounded by the fact that the degree of skill specificity of an 
occupation may also change across time, so that a given share of workers in an 
occupation might suggest a different level of skill specificity in the economy. Third, I 
have tested the effect of the share of craft workers (the ultimate specific skills 
occupation) on temporary work reforms and the results are consistent with my 
expectation (see table A2.22 in appendix in appendix A2.5). 
The lack of effect of openness on government deregulation is surprising, so I 
tested for three alternative measures: (1) imports, (2) exports, and (3) total trade, with 
emerging and developing market economies (see Table A3.3 in appendix for 
definitions). Exports and total trade with this subset of economies are positively 
associated with temporary work deregulation (see Table A2.14 in appendix). Lastly, I 
checked whether the results are stable to the exclusion of any one country (Jack-knife 
robustness check) in Table A2.16 and carried out a stepwise inclusion of my variables 
to investigate whether the specification was sensitive to any one variable (Table A2.17 
in appendix). The results were also unchanged. 
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Overall, these findings are consistent with the argument that factors which 
increase replaceability make permanent workers share the interests of temporary 
workers for a higher level of EPL of temporary work. This allows temporary workers 
to benefit from the greater political strength of permanent workers and makes it more 
likely that governments tighten regulations of temporary work. In the next section, I 
test my argument on France, which allows me to substantiate causality and to 
demonstrate that my explanation does indeed solve the French puzzle. 
 
3. The Left and temporary work regulations in France 
Temporary work has been a major concern of policy makers in France since the 
late 1970s. There has been a tremendous rise in the share of temporary employment in 
the French economy since 1983 from under 4% to more than 12% since the end of the 
1990s. Due to high replaceability in France, the interests of permanent and temporary 
workers overlap, and the aim of the left has consistently been to increase the cost of 
temporary work and to limit the number of valid cases where a company can hire 
temporary workers.  
 
3.1. Why is replaceability higher in France? 
Table 6 showed that the share of respondents that say it is very easy for the 
firm to replace them was the highest in France. I have argued and shown using 
regression analysis that replaceability can be expected to be higher in countries where 
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wage coordination is low, skills are more general, and where temporary workers and 
regular workers have more similar educational backgrounds. 
Consistent with my expectations, countries which have a low degree of 
replaceability such as Germany, Denmark and Sweden (see Table 5) have high wage 
coordination scores. Denmark scored between 3 and 5 in the 1980s, 3 in the 1990s and 
between 3 and 4 in the 2000s. Similarly, Sweden scored between 3 and 5 throughout 
the 1980s and between 3 and 4 in the 1990s. Germany scored 4 throughout the period 
under consideration. By contrast, France which had the highest level of replaceability 
scored 2 throughout most of the period under consideration. 
A second reason for higher replaceability in France lies with the nature of 
workers’ skills. Two aspects are particularly important. The first concerns the 
specificity of skills. It is notoriously difficult to measure the degree of specificity of 
skills, and even harder to compare skill specificity across countries. With this caveat 
in mind, the weight of the evidence does suggest that the French labour force has 
general skills, and in any event, has much more general skills than typically 
coordinated market economies like Germany and Sweden. French workers’ skills were 
particularly low and general in the 1980s when the left in France tightened regulations 
surrounding temporary work. Hancké (2001: 308) argues that there was a large pool of 
low and semi-skilled workers carrying out very narrow tasks in the 1980s. For 
instance, 60% of the workforce was low or semi-skilled in 1982. The general nature of 
skills in turn stems partly from the education system. In contrast to Germany, French 
137 
 
workers mostly have general skills such as “mathematics and languages” which allow 
them to carry out administrative and quality control tasks (Hancké, 2001: 324). 
Four additional indicators can further substantiate the claim that France has 
more general skills. A first indicator is the amount of company training that workers 
receive. Company training is a good indication of how specific workers’ skills are 
since employees acquire specific skills mostly through on-the-job training (Busemeyer 
and Trampusch, 2012). In 2001, 67% of French employees declared receiving no 
employer training in the past 5 years, compared with 44.5% for Germany and 34.2% 
in Sweden. Moreover, this represented a 5 percentage point increase from 1996 where 
61.7% declared receiving no training (Gallie and Paugam, 2002: 82). 
Second, over time the occupational structure in France has made replaceability 
more of a problem. The share of manual workers (ouvrier) has been falling from 
30.2% to 22.9% in the period 1982-2006, which was mostly driven by a fall in the 
share of unskilled manual workers. In contrast, the same period witnessed the rise of 
the share of employees (employés) from 24.7% to 29.3%, mostly driven by the 
increase in the share of unskilled employees.40 Unskilled employees include clerks and 
service workers which are in occupations requiring much less specific skills41 than 
                                                 
40
 INSEE, employment study. More details on the different categories can be found at: 
http://www.insee.fr/fr/methodes/default.asp?page=nomenclatures/pcs2003/liste_n1.htm;  
The data can be accessed at: http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/detail.asp?ref_id=ir-
martra10&page=irweb/martra10/dd/martra10_paq2.htm 
41
 See skill specificity scores of different occupations developed by Iversen and Soskice (2001) and 
Cusack, Iversen, and Rehm (2006), reproduced in  Table A2.3 in the appendix. 
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occupations such as craft workers which I have shown to feel less replaceable in the 
previous section. 
The share of the workforce carrying out repetitive tasks represent a third metric 
for how specific skills are. Variable q20_a of the third (2000) European Working 
Conditions Survey asks respondents whether their job involves repetitive tasks of less 
than 1 minute.42 Between 20% and 22% of respondents in Denmark, Austria, Italy said 
yes, compared with 30.16% in France. Fourth, the same survey reveals the share of the 
workforce carrying out complex tasks, which is also a good indicator of how 
replaceable a worker can be. The share of respondents carrying out complex tasks was 
76.54% in Austria, 67.2% in Denmark, and 65% in Germany compared to 50.8% in 
France. 
In addition to wage coordination and the degree of skill specificity, the gap in 
educational attainment between permanent and temporary workers is also a condition 
of the extent to which employers are able to substitute regular workers by temporary 
workers. The share of an age group that completed secondary education increased 
tremendously in France and reached 75% in 1995 (Hancké, 2001: 322). Using the 
fourth wave of the European Social Survey (ESS, 2008), Table 10 shows that France 
has a very high share of temporary workers who have completed upper secondary 
education, indeed it is one of the highest in the EU.43 It is also the only country along 
                                                 
42
 I cross-tabulate the share of respondents that carry out repetitive task by country (source of EWCS 
available at: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/ewco/surveys/index.htm). 
43
 For reasons of space, I only report in the body of the paper the numbers for France in Table 10, the 
numbers for other EU countries are available in Table A2.18 in the appendix. 
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with Belgium where the share of temporary workers with upper secondary education 
is higher than for permanent workers. 
To sum up, France is the only country that has low wage coordination, general 
skills and a high share of temporary workers with upper secondary education. 
Although the UK and Ireland also have general skills and a small educational gap 
between temporary and regular workers, permanent workers are not well-protected, 
thereby giving little incentives to employers to substitute permanent with temporary 
workers. Although Germany and Austria have well-protected permanent workers, high 
wage coordination and more specific skills hinder employers’ ability to replace 
permanent by temporary workers. Lastly, although Spain evolves in a similar type of 
Capitalism as France, and temporary work has also expanded fast there, the share of 
temporary workers with only upper secondary education was much lower than in 
France. 44 
 
3.2. Composition and political preferences of temporary and permanent workers 
To investigate the implications of replaceability, I now analyse the 
demographic composition of temporary and permanent workers in France, their degree 
of replaceability, and their political preferences. 
                                                 
44
 The share of temporary workers that have completed only upper secondary education was 17.6% in 
Spain, compared to 48.4% in France (See Table A2.18 in appendix). 
140 
 
Fixed-term contracts are particularly concentrated in the service sector whereas 
interim contracts are mostly found in industry. In 2002, 12% of workers in personal 
care, education and health were on fixed-term contracts, about 5% in the food 
industry, but less than 3% in the car industry (Kornig and Michon, 2010: 54). By 
contrast, 8.1% of the workers in the construction sector and 6.9% of those in the 
industrial sector were interim workers, compared to 1.7% for the tertiary sector (ibid: 
49). Men are over-represented in the interim sector but under-represented among 
fixed-term contracts. In 2008, 69.3% of interim workers but only 38.5% of workers on 
fixed-term contracts were men (ibid: 51). Interim workers also tend to have lower 
skills: 38.4% were unskilled manual workers, 39.4% skilled workers, compared to 
only 13.2% working as employees and 9% in management or intermediary professions 
(ibid: 8).  
The low level of skills of temporary workers is also reflected when considering 
their educational background. In 2007, among those that finished their education less 
than 4 years ago, 31% were in temporary contracts, 54% in private permanent 
contracts and 11% in public permanent contracts. For those that had not completed a 
secondary school degree, 45% were in temporary contracts, compared to 22% for 
those with university education. Even when considering respondents that finished their 
education more than 11 years ago, 10% of those with no secondary education were on 
temporary contracts compared to only 4% of those with university education (Kornig 
and Michon, 2010: 51). 
Temporary work is also particularly concentrated among younger workers. In 
2008, 26.4% of those within the 15-24 age groups were on fixed-term contracts and 
141 
 
6.6% were in interim work. By contrast, the respective numbers for the 25-49 age 
groups were 7.5% and 2.1% (ibid: 51). However, transitioning from temporary to 
permanent employment is slow. In 2003 only 25% of those that were initially on a 
fixed-term contract were on a permanent contract one year later, and only 17.3% of 
those in interim contracts had managed to get a permanent contract one year later 
(ibid: 57). 
Immigrants are also more likely to be employed under temporary contracts. In 
2009, 11.4% of newly arrived migrants in France worked for interim agencies and 
26.1% had a fixed-term contract (ELIPA, 2010). This prevalence of temporary work 
among immigrants extends well beyond the first year of arrival. In 1999, for the 18-40 
age group, 7% of male immigrants that had arrived when they were older than 10 
years old were interim workers and 11.5% were in fixed-term contracts. By contrast, 
for the same age group only 3.8% of male natives were in interim work and 10% on 
fixed-term contracts. For those born in France but from parents born in a foreign 
country, 5.2% of male respondents were in interim work and 11.6% in fixed-term 
contracts. Within the immigrant population, more than one third of males that 
emigrated from sub-Saharan Africa were in precarious contracts compared to 19% for 
natives (Meurs, 2006: 780). Controlling for age, education, and marital status, male 
immigrants were still three times more likely to be in a precarious contract than 
natives (ibid: 781). 
In the last 2007 French election, more than 60% of temporary workers voted 
for left-wing parties (see Table 10) and nearly twice as many temporary workers as 
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regular workers voted for the extreme left. 45  The tightening of temporary work 
regulations that the left has undertaken in the last three decades was therefore 
beneficial to these workers. This involved provisions for equal pay between regular 
and temporary workers, ‘end of contracts bonuses’ to compensate for the precarious 
nature of temporary work, as well as better access to training and paid holidays. Legal 
restrictions on the use of temporary workers can also be beneficial to them. For 
instance, thanks to the regulations in place in France, the Court de cassation ruled in 
2004 that certain agency workers employed by automobile companies should be 
transferred to permanent contracts (Math, 2004). 
However, temporary workers alone cannot push for better work conditions. 
These more stringent regulations of temporary work were also in line with many of the 
left’s constituents’ concerns for replaceability. With respect to occupations, 55% of 
technicians, 58% of machine operators and a staggering 62% of workers in elementary 
occupations voted for left-wing parties in the first round of 2007 (see Table 10). Those 
occupations were characterised by a high implementation of temporary work: 28% of 
respondents in elementary occupations, and nearly 17% of those in craft work reported 
being on limited duration contracts. As many as 41% of respondents in elementary 
occupations and 33% working as plant and machine operators declared it was “very 
easy” for the firm to replace them (see Table 10). Key constituents of left-wing parties 
in France are therefore adversely affected by temporary work and feel very 
replaceable. 
                                                 
45
 Detailed analyses of temporary workers’ voting records for different political parties in the 2007 
elections are presented in Table A2.19 in the appendix. 
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3.3. The evolution of temporary work regulation in France 
Since key constituents of the left feel very replaceable, one should expect that 
the left in France has attempted to regulate the temporary work sector to mitigate and 
prevent this risk of replaceability of permanent by temporary workers. This section 
shows this is precisely what has happened since the issue of temporary work was 
politicised in France. 
Temporary agency or interim work was legalised by the right-wing 
government in a law passed in 197246 and implemented through a government decree 
in 1973.47 While the practice of interim work had de facto been tolerated before, this 
law was meant to promote interim work by providing it with a clearer legal 
framework. Right-wing policy makers saw this new form of work as positive to fulfil 
both economic and social functions (Alibert, 1974). At the time of the law, only 1% of 
the active labour force was in interim work (ibid: 13) and the user company did not 
have to pay the same wage for interim workers as their actual workers (Fossaert, 
1981). 
Similarly, the first law concerning the Contrat a Durée Déterminées, the main 
type of FTC in France, was passed in March 1979.48 As with the 1972 law, the 1979 
law was meant to promote this type of employment by reducing the legal uncertainty 
that employers faced when using these types of contracts (Poulain, 1979; Couturier, 
1980; Lyon-Caen, 1980). The rapporteur of the national assembly argued that 
                                                 
46
 3rd January 1972 Law. 
47
 Decree N73-53. 
48
 Loi du 3 Janvier 1979 relatif au Contrat à Durée Déterminée. 
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achieving their objective to increase the reliance on FTCs required removing all the 
apprehensions that employers had felt regarding these contracts before the law 
(Couturier, 1980: 38). The French employers’ association not surprisingly welcomed 
this law which made it easier and cheaper to hire FTCs (Darcel, 1980). 
The 1972 and 1979 laws passed by the right, set in motion the process of 
replaceability, 49  which ultimately increased the degree of overlap between the 
preferences of permanent and temporary workers and motivated the labour movement 
and the left to tighten regulations of temporary work. Writing in 1981, Robert Fossaert 
(1981: 509) argued that this growing segment of precarious work would lead to a 
twofold pressure on wages. These pressures would operate directly through the lower 
wages that temporary workers received but also indirectly through competition and 
substitution effects with respect to regular employees. The union movement was 
already opposed to lowering temporary work regulations at the time because they 
thought this would bypass collective agreements and regulations on collective 
dismissals (Lyon-Caen, 1980: 9). Similarly, the detractors of the 1979 law on the left 
saw the law as promoting the ‘précarisation’ of employment (Couturier, 1980). 
It is in this context that Mitterand, the first socialist president of the fifth 
republic, was elected on the 21st of May 1981 (EIRR, 1981). In his speech to the 
national assembly in July 1981, the newly elected Prime Minister Mauroy announced 
the government’s intention to tackle temporary work by introducing “improved 
                                                 
49
 At the end of the 1979, 35% of newly registered unemployed workers come from ending FTCs 
(Darcel, 1980: 19). 
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controls on temporary work agencies and employers recruiting workers on FTCs. 
Workers employed on a temporary basis will also be given improved rights” (ibid: 3). 
The Auroux report which represented the basis for the upcoming legislative activity of 
the new government attacked the use of “inferior forms of employment” that have 
been used by employers in the form of agency work or FTCs (EIRR, 1981: 4). The left 
government identified the fast expansion of temporary work as resulting from 
companies’ attempts to the avoid costs of permanent employment by using temporary 
workers (EIRR, 1982: 6). 
Three ordinances were issued by the government in 1982 to address the shared 
concerns of permanent and temporary workers concerning the protection of temporary 
work. With the 24th February 1982 ordinance, the legislator stated his intention to 
“avoid that jobs, that should normally be permanent, are undertaken in a permanent 
fashion by workers holding precarious contracts” (Pradel, 1984: 521). Temporary 
work was as a result surrounded by a number of conditions and formalities. The new 
law tightened the set of reasons under which companies could hire FTCs or agency 
workers.  
Specifically, temporary employment could be used for a temporary 
replacement of a regular worker, to cope with the occurrence of an unexpected and 
significant increase in economic activity, or to carry out a specific task in pre-
authorised sectors (EIRR, 1982; Lyon-Caen, 1983: 10). Maximum duration, 
authorisation procedures and sanctions for non-compliance with regulation were also 
tightened (ibid). Specifically, the new maximum duration of the mission could no 
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longer exceed six months, whereas there were no time limits before (EIRR, 1982). The 
legislator also introduced higher civil sanctions of the employer if they terminated the 
contract before the end of the agreed duration (Pelissier, 1983). 
New rights were also granted to temporary agency workers. The legislation 
granted, for the first time equal rights in terms of wages50 and collective advantages 
between interim and regular workers in the user company. For FTCs, equality of rights 
concerned paid holidays, right to training, sick leave and indemnities for accidents. 
Interim agency workers received an increase in the ‘insecurity bonus’ of up to 15% of 
their total gross earnings at the end of their mission. FTC workers were for the first 
time also made eligible to a similar end of contract indemnity equal to 5% (EIRR, 
1982; Pelissier, 1983: 20). 
In March 1986, the right won the legislative elections with a clear intention to 
relax restrictions on temporary work (Belier, 1986). The 11th of August ordinance 
removed restrictions on FTCs and agency work to “give more freedom to companies 
in human resources management” (Seguin, 1986: 829). The available conditions to 
employ an FTC were expanded by abandoning the list of cases in which hiring 
temporary workers is authorised (Savatier, 1987). Further, the administrative 
authorisation for companies to hire temporary workers was suppressed and the 
maximum duration of contracts was extended to 24 months (Pelissier, 1987; Seguin, 
1986).  
                                                 
50
 That is the interim worker will get the same wage as someone in a similar post/occupation in the 
using company. 
147 
 
When Mitterand won a second term as president in 1988, the left also returned 
to the government with Michel Rocard as Prime Minister. A bill was presented to the 
parliament by the left on the 6th December 1990 to place “limitations on the use that 
employers may make of these forms of employment” and mainly involved re-
introducing restrictions on temporary work that had been removed by the 1986 decree: 
the use of temporary work was limited to only three cases, the maximum duration was 
shortened back to 12 months, and employers were prevented from hiring temporary 
workers to cope with increased economic activity. This bill was generally favoured by 
Socialist MPs but generated “fierce opposition by employers” (EIRR, 1990: 4, 5). 
The main employers’ organisation insisted that legislators should let the social 
partners negotiate on the issue of temporary work. Most of the socialist party wanted 
the bill to be debated in the parliament directly, but the government nevertheless chose 
to let the social partners negotiate (EIRR, 1990: 4). The 12th July 1990, a law was 
passed that incorporated most of the agreement that the social partners had reached. Its 
objective as stated in its first article was to “claw back the share of precarious jobs by 
facilitating their transformation into stable employment.”51 Union representatives were 
granted the right to evaluate the increase in precarious employment in the annual 
                                                 
51
 Author’s translation from the following quote: “de faire reculer la proportion d’emplois précaires en 
facilitant leurs transformations en emplois stables” (Blaise, 1991: 11). 
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negotiation between social partners, both at the sectoral and company level. Sanctions 
for unlawful use of fixed term and temporary employment were also reinforced.52 
The 1990 law therefore represented a return to a more strict limitation of the 
cases where a company could use precarious contracts (Blaise, 1991). The maximum 
duration was fixed at 18 months compared to 24 months in the 1986 law (EIRR, 1990: 
13, 14). The principle of equal pay between temporary and permanent workers was 
also reinforced by extending provisions that existed to interim workers to fixed term 
contracts.53 
From 1993 to 1997, the right controlled the government, with no major 
changes in the legislation of temporary work. In June 1997, the left won the legislative 
elections bringing Lionel Jospin to the post of Prime Minister. A social modernisation 
bill was approved by parliament in 2001. Articles 122-124 of this law entailed a 
number of initiatives concerning the fight against precarious work, aimed at restricting 
temporary contracts. The exceptionality of temporary work was re-affirmed (Roy-
Loustaunau, 2002).54 As before, the aim of the law was to prevent companies from 
replacing permanent workers by temporary workers for work to be carried out that is 
in fact of a permanent nature. The law also further harmonised the ‘instability 
                                                 
52
 Regarding the unlawful use of fixed term and temporary contracts by a company, any infractions 
concerning the duration or number of renewals of contracts, and the minimum waiting period for using 
consecutive a temporary contract on the same post. 
53
 With the new 1990 law, the rate is now 6% for fixed term contracts and 10% for interim workers  
(Blaise, 1991). 
54
 For instance: “Fixed term contracts, whatever their motives cannot aim or result in the permanent 
placement of an employee linked to a normal and permanent activity of the company” (author’s own 
translation, from article L122-1 of the labour code– see : Raveyre, 2001). 
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indemnity’ of agency and fixed term contract workers by setting the indemnity for 
both at 10% of their total gross income of the worker. Last but not least, sanctions and 
controls were further reinforced (ibid: 311). 
In sum, the left has consistently tightened the regulations of temporary work 
whereas the right has supported the deregulation of the sector. Thus, temporary 
workers in France have benefited from their shared interests with politically more 
powerful permanent workers. The main employer organisation in France 55  was 
strongly opposed to further restrictions on temporary work in both in 1990 and 2001, 
and was supportive of the right’s deregulation in 1986. 
By contrast, unions have throughout the period been concerned about 
replaceability. For instance, the two biggest unions in France, the CGT and CFDT,56 
have been systematically opposed to temporary work and calling for more regulations 
to prevent replaceability.57 Unions have also increased their presence across the main 
temporary work agencies such as Randstadt and have created novel organisational 
structures within their confederations such as the CFDT Services-Interim which aims 
to represent temporary workers.58  
 
                                                 
55
 The Mouvement des Entreprises de France (MEDEF). Interviews with MEDEF representatives 
carried out in September 2011 further confirmed that their preference is for reducing the level of EPL. 
56
 CGT stands for “Confédération Générale du Travail” and “CFDT for Confédération Française 
Démocratique du Travail”. 
57
 Interviews with CFDT and CGT representatives carried out in July and September 2011. 
58
 Interviews with CFDT Services Federation and CGT interim and temporary work Federations carried 
out in July and September 2011. 
150 
 
Table 10: Occupations, replacement, votes, contracts and education in France 
 Employment status (1) % respondents (2) % respondents voted left in 
2007 presidential election (3) By occupation Unlimited Limited No contract Not Very easy Very easy 
 (as % of total workforce)    
Legislators, senior officials and managers 83.59 4.96 11.44 78.72 21.28 22.6 
Professionals 84.16 10.96 4.87 78.1 21.9 56.2 
Technicians and associate professionals 83.6 11.86 4.54 79.55 20.45 55.6 
Clerks 73.89 16.85 9.26 69.4 30.6 51.78 
Service workers and shop and market 
sales workers 69.26 20.48 10.26 
66.56 33.44 45.61 
Craft and related trade workers 74.89 16.39 8.73 87.62 12.38 44.77 
Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers 78.97 11.87 9.16 
66.39 33.61 58.13 
Elementary occupations 58.31 28.9 12.79 58.02 41.98 62.93 
For all occupations       
Voted in 2007 for the left (4) 53.05 61.44 45.41    
Only upper secondary education 
completed (5)  42.3 48.4 n.a. 
  
 
Notes and sources (1) to (5) can be found in Table A2.21 in the appendix. 
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Conclusion 
In the last three decades, temporary work has been on the rise across Europe 
both in the form of temporary agency work and fixed-term contracts. The expansion of 
temporary work is partly the result of companies attempting to bypass what they see as 
rigid regulations of permanent contracts by hiring temporary workers. In many cases, 
it is also the result of government policy choices to create flexibility at the margin of 
the core employment relation, while leaving the status of insiders unaffected. The 
protection of temporary workers represents a particular challenge for governments 
because these workers have little political power to promote their interests while 
temporary work has wide-ranging implications for inequality. Indeed, temporary 
workers are on average less well-off than permanent workers in terms of pay, access 
to training, job satisfaction and job security. 
Whereas most countries have reduced temporary work regulations, France has 
moved in the opposite direction with left-wing governments tightening regulations on 
a number of occasions. All the conditions that the literature identifies to explain 
deregulation at the margin in other countries (high socio-economic pressures and 
insulated insiders) are also present in France. I argue that solving the puzzle of French 
temporary work regulations requires challenging an implicit assumption of most of the 
literature, namely, that permanent workers are unaffected at worst and at best even 
benefit from deregulation at the margin.  
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Specifically, there are good theoretical reasons and strong empirical support for 
the claim that some permanent workers are adversely affected through the ability of 
employers to replace regular by temporary workers. Workers in occupations 
characterised by more general skills and in countries that have low wage coordination 
and a large temporary work sector feel the most replaceable. Where replaceability is 
high, permanent and temporary workers have increasingly overlapping preferences for 
higher protection of the temporary work sector. 
As a result, governments, especially when controlled by left-wing parties, are 
more likely to tighten temporary work regulations in low coordination settings with a 
large temporary work sector but more likely to reduce temporary work regulations in 
countries with high wage coordination. Thus, the tightening of EPL for temporary 
workers will not happen where coordination is high and skills are specific (e.g. 
Germany), where the temporary work sector is small (UK) or where temporary 
workers have very different skills to regular workers (e.g. Spain). 
By contrast, where a sufficiently large number of permanent workers feel 
replaceable, as in France, they share temporary workers' preferences for increased 
protection of temporary work. As a result, the politics of temporary work regulations 
are significantly altered and the gains from tightening temporary work regulations 
may outweigh the costs of not deregulating. Consistent with my argument, I have 
shown that the high share of replaceable workers in France is the result of three 
factors: general skills, low wage coordination and similar educational background 
between permanent and temporary workers. 
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Faced with stringent regulations of permanent employment, French employers 
are both willing and able to replace permanent by temporary workers. Both temporary 
workers and permanent workers that feel most replaceable are important constituents 
of France’s left-wing parties. French unions have also been strongly opposed to the 
deregulation of temporary work. As a result, the left has systematically tightened 
temporary work regulations (1982, 1990, and 2001). The right is in principle more 
favourable to deregulation, which is also supported by employers, and has indeed 
deregulated temporary work in 1986. 
My findings have implications for the dynamics of EPL of temporary work 
across Europe but also for other policy domains in France. Indeed, the political 
implications of this higher replaceability of French workers have also manifested in 
other domains of the French welfare state. In 2007, total public social expenditures as 
a share of GDP in France was the highest of Western Europe (OECD statistics) and its 
statutory minimum wage one of the highest.59  
My findings have implications for the dynamics of EPL of temporary work 
across Europe. Specifically, they suggest that the trend towards the deregulation of 
temporary work across the EU may become unstable and be reversed. If replaceability 
starts affecting insiders in permanent employment, temporary workers may become 
able to benefit from the greater political strength of core constituents of the left. There 
is some evidence that this may have started happening in other European countries 
that share the French combination of protected insiders but do not have sufficiently 
                                                 
59
 By 2007 it had reached more than 60% of the median wage (Champsaur et al., 2009: 45). 
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high coordination to avoid substitution between workers. Spain is a case in point: after 
nearly two decades of deregulation, the unions started promoting temporary work 
regulations by the end of the 1990s, and the government passed a law in 2006 (Law 
43/2006) aiming to promote permanent contracts and restrict the expansion of 
temporary work (Villarejo, 2008). 
Lastly, two broader implications emerge from this paper. First, highly 
coordinated market economies may paradoxically lead to more durable divides 
between workers, since permanent workers are more insulated from the pressure of a 
growing temporary work sector. Crucially, this higher protection of insiders does not 
stem from higher de jure EPL but rather from the more specific skills that insiders 
possess and from a higher degree of wage coordination. 
Second, the argument and evidence presented in this paper challenges the 
premise of much of the insider-outsider literature where reductions in working 
conditions and benefit eligibility of outsiders has no impact on insiders. This may 
question the relevance of dualism as an analytical category. Further research should 
therefore investigate whether and why more coordinated market economies may be 
more dualised, the determinants of the extent to which the interests of insiders and 
outsiders overlap, and the ensuing politics of reforms that affect outsiders in other 
policy domains. 
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Paper 3 
 
III: THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF DUALISATION, 
RECOMMODIFICATION, AND NON-INCLUSIVE 
COORDINATION ON WAGE INEQUALITY  
 
 
 
Abstract 
What explains wage inequality in countries that were once seen as fairly egalitarian? 
Research on inequality in comparative political economy stresses the role of welfare 
state spending and economic coordination in reducing inequality. However, the pattern 
of gross earnings inequality between median and low income workers in Western 
Europe contradicts this conventional wisdom. Using this measure of inequality, the 
German coordinated market economy is now more unequal than the UK, a typical 
liberal market economy, and Denmark, characterised by its social democratic welfare 
regime, is now more unequal than countries with Bismarckian welfare regimes such as 
France and Belgium. To solve this puzzle, I argue that non-inclusive economic 
coordination, recommodifying welfare state policies, and labour market dualisation 
have increased inequality. I test - and find significant support for - this argument using 
a large N quantitative analysis of wage inequality in a panel of fifteen Western 
European countries over the last three decades. 
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Introduction 
One of the most profound changes of the past three decades in the developed 
world is the significant rise in inequality after its relative decline in the post war years 
(Kenworthy and Pontusson, 2005). These trends in inequality have motivated 
important works in economics (Atkinson and Piketty, 2007; Leigh, 2007). Despite 
common trends in technology, openness and education, there are important cross-
national differences in inequality among European political economies.  
One should distinguish between wage income, market income and disposable 
income. Wage or earnings represent the monetary reward for the provision of labour 
by workers. Market income also includes non-wage market income such as capital or 
property gains. Deducing taxes and adding benefits result in disposable income 
inequality (Beramendi and Cusack, 2009: 258). This paper focuses on gross wage or 
earnings inequality. Earnings are the main determinant of overall income for 
employed workers. Gross earnings inequality also has a crucial impact on workers’ 
incentive to acquire skills (Blau and Kahn, 1996) and may adversely affect the 
employment probability of low skill workers (Card and Krueger, 1995; Neumark and 
Wascher, 1999).  
Economic factors alone cannot account for the cross-national diversity of wage 
inequality. For instance, markets forces alone would predict that inequality between 
middle and low skilled workers should be lower in the US than in EU countries (Blau 
and Kahn, 1996: 831). This calls for an institutional and political explanation of cross-
national variation in wage inequality. Following the recent research in comparative 
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political economy undertaken by Iversen (1999), Pontusson et al. (2002) and Rueda 
(2008), I focus on wage inequality between the 5th and bottom 10th gross earnings 
deciles of full-time dependent employees compiled by the OECD.  
When considering gross earnings, there are three reasons to restrict the analysis 
to full-time employees. First, to the extent that low income part-time workers would 
by definition be further away from full-time middle income workers, focusing on full-
time wages provides a low estimate of the actual underlying degree of inequality. 
Second, including part-time workers in the analysis of inequality would misconstrue 
inequality which stems from different pay and inequality, which stems from 
insufficient work. Third, there is very limited availability of time-series cross-section 
data for hourly earnings inequality. 
Moreover, wage inequality between full-time workers in median and bottom 
income deciles displays surprising patterns both in cross-national terms and over time. 
More specifically, the difference between European countries in their ratio of gross 
earnings of the 5th and the bottom decile of full-time workers presents us with a 
puzzle. Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs), which were portrayed as an equally 
efficient - but more egalitarian - type of Capitalism compared to their liberal 
counterparts (Hall and Soskice, 2001), have experienced particularly steep rises in 
inequality. Most strikingly, Germany is now more unequal than the UK. Denmark 
which is characterised by its social democratic welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 
1990) now has higher levels of inequality at the bottom of the income distribution than 
Belgium or France.  
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In this paper I make three arguments to solve this puzzle. First I argue that 
higher inequality over time is the result of labour market dualisation where an 
increasingly unprotected temporary employment sector has grown significantly in the 
last three decades. While a large part of the literature has looked at welfare state and 
labour market dualisation, no studies - to my knowledge - have carried out a 
systematic empirical investigation of the effect dualisation has on inequality across 
countries. 
Second, European welfare states have undergone profound reforms, where the 
emphasis has been to incite the unemployed to take up jobs whether through lower 
generosity of unemployment benefits or higher employment incentives to accept low 
income jobs. In other words, higher inequality may be the result of both reductions in 
decommodifying policies and the introduction of recommodifying policies such as 
employment incentives.  
Third, following recent research by Thelen (2012: 142) and Swank et al. 
(2008), I argue that one must distinguish between the degree of coordination of 
institutions and their degree of inclusiveness or social solidarity. Economic 
coordination on average enhances the productivity and wage bargaining power of 
employees. However, one should not conflate “coordinated” with “egalitarian 
capitalism” (Thelen, 2012: 143). Instead, the degree to which coordination affects 
workers in different income deciles depends crucially on the inclusiveness of 
bargaining institutions. As a result, the higher economic coordination and the lower 
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the inclusiveness, the larger the income gap between median income workers that are 
coordinated and low income workers that are not.  
European countries with more coordinated but less inclusive wage setting 
institutions should therefore ceteris paribus exhibit more inegalitarian outcomes. 
Coordination is therefore consistent with lower inequality only where unions are 
strong and encompassing (e.g. Sweden) or where the State intervenes through the 
regulation of minimum wages (e.g. France). Where economic coordination is high but 
unions are smaller and there is no minimum wage regulation (e.g. Germany), 
coordination actually leads to higher inequality. 
These three arguments are tested using panel data regression analysis on a 
sample of Western European countries over the last three decades. The paper is 
organised as follows. The next section reviews the existing literature on wage 
inequality and argues it cannot account for the current patterns of inequality in the 
lower half of income distribution in Europe.  
The second section identifies a number of hypotheses concerning the impact 
on inequality of labour market dualisation, decommodifying and recommodifying 
welfare state policies and economic coordination in different institutional contexts. In 
the third section, the data, empirical model and estimation method are discussed. The 
fourth section presents the results of the empirical analysis. The last section concludes 
with some implications for further research on the relation between coordination, the 
welfare state and egalitarianism, and hence between efficiency and equity.  
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1. Previous literature on the determinants of wage inequality 
An important area of the literature in economics (1.1) and comparative 
political economy has looked at wage inequality (1.2). However, patterns of wage 
inequality over time and across countries contradict this conventional wisdom (1.3). 
 
1.1. Economic determinants of inequality 
Economics has attempted to explain inequality by analysing supply and 
demand for workers with different levels of skills. The literature generally agrees that 
a shift in the demand for skilled workers has raised the wage skill premium of skilled 
workers relative to non-skilled workers (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997: 647). One 
group of authors emphasise the role of technological change (e.g. introduction of 
computers) in making skilled workers more productive to employers and hence 
increasing the demand for skilled workers (Acemoglu, 2002; Freeman and Katz, 1995; 
Blau and Kahn, 1996; Goldin and Katz, 1996). Changes in the structure of 
employment, not least deindustrialisation, may also have reduced demand for low skill 
employment (Levy and Murnane, 1992). 
Rising trade competition may also have increased the relative demand for 
skilled workers as well as the supply of less skilled workers in developed countries 
(Wood, 1994; Freeman, 1995; Burtless, 1995). This argument generally assumes a 
Heckscher-Ohlin trade model where countries predominantly export goods that use 
their more abundant factor of production. If skilled workers are more abundant 
relative to unskilled workers in developed countries, then they will export high skill 
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products and import low skill goods. The increase in the supply of low skills goods 
leads to a lower domestic price for these goods. This in turn puts downward pressure 
on unskilled workers’ wages. As trade with developing countries increases, inequality 
between skilled and unskilled workers in developed countries therefore rises (Wood, 
1994: 58-60). To the extent that immigrants are, on average, less educated than 
natives, increases in immigration may also put further downward pressure on unskilled 
workers’ wages (Borjas et al., 1997: 357; Rueda and Pontusson, 2000: 357). 
In sum, trade openness and technological change are seen to increase 
inequality (Gottschalk and Danziger, 2005; Katz and Autor, 1999; Burtless, 1995; 
Atkinson, 2003; Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997; Wood, 1994). However, economic 
factors alone fail to fully account for existing inequality. For instance, these 
explanations cannot easily make sense of the fact that inequality has increased even 
within skills groups (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997: 645). In addition, inequality in 
literacy seems to explain only a small part of the variation in earnings inequality 
(Freeman and Devroye, 2002; Blau and Kahn, 2002).  
Last but not least, while technological change and increased trade has occurred 
in all EU countries, and could plausibly explain a rise over time of inequality, these 
factors are less able to explain variation between EU countries at one point in time 
(Mahler et al., 1999). The cross-national variation in wage inequality therefore 
requires a political and institutional explanation (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997).60 
                                                 
60
 Note that even for changes in inequality within a country over time, institutional change may matter 
more than other economic factors (see for instance Gordon, 1996 and Fortin and Lemieux, 1997). 
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1.2. Political and institutional determinants of inequality 
Important changes in inequality and the relative inability of economics to make 
sense of the cross-national diversity have motivated an emerging area of literature 
from a comparative political economy perspective. I therefore briefly review the 
political and institutional factors that have been shown to affect inequality. 
Political factors 
In line with other works in comparative politics that have examined the impact 
of partisanship on economic outcomes (Hibbs, 1977; 1987; Alt, 1985), the Power 
Resource approach (Korpi, 2006) stressed the impact of the ideology of the political 
party in power on the level of inequality. While the left can directly affect household 
disposable income through redistribution, the mechanism through which partisanship 
would affect gross earnings inequality is less clear.  
One channel through which the left can affect wage distribution is indirect. For 
instance, the left can decommodify labour more extensively through more generous 
social benefits and more regulated labour markets, thereby increasing the reservation 
wage of workers and in turn reducing inequality. This argument is therefore 
contingent on whether the left does indeed increase welfare state spending. The 
evidence concerning the impact of the left on the welfare state is mixed. While some 
studies find that the left increases welfare state spending (Garrett, 1998), other authors 
contend that partisan differences over the welfare state are fading (Pierson, 2001; 
Huber et al., 1999). More recent evidence by Rueda (2008) suggests that policies that 
reduce inequality are themselves undertaken more by left governments.  
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Another way the left may affect the distribution of gross earnings is by using 
policies that have a direct effect on wages. This channel is best illustrated by the use 
of minimum wage regulations that impose a floor on wage settlements (Dolado et al., 
1996). The left may also reduce inequality by expanding the size of the public sector 
which often entails more egalitarian61 wage settlements (Kahn, 1999). Last but not 
least, the left may influence private sector wage agreements. Governments can for 
instance extend collective bargaining agreements to all workers in an economy or 
change the wage distribution “through arbitration or the imposition of mandatory 
wage controls” (Wallerstein, 1999: 655).  
Besides political parties and welfare state policies, early studies of inequality 
have focused on the role of unions. While, in principle, unions can raise inequality by 
increasing the wage premium for union members only, while leaving the wages of 
non-unionised workers unchanged, empirical evidence suggests that the presence of 
unions has overall equalising effects. More specifically, unions have been found to 
mitigate inequality both within and across unionised companies (Freeman, 1993; 
Freeman, 1980; Freeman, 1982; Swensson, 1989). This finding is consistent with the 
notion that unions operate in a more democratic fashion than markets do. If the 
median income is lower than the average income of a unionised worker, lower 
inequality should be favoured by the majority of unionised workers, and unions can be 
expected to reduce inequality (Rueda and Pontusson, 2000: 359). 
 
                                                 
61
 See for instance Katz and Krueger (1991) on the US public sector. 
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Institutional factors 
However, union density may not be an adequate proxy for the number of 
workers covered by a wage agreement in countries with low union density but high 
bargaining coverage. This is for instance the case in France, where union density is 
very low whereas wage bargaining coverage is particularly high as a result of the 
extension of bargaining agreement by the government. Most empirical tests confirm 
that a high bargaining coverage mitigates the degree of inequality (Fortin and 
Lemieux, 1997; Freeman and Katz, 1995; Traxler and Brandl, 2009: for a review of 
the evidence). 
Since Katzenstein (1985; 1987) it is recognised that countries exhibit 
fundamental differences in the way their institutions are structured and in the way 
their markets are organised (Soskice, 1990). Differences in these institutions have far 
reaching implications for the extent of wage inequality across countries. For instance, 
institutions such as wage bargaining and union centralisation have been shown to have 
significant negative effects on inequality (Card et al., 2003; Wallerstein, 1999).62 Most 
of the literature finds that centralised wage setting, where “national union 
confederation and the national employers’ organisation can influence and control 
wage levels and patterns across the economy” (Aidt and Tzannatos, 2001: 9), reduces 
inequality more than company level bargaining.  
                                                 
62
 Though note that bargaining centralisation has been found to be less prominent (Golden and 
Longredan, 2006) than initially argued by Wallerstein (1999). 
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Wallerstein (1999: 673-675) identifies three sets of reasons why higher 
centralisation leads to lower wage inequality. A first reason is that market determined 
(decentralised) pay agreements may be inefficient in the presence of some strongly 
unionised industries. In such a context, the unionised sector earns above market 
clearing wages. This leads to a misallocation of labour, and a sub-optimal aggregate 
employment level. Centralisation therefore reduces inequality by restoring efficient 
pricing of different labour inputs.  
Second, centralisation may empower certain workers at the expense of others. 
More specifically, centralisation is likely to empower median income workers. Since 
these workers have an incentive to reduce inequality in contexts where the mean wage 
is higher than the median wage, this results in lower inequality (Freeman and Medoff, 
1984). Third, higher centralisation may increase the ability of workers to impose 
norms of fairness on the wage distribution and makes it more likely that low wage 
unions “demand redistributive measures” (Rueda and Pontusson, 2000: 361). The 
extent of wage centralisation may also mitigate the impact of falls in unionization 
rates or growing trade openness on inequality (Oskarsson, 2005; Kenworthy, 2007). 
However, institutions may matter beyond the wage setting process. The 
seminal work on VoC underscored the relation between the type of capitalism and 
economic outcomes (Hall and Soskice, 2001). More specifically, CMEs were seen as 
being as efficient as their liberal counterparts while achieving more egalitarian 
outcomes. CMEs are characterised by higher employment protection, more developed 
welfare states, stronger and more encompassing unions as well as more coordinating 
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wage bargaining institutions than LMEs. Seen in this light, they therefore combine all 
the institutional and political factors that have been shown to reduce inequality. The 
particular constellation of institutions follows the interests of firms in CMEs. These 
firms’ interests are in turn consistent with the product market strategies that they 
follow:  
“Product market strategies that rely on high levels of industry specific and firm specific 
skills are likely to create more egalitarian societies than product market strategies based on 
general skills” (Estevez-Abe et al., 2001: 156, 157). 
The link between skill regimes and inequality operates crucially through the 
impact that skill regimes have on the opportunities of low income workers: 
“Countries with well-developed … vocational training systems provide a stable economic 
future even to those students who are not academically strong. General education systems, 
in contrast, offer these students relatively few opportunities for improving their labour 
market value outside of the school system” (ibid). 
Rueda and Pontusson  (2000) further show how the type of VoC may also 
mediate the influence of various factors on wage inequality. Their analysis confirms 
that wage bargaining centralisation reduces inequality but the effect of centralisation is 
stronger in Social Market Economies (SMEs).63 In addition to affecting the impact of 
centralisation, the type of capitalism also determines whether partisanship has an 
effect on inequality. More specifically, they find that left control of government only 
reduces inequality in LMEs consistent with the notion that governments are more 
constrained in SMEs (ibid: 375-376). Only union density is found to have a consistent 
(negative) effect on inequality in both LMEs and SMEs. (ibid: 379). 
                                                 
63
 While they focus on the difference between Social Market Economies (SMEs) and other economies, 
the overlap between their SME category and CMEs is strong, and the underlying logic similar. 
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1.3. The puzzle of inequality at the bottom of the income distribution 
Table 11 summarises the results of previous studies in comparative political 
economy that have looked specifically at wage inequality between the 5th and the 
bottom decile. Iversen (1999), Pontusson et al (2002) and Rueda’s (2008) results all 
show a strong and significant negative effect of wage bargaining centralisation on 
inequality. Minimum wages, higher government employment and union density also 
reduce wage inequality. Unemployment and corporatism have ambiguous effects with 
the negative effect being significant only in certain specifications. The coefficient for 
partisanship,64 trade, the size of the female labour force or of private sector services 
and monetary policy are not statistically significant.  
In 2005, European countries exhibited significant cross-national variation in 
this measure of inequality (Table 12). A number of puzzling features are apparent. 
Denmark, despite its social democratic welfare regime, has a higher inequality than 
countries with Bismarckian welfare regime such as Belgium and France (Esping-
Andersen, 1990). The Power Resource approach and the welfare state regime literature 
suggest that Social democratic welfare regimes with a strong labour movement should 
have lower inequality (Korpi, 2006; Esping-Andersen, 1990). However, Denmark has 
a higher level of union density than France, Belgium and Norway, so Danish 
inequality is hard to reconcile with this literature.  
 
                                                 
64
 Note, however, that Rueda does find that the control of the government by the left affect variables 
that reduce inequality ((2008)) 
  
 
168
Table 11: Summary of determinants of inequality between 5th and bottom deciles 
Variables  Iversen (1999) Pontusson et 
al. (2002) Rueda (2008) 
Centralisation of wage bargaining --- --- --- 
Corporatism 
  
0/- 
Left partisanship 0 0 
 
Union density 0/- - 
 
Welfare state generosity 
  
0 
Minimum wage 
  
--/- 
Monetary policy accommodation 0 
  
Government employment 
 
--- --/- 
Private sector services 
 
0 0 
Female Labour force 
 
0 0 
Trade from least developed 
countries 
 
0 0 
Total trade 0 
  
Unemployment - 0 0/- 
Note: ---, --, - negative effect at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels; 0 no significant effect. When 
results differ between specifications, both results are mentioned separated by /. 
Source: Iversen (1999), Pontusson et al. (2002), Rueda (2008). 
 
Similarly, the higher degree of centralisation in Denmark than in France and 
Finland is hard to reconcile with the finding in the literature that wage centralisation 
reduces inequality. Also, one cannot make sense of this higher inequality in Denmark 
with either Openness which was higher in Belgium, or with the size of its public sector 
which was higher than in Finland and France. 
Even more striking, Germany, the archetype of the Coordinated Market 
Economy (CME), has a higher inequality than Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) 
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such Ireland and the UK. The higher degree of coordination generally attributed to 
Germany is reflected by its higher degree of centralisation. Wage coordination is also 
– not surprisingly – much higher in Germany than in the UK. In sum, there is 
surprising variation in wage inequality both within and across welfare regimes and 
types of capitalism. This variation cannot be easily explained by the Power Resource 
or the VoC literature, nor is it consistent with the findings of the three studies 
reviewed in Table 11. 
Given that wage inequality is measured among full-time dependent employees, 
it is important to ensure that the surprising German and Danish ranking is not the 
result of a bias. This could be the case if low income workers in the UK, France and 
Belgium are, on average, more likely to be in temporary or part-time work and hence 
the measure of inequality is biased downwards in these countries. This is unlikely to 
be the case as the share of temporary employment is higher in Germany than in the 
UK, and higher in Denmark than in Belgium. Similarly, the share of part-time 
employment is higher in Germany than in France, Belgium and Ireland, and higher in 
Denmark than in Belgium (see Table 13). Thus, including part-time and temporary 
employees when measuring wage inequality between the median and bottom deciles 
of the income distribution would likely increase inequality more in Germany and 
Denmark than in the other countries. 
Furthermore, hourly earnings inequality between workers employed in the 
industry and services – regardless of the type of contract they have – is higher in 
Germany and Denmark than in Belgium, France, Ireland and the UK. The same is true 
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when analysing the hourly earnings ratio of workers on indefinite contracts relative to 
those on fixed term contracts. If one considers instead the hourly earnings ratio of 
workers with medium, relative to low education, the German ratio is again larger than 
in France, Belgium, Ireland or the UK, and the ratio in Denmark is larger than in 
Belgium or France.  
 
Table 12: European wage inequality between 50th and 10th deciles in 2005 
Country 
Wage 
inequality 
Union 
density 
Wage 
coordination 
index 
Centralisation 
Public 
sector 
employees 
Trade 
Openness 
Germany 1.95 21.64 4.00 0.50 24.54 76.92 
Ireland 1.83 36.81 5.00 0.45 24.55 151.55 
UK 1.82 29.27 1.00 0.30 26.31 56.17 
Greece 1.72 22.98 4.00 0.40 30.45 53.91 
Austria 1.70 33.00 4.00 0.76 24.58 104.40 
Spain 1.67 14.98 4.00 0.46 19.81 56.64 
Netherlands 1.65 21.92 4.00 0.60 28.06 130.72 
Portugal 1.61 n.a. 3.00 n.a. 22.34 64.96 
Italy 1.61 33.77 4.00 0.35 22.75 51.96 
Denmark 1.53 71.70 3.00 0.44 32.33 93.07 
France 1.47 8.01 2.00 0.24 30.08 53.35 
Norway 1.46 54.87 4.00 0.52 n.a. 72.80 
Finland 1.42 72.43 4.00 0.43 30.76 79.49 
Belgium 1.40 52.86 5.00 0.48 32.58 156.44 
Sweden 1.35 76.04 3.00 0.53 34.23 89.04 
Note: Centralisation and wage coordination are higher for higher values of the index. 
Source: See section 3.1 for data sources. 
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Table 13: Temporary and part-time employment, and hourly earnings inequality 
  
Temporary 
work 
 
Part-
time 
work 
 Hourly earnings 
ratio 
industry/services 
Ratio indefinite 
duration/fixed-
term 
Ratio medium/low 
educational 
attainment 
Belgium 8.86 19.29 1.033 1.146 1.107 
Denmark 9.84 17.59 1.117 1.463 1.179 
France 13.88 13.92 1.001 1.147 1.147 
Germany 14.24 21.84 1.115 1.328 1.555 
Ireland 3.67 20.37 1.064 1.279 1.102 
UK 5.76 23.04 1.034 1.165 1.304 
Year 2005 2005 2002 2006 2006 
Source: Temporary and part-time employment as a share of total dependent employees (OECD statistic 
website), hourly earnings ratio industry/services (EU KLEMS database) and ratios of indefinite/fixed 
and medium/low educational attainment (Eurostat, SES 2006; earn_ses06_22). 
 
2. Hypotheses: Power resources, coordination, and dualisation 
This section derives a number of hypotheses concerning the impact of welfare 
state policies, economic coordination and labour market dualisation on inequality. The 
expansion of the temporary work sector and the parallel deregulation of employment 
protection legislation in this sector have put upward pressure on inequality 
(Hypothesis 1). I challenge the conventional wisdom concerning the effect of 
coordination and welfare state policies. Welfare state policies may increase or 
decrease inequality depending on whether they decommodify or recommodify benefit 
recipients (Hypothesis 2). Also, economic coordination is consistent with lower 
inequality only in settings where the unions are strong and inclusive and/or where 
there is a national statutory minimum wage regulation (Hypothesis 3).  
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2.1. Hypothesis 1: Labour market dualisation and inequality 
In parallel to changes in inequality, European economies have undergone the 
dualisation of their labour market policies and institutions (Palier and Thelen, 2010; 
Iversen and Soskice, 2009). For the purpose of this paper, dualisation is understood as 
a process of differentiation in rights, protection and conditions of work that can be 
observed between insiders, regular workers in full-time permanent protected and well-
paid jobs, and outsiders in temporary or part-time work, low protection and low pay 
jobs. This conceptualisation of insiders is akin to Piore’s (1972: 2) characterisation of 
jobs in the primary sector with “relatively high wages, good working conditions, 
chances of advancement, equity and … employment stability”.  
One should further distinguish between the process of dualisation, the dualism 
in policy outputs that this process generates, and the divides between different workers 
in terms of wage outcomes, for example (Emmenegger et al., 2012). The analysis of 
dualisation remains in its infancy and no attempts have been made to systematically 
link policy dualism to developments in wage inequality. Inequality in wages between 
low income and middle income full-time workers therefore represents a good testing 
ground for the impact of the dualisation processes and the effect of insiders’ 
institutions on outsiders’ welfare (cf. Oliver, 2010).  
There is both a quantitative (i.e.: number of outsiders) and a qualitative (i.e.: 
how much they are protected) aspect to labour market dualisation. Here I focus on 
temporary work for which there are data for both the size of the temporary work sector 
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and the extent to which the sector is regulated. The larger the size of temporary work 
and the less temporary workers are protected the more dualised a labour market.  
I expect labour market dualisation between temporary and permanent workers 
to lead to greater inequality among permanent workers. Indeed, to the extent that 
temporary workers have on average lower skills and wages, the growth of the 
temporary work sector should put greater pressure on permanent workers with low 
income, thereby increasing inequality. From this discussion I therefore derive the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The more dualised the labour market between temporary and 
permanent workers the higher the inequality between median and low income 
workers. 
 
2.2. Hypothesis 2: Power resources, decommodification and recommodification 
In the Power Resource (PR) approach, the strength of the labour movement is a 
key determinant of positive labour market policies such as generous unemployment 
benefits and also outcomes such as lower unemployment and inequality (Korpi, 1983; 
Korpi, 2006; Stephens, 1979; Esping-Andersen, 1999). Left-wing parties are seen to 
represent the interests of labour and hence will expand welfare state institutions in a 
way that is conducive to workers’ interests. The effect of these policies that the left 
generally expands - total social expenditures, benefit generosity, labour market 
policies, and so on – are then seen to lead to more egalitarian distributive outcomes 
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(Bradley et al., 2003). Therefore the argument has two observable implications: (1) 
the left expands welfare state policies, and; (2) this leads to lower inequality.  
Though in the PR literature, the effect of the left works through welfare state 
policies, so there are two reasons why one should consider the effect of partisanship 
and welfare state policies separately. First, as I have shown in the first paper of this 
thesis, the left may actually oppose some welfares state policies if they have a 
detrimental impact on employed workers. Second, in many European countries 
governments also have a direct role in the wage setting process (Wallerstein, 1999). If 
left-wing governments prefer lower inequality than right-wing governments, then one 
should expect that left control of the government has a direct mitigating effect on 
inequality, distinct from the effect which they may have through welfare state policies. 
In addition to partisanship, union strength can lead to lower inequality through 
two mechanisms. First, as discussed earlier in the literature review, unions have both 
more preferences for the compression of wages and more capacity than isolated 
individuals to negotiate wages (Kenworthy, 2010; Freeman and Medoff, 1984). The 
stronger the unions, the more they will be able to impose their preferences for low 
inequality in the wage bargaining process. Second, it is important to analyse union 
strength separately from left government control because these two actors may not 
have the same preferences for welfare state policies (Jensen, 2011). Stronger unions 
may successfully push for certain welfare state policies, regardless of the government 
in power. I therefore expect higher union density to have a negative effect on wage 
inequality.  
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Lastly, a vast area of the literature has argued that the welfare state serves to 
decommodify labour which should ceteris paribus reduce inequality (Esping-
Andersen, 1990). However, welfare states have undergone profound reforms of the 
design of existing policies, for instance through activation (Clasen and Clegg, 2006; 
Daguerre, 2007), and new policies such as in-work benefits have been introduced 
(Leppik, 2006). The implication of these reforms and new policies is that welfare state 
policies may have become increasingly recommodifying (Pierson, 2001), in the sense 
of incentivising workers to accept low income jobs.  
If this is true, recommodifying welfare state policies should be associated with 
higher, not lower, inequality. For instance, among the set of Active Labour Market 
Programmes (ALMPs) that countries can undertake, two programmes - employment 
incentives and rehabilitation - incentivise unemployed workers to return to 
employment. To the extent that these programmes recommodify - rather than 
decommodify - workers, they should be associated with higher inequality. In sum, I 
test the following two hypotheses concerning the impact of the left, unions and 
welfare state polices: 
Hypothesis 2a: Stronger unions and the control of government by the left are 
associated with lower inequality. 
Hypothesis 2b: Decommodifying welfare state policies reduce inequality but 
recommodifying welfare state policies increase inequality. 
 
  
 
176
2.3. Hypothesis 3: The ambiguous effect of economic coordination 
Different types of capitalism can be equally efficient but with important 
differences in terms of social and egalitarian outcomes (Hall and Soskice, 2001). The 
efficiency of an economy depends on the ability of firms in capitalist countries to 
solve various coordination problems across spheres of the economy. These spheres 
include the provision of skills (training), worker-employer relations (industrial 
relations), internal management practices and access to capital (financial system). 
Problems can be solved either through market or non-market coordination. One should 
distinguish between CMEs where firms rely mostly on non-market coordination and 
Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) where firms coordinate through the market. 
Countries that rely on a mix of market and non-market coordination belong to Mixed 
Market Economies (MMEs) and are generally less efficient (Hancke et al, 2007; Hall 
and Gingerich, 2004). 
The high skill and high value added production strategy of CMEs is seen to 
allow for more solidaristic wage settlements. As was discussed earlier in section 1.2, 
the VoC literature expects CMEs to be more successful in mitigating inequality 
between median and low income workers because of more coordinated wage 
bargaining and a greater ability to raise the skills of low income workers. The 
expectation from this literature is that CMEs should be associated with more 
egalitarian outcomes than non-CMEs.  
However, as was documented in section 1 using descriptive data, wage 
inequality at the lower end of the income distribution is now higher in a number of 
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CMEs than in other MMEs and LMEs. To understand why that might be the case, it is 
important to distinguish the degree of coordination of an economy from the 
inclusiveness of its coordinating institutions.  
Recall that the neoclassic economics literature has long shown that unions win 
higher wages for their members as opposed to non-members, a process commonly 
referred to as ‘union wage gap’ (Borjas, 2005: 428). There is a large body of evidence 
to substantiate the claim that there exists such a union wage premium (Budd and Na, 
2000; Freeman, 1984; Hirsch, 2004). However, there are two contradicting effects at 
work. On the one hand, unionised workers earn more, everything else being equal, 
than their non-unionised counterparts, but on the other hand, unions reduce inequality 
between their members (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). 
If unions are more likely to unionise median and high income workers than 
low income workers, only unions which cover the vast majority of the workforce 
would have low income workers among their ranks. This assumption is consistent 
with existing evidence which documents the over-representation of the top quintile 
relative to the bottom quintile in most other European countries (Becher and 
Pontusson, 2011: Table 2). Perhaps more directly relevant, and further confirming this 
assumption, Checchi et al. (2007: 17, 18) show that “trade unions mainly attract 
workers from the intermediate earnings group.” More specifically, their findings 
demonstrate that the probability of union membership is lower when the income of the 
worker is further away from the median. This effect is stronger for workers with 
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incomes below the median than those with incomes above the median. This result 
holds for the vast majority of European countries in their sample. 
If unions often do not count among their members low income workers, and if 
economic coordination increases the productivity of coordinated workers and 
strengthens the union movement, higher coordination should increase the wages of 
median income workers more than of low income workers. As a result, economic 
coordination that covers only median income workers actually leads to greater 
inequality between median and low income workers.  My argument entails a similar 
logic to theories that emphasise the adverse efficiency implications of centralised but 
insufficiently encompassing institutions (e.g. Calmfors and Driffill, 1988), but stresses 
instead the equity implications: coordination in the absence of a strong and inclusive 
labour movement creates inequality at the bottom of income distribution.  
In constructing a conceptual distinction between the coordinating and 
equalising effects of institutions, I follow the distinction developed by Swank et al. 
(2008: 8) between coordination, the “extent to which actors rely on non-market 
coordination”, and egalitarianism, “egalitarian income and employment.” As a result, 
both “high levels of equality with liberalisation” and “declining solidarity in the 
context of continued significant coordination” represent possible paths (Thelen, 2012: 
137).  
My expectation is therefore that economic coordination will not increase 
inequality where the union movement is still strong and encompassing, as is for 
instance the case in Sweden. Where high coordination occurs in the presence of 
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national statutory minimum wage regulations, this should also mitigate the 
inegalitarian effects of coordination. In other words, minimum wage regulation is a 
functional equivalent to encompassing coordination. To sum up, two hypotheses are 
tested concerning the effect of coordination: 
Hypothesis 3a: On average economic coordination increases inequality. 
Hypothesis 3b: The effect of economic coordination on inequality is negative 
only where unions are strong and encompassing and/or in the presence of 
national minimum wage regulations. 
 
3. Testing the hypotheses: empirical model and estimation method 
This section briefly describes how I operationalise my hypotheses (3.1), 
identifies the data and specifies the empirical model (3.2) and discusses the chosen 
estimation method (3.3). 
 
3.1. Operationalisation of my hypotheses 
To test my first hypothesis concerning the effect of labour market dualisation 
on inequality, I create an index of dualisation which is obtained by calculating the 
ratio of temporary work (share of the labour force) divided by the employment 
protection legislation for temporary workers. Thus, this index captures the fact that 
dualisation increases as the size of temporary work expands and the regulations of the 
sector are reduced. I expect this dualisation index to be associated with higher 
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inequality (hypothesis 1). This index is lagged once to account for the fact that the 
effect of dualisation on inequality is unlikely to be instantaneous.  
The second set of hypotheses partly build the Power Resource approach by 
expecting wage inequality to be negatively associated with left control of the 
government, union strength and welfare state policies. To test the effect of the strength 
of the left (hypothesis 2a), I include the share of the cabinet controlled by the left in a 
given year65  and the size of the union, captured by the share of workers that is 
unionised (i.e.: union density - see appendix for sources and detailed description of all 
the variables).  
To investigate the impact of the decommodifying welfare state policies on 
inequality (hypothesis 2b), I focus on the unemployment benefit system which is an 
important determinant of workers’ reservation wage. More specifically, I include the 
unemployment benefit replacement rate in the first year of unemployment (CEPS-
OECD data). In addition, to show that not all welfare state spending is necessarily 
conducive to equality, I also create a variable “Bad ALMPs”66 which sums spending 
on employment incentives and employment rehabilitation programmes. Employment 
incentives and rehabilitation programmes are good examples of recommodifying 
policies. I expect this variable to be positively associated with wage inequality. 
                                                 
65
 Note that other measures of left strength will also be tested. 
66
 Note that the adjective is used purely for convenience: though the choice of the adjective seems value 
loaded, I do not wish it to convey a normative point. These ALMPs are only ‘bad’ insofar as they may 
have adverse effects on wage inequality. 
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Finally, to test whether CMEs have systematically lower inequality than LMEs 
(hypothesis 3a) the analysis mainly67 relies on the Hall Gingerich (2004) index of 
coordination that ranges from 0 (low coordination) to 1 (high coordination). If VoC is 
correct, this index should be negatively associated with inequality. By contrast, I 
expect this variable to be either insignificant or positively associated with inequality 
because economic coordination raises the bargaining power of median income worker 
but leaves the bargaining power of low income workers unchanged.  
Furthermore, I test whether the effect of coordination on inequality is 
contingent on the strength of labour and institutions (hypothesis 3b). To do so I create 
two interaction terms between coordination on the one hand and union density and the 
presence of the minimum wage regulations. My expectation is that coordination only 
increases inequality where union density is low and there are no statutory minimum 
wages. 
 
3.2. Data and Empirical model 
My sample includes 15 European countries (EU15 minus Luxembourg plus 
Norway) for all available years up until 2007, though the sample when all relevant 
independent variables are considered jointly, comprises 10 EU countries (Belgium, 
                                                 
67
 I also test the effect of union centralisation in wage bargaining which captures “both union authority 
and union concentration at multiple levels” (Visser, 2009). As a robustness check I also test this 
hypothesis using the wage coordination index which was also developed by Visser (2009). See Table 
A3.3 in the appendix for more details on these two variables. 
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Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK). 
The baseline regression that is estimated for i countries in t years is:  
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Where INEQ is the dependent variable, wage inequality between the median 
and bottom income deciles in year t in country i, UD is union density, LEFT is control 
of the cabinet by the left, TSS is total public social spending, and COORD is the index 
of coordination mentioned earlier. The variables DUA, REP, and BADALMP 
represent the index of dualisation, unemployment benefits replacement rate and the 
sum of spending on employment incentives and rehabilitation programmes, 
respectively. The description and sources of each variable can be found in Table A3.3 
in the appendix. I also control for a number of economic factors identified in the 
economic literature (see section 1.1) such as unemployment, GDP growth and trade 
openness (total trade as a % of GDP). 
While openness can be expected to increase inequality (Wood, 1994), the 
expectations for growth and unemployment are less clear. To the extent that 
unemployment puts downward pressure on low income workers, this could raise 
inequality. On the other hand, if low skill workers are priced out of the labour market 
as a result of institutions that prevent wages from falling too low (e.g. minimum wage 
regulation) then the two might be positively correlated.  
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Last but not least, the analysis also considers a number of other factors that 
may have an effect on my dependent variable: the size of the public and 
manufacturing sector (% of total employees), inflation, educational attainment, and the 
presence of statutory national minimum wage, the amount of the minimum wage 
relative to the median income, and the structure of the labour market (share of self-
employment, part-time and temporary employment relative to total employment). 
 
3.3. Preliminary statistical tests and estimation method 
A number of preliminary statistical tests were carried out to identify the correct 
estimation method. The null hypothesis that all the panels contain a unit root is 
rejected, so I conclude that non-stationarity is not a problem.68 Heteroskedasticity69 
and auto-correlation are present 70  so the appropriate estimation method is robust 
clustered standard error.71  
The Hausman test does not suggest that country72  fixed effects should be 
included. Note further that my index of economic coordination is time invariant and so 
partly captures cross-national variation. Indeed, when including fixed country effects, 
                                                 
68
 More specifically, the Fisher unitroot test was used. 
69
 LR test of heteroskedasticity rejects the null of homoskedastic disturbances. 
70
 Wooldridge test for autocorrelation rejects the null of no-first order autocorrelation. 
71
 The stata command that was used in Stata 11 is: xtreg … , vce (cluster id). 
72
 The Hausman test was performed on a regression with wage inequality as the dependent variable and 
a number of independent variables (GDP growth, unemployment rate, the degree of openness and the 
control of the cabinet by the left, union density, total social public expenditures, and the Hall Gingerich 
index of coordination). 
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Stata automatically drops the index of coordination. Time effects were included as an 
F-test rejected the null hypothesis that all year coefficients are jointly zero. 
Multicollinearity tests were also undertaken on the main independent variables 
(GDP growth, unemployment rate, left share of cabinet, openness, union density, 
economic coordination, total social public expenditures, index of dualisation, ‘bad 
ALMPs’ and the replacement rate). The variance inflation factors for my independent 
variables were all under 4.05 and tolerance levels under 0.84, suggesting 
multicollinearity is not a concern. 
 
4. Results 
This section first presents the results for the baseline regression (4.1). Next, I 
investigate the stability of the results when a range of variables accounting for 
competing explanations are included and carry out a number of robustness checks 
(4.2). The effect of coordination on inequality and how it varies depending on the 
strength of unions and the presence of minimum wage regulation is then discussed 
(4.3). 
 
4.1. Baseline results 
Table 14 presents the regression results. I first report the results for a 
parsimonious model that tests the impact of power resources, coordination and 
economic factors on wage inequality. Each column then introduces an additional 
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variable: dualisation, ‘bad ALMPs’ (i.e.: employment incentives and rehabilitation), 
and the replacement rate. The fully specified model is presented in column 4. Column 
1 shows the results for a baseline model. GDP growth, unemployment, openness and 
the left share of the cabinet have no statistically significant effect on the dependent 
variable. The index of coordination is similarly insignificant. Union density and public 
expenditures have a negative significant effect on wage inequality.  
The second column introduces my index of dualisation which is positive and 
significant as expected. Other coefficients remain essentially unchanged. The third and 
fourth columns introduce the unemployment benefit replacement rate and my variable 
‘bad ALMPs’. More generous replacement rates have a negative effect on wage 
inequality, whereas ‘bad ALMPs’ are associated with higher wage inequality. The 
negative effect of openness also becomes statistically significant in the fully specified 
model. 
In the fifth column, I include fixed country effects instead of time effects, 
which results in the regression dropping the index of coordination (since it is fully 
time invariant). Union density, social expenditures, the replacement rate and 
employment incentives become insignificant as the country fixed effects absorb the 
cross-national variation in my dependent variable. Note however that my index of 
dualisation is still significant in the presence of country effects. 
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Table 14: Determinants of wage inequality between 5th and bottom decile 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GDP growth rate 0.00602 0.00818 0.01532 0.02362* 0.00318 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) 
Rate of Unemployment  0.01130 -0.00295 -0.01877** -0.00430 -0.02206 
(% of Civilian Labour 
Force) 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.016) 
Trade-to-GDP-ratio -0.00096 -0.00082 -0.00050 -0.00172*** -0.00240 
(Total trade) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
Union density -0.00294*** -0.00378*** -0.00387*** -0.00385*** 0.01220 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) 
Left cabinet 0.00004 0.00014 -0.00028 -0.00007 0.00022 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Social 
Expenditures 
-0.02647** -0.01901* 0.00153 -0.01799** -0.00458 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) 
Index of coordination -0.00378 0.38517 0.59213*** 0.56422*** (omitted) 
(Hall Gingerich) (0.215) (0.273) (0.122) (0.070)  
Index of dualisation  0.01704** 0.02285*** 0.01497*** 0.00690** 
(lagged)  (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) 
Replacement rate   -0.00410*** -0.00700*** 0.00501 
(first year)   (0.001) (0.001) (0.012) 
Employment incentives 
and rehabilitation 
programmes 
   0.35813*** 0.36326 
(Spending as % of GDP)    (0.048) (0.244) 
Constant 2.27639*** 1.88898*** 1.58844*** 2.09955*** 1.12538 
Observations 195 146 107 107 107 
Number of id 14 14 10 10 10 
Country FE No No No No Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes No 
R-squared within 0.24 0.29 0.35 0.44 0.34 
R-squared between 0.60 0.80 0.97 0.99 0.39 
R-squared overall 0.67 0.72 0.87 0.91 0.31 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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The control of the government by the left does not seem to have an impact so I 
further investigate whether alternative proxies for these variables have an effect on 
inequality. The results are presented in Table 15. Columns 1 and 2 investigate the 
effect of the left share of parliament and a moving average of left cabinet shares, 
respectively. 
Column 1 shows the result when the left share of cabinet is replaced by the left 
share of parliament. The effect of the left is still insignificant, in line with the 
expectation that the control of the government does not directly alter wage 
distribution. It is plausible that the effect of partisanship takes a significant amount of 
time to feed into economic outcomes, so I also test for the inclusion of a four year 
moving average of my variable, left share of the cabinet. This does not alter the 
results.  
The negative coefficient for openness was also surprising as it ran counter to 
theoretical expectations that more openness may result in higher inequality by putting 
downward pressure on low income workers’ wages.73 In columns 3 and 4, I therefore 
look at imports and total trade with emerging and developing market economies, 
because trade with these countries tends to be in goods that utilise low skill low 
income workers. The negative significant coefficient suggests that higher imports 
from developing countries are also negatively associated with inequality. 
  
                                                 
73
 This suggests that openness may put more downward pressure on median income workers than on 
those in the bottom income decile. 
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Table 15: Alternative measures of left and openness 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GDP growth rate 0.02350* 0.02400** 0.01376 0.01608 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014) 
Rate of Unemployment  -0.00615 -0.00470 -0.00709 -0.00324 
(% of Civilian Labour Force) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Trade-to-GDP-ratio -0.00185*** -0.00173***   
(Total trade) (0.001) (0.000)   
Union density -0.00387*** -0.00383*** -0.00442*** -0.00405*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Social Expenditures -0.01683** -0.01763** -0.01164 -0.01061 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) 
Index of coordination 0.57153*** 0.55805*** 0.59007*** 0.58866*** 
(Hall Gingerich) (0.077) (0.068) (0.071) (0.070) 
Index of dualisation 0.01545*** 0.01487*** 0.01687*** 0.01665*** 
(lagged) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Replacement rate -0.00713*** -0.00691*** -0.00725*** -0.00737*** 
(first year) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Employment incentives and 
rehabilitation programmes 
0.35982*** 0.35384*** 0.31002*** 0.30097*** 
(Spending as % of GDP) (0.056) (0.058) (0.046) (0.044) 
Left parliament -0.00090    
 (0.001)    
Left cabinet  -0.00015   
(4 years moving average)  (0.000)   
Left cabinet   -0.00005 -0.00005 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Imports from Emerging and 
developing economies 
  -0.01655***  
   (0.003)  
Trade to and from Emerging and 
developing economies 
   -0.01025*** 
    (0.002) 
Constant 2.13341*** 2.09796*** 1.97839*** 1.92307*** 
Observations 107 107 107 107 
Number of id 10 10 10 10 
Country FE No No No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared within 0.44 0.44 0.37 0.37 
R-squared between 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
R-squared overall 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.90 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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4.2. Controlling for additional factors and robustness checks 
Table 16 investigates the impact of additional factors on the stability of the 
results presented in column 4 in Table 14. Column 1 just reproduces the results from 
column 4 in Table 14 to facilitate the investigation of the stability of results. Columns 
2 and 3 test the effect of other characteristics of the union movement on inequality. 
Column 2 shows the results when union centralisation is included. The coefficient of 
union centralisation is not significant, while the other coefficients of my main 
independent variables are unchanged. In column 3, I test for the inclusion of 
bargaining coverage which does not have a significant impact. 
Columns 4 to 6 consider the effect of labour market institutions. A particularly 
important institution for inequality at the lower end of the income distribution is 
minimum wage regulations. Here the main difference between countries is whether 
they have a statutory national minimum wage. Using Visser’s (2009) minimum wage 
setting data, I create a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the country has a 
national statutory minimum wage and 0 otherwise. As expected, the presence of a 
national statutory minimum wage has a significant negative impact on inequality 
(column 4). 
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Table 16: Determinants of wage inequality: including additional controls 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GDP growth rate 0.02362* 0.02342* 0.02827** 0.02282 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) 
Rate of Unemployment  -0.00430 -0.00473 -0.00733 -0.00103 
(% of Civilian Labour Force) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) 
Trade-to-GDP-ratio -0.00172*** -0.00168*** -0.00201*** -0.00156*** 
(Total trade) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Union density -0.00385*** -0.00384*** -0.00396*** -0.00417*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Left cabinet -0.00007 -0.00006 -0.00025 0.00003 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Social Expenditures -0.01799** -0.01824** -0.01429 -0.01937** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Index of coordination 0.56422*** 0.57483*** 0.47836*** 0.51023*** 
(Hall Gingerich) (0.070) (0.083) (0.077) (0.071) 
Index of dualisation 0.01497*** 0.01513*** 0.01118*** 0.01298*** 
(lagged) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Replacement rate -0.00700*** -0.00700*** -0.00788*** -0.00658*** 
(first year) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Employment incentives and 
rehabilitation programmes 
0.35813*** 0.36117*** 0.40694*** 0.35322*** 
(Spending as % of GDP) (0.048) (0.049) (0.063) (0.055) 
Union centralisation  -0.02512   
Bargaining coverage (adjusted)   -0.00042  
Minimum wage dummy    -0.03647** 
Constant 2.09955*** 2.10871*** 2.19678*** 2.14930*** 
Observations 107 107 104 107 
Number of id 10 10 10 10 
Country FE No No No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared within 0.44 0.44 0.46 0.43 
R-squared between 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
R-squared overall 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.91 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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To further investigate the impact of minimum wages and ensure that my 
analysis does not suffer from an omitted variable bias, I also test for the effect of the 
level of the minimum wage in countries that do have statutory minimum wage 
regulations. More specifically, my variable measures the value of the minimum wage 
relative to the median wage in each country. Again the coefficient is negative and 
significant (column 5). Besides minimum wage regulation, employment protection 
legislation may also affect the wage bargaining power of workers. Higher employment 
protection legislation for regular workers could enable skilled workers to extract 
higher wages relative to low income workers on temporary contracts. The coefficient 
for employment protection legislation for regular workers is not however statistically 
significant (column 6). 
Columns 7 to 11 analyse the effect of other economic and structural factors. 
Column 7 tests for the effect of the supply of higher skills in the economy. Previous 
literature has underscored the possibility that inequality was driven by an increase in 
the educational attainments of some workers. Following Wallerstein (1999), I use 
educational attainment of the total population aged 15 and over, expressed as average 
years of schooling.74 There does not seem to be any significant impact. Note that 
studies using more sophisticated measures of education do not find any impact on my 
measure of inequality either (Mahler, 2011). 
  
                                                 
74
 Taken from a dataset collected by Barro and Lee (2000). 
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Table 16 (continued): Determinants of wage inequality: stepwise inclusion of additional 
controls 
Column (5) (6) (7) 
GDP growth rate 0.03147** 0.02524* 0.02363* 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) 
Rate of Unemployment  -0.00705 -0.00443 -0.00535 
(% of Civilian Labour Force) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Trade-to-GDP-ratio -0.00133*** -0.00171*** -0.00172*** 
(Total trade) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Union density -0.00504*** -0.00419*** -0.00373*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Left cabinet -0.00019 -0.00005 -0.00007 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Social Expenditures -0.01320* -0.01826** -0.01792** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
Index of coordination 0.39400*** 0.61912*** 0.57654*** 
(Hall Gingerich) (0.105) (0.117) (0.084) 
Index of dualisation 0.00989** 0.01566*** 0.01522*** 
(lagged) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Replacement rate -0.00742*** -0.00657*** -0.00704*** 
(first year) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Employment incentives and 
rehabilitation programmes 
0.38208*** 0.36862*** 0.35419*** 
(Spending as % of GDP) (0.060) (0.064) (0.051) 
OECD minimum wage relative to 
median 
-0.13329**   
Employment Protection Legislation 
(regular workers) 
 -0.02604  
Educational attainment   -0.00411 
Constant 2.19947*** 2.10331*** 2.13123*** 
Observations 105 107 107 
Number of id 10 10 10 
Country FE No No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared within 0.48 0.44 0.44 
R-squared between 0.98 0.99 0.99 
R-squared overall 0.92 0.91 0.91 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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In column 8, I examine whether inflation affects distinct income groups 
differently. The coefficient is positive but not significant. Technological change was 
identified as a potential driver of recent trends in inequality in section 1. Following the 
OECD (2012), I use spending on Research and Development in the private sector as a 
proxy for technological change. The coefficient is not significant further confirming 
that economic factors do not seem to drive wage inequality at the low end of the 
income distribution. 
In columns 10 and 11, the effect of the size of the manufacturing and public 
sector employment75 is analysed. Public sector employees are generally conceived to 
have more egalitarian wage structures. However, I find no empirical support for this 
claim (column 10), which may be consistent with the drive towards more flexible 
wage scales emblematic of New Public Management (Sindane, 2004; Taylor-Gooby, 
2008; Grimshaw, 2009), which has been taking place in public sectors across Europe.  
Deindustrialisation may have reduced the availability of well-paid jobs for low 
income workers, whereas the concurrent expansion of the service sector may have 
increased the supply of well-paid jobs for skilled workers. I find no empirical support 
for this claim as the coefficient of my manufacturing variable is not statistically 
significant (column 11).  
  
                                                 
75
 Both are expressed as a share of total labour force – see appendix for details. 
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Table 16 (continued): Determinants of wage inequality: stepwise inclusion of additional 
controls 
Column (8) (9) (10) (11) 
GDP growth rate 0.02332* 0.02317 0.02325* 0.02298* 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) 
Rate of Unemployment  -0.00374 -0.00616 -0.00585 -0.00871 
(% of Civilian Labour Force) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
Trade-to-GDP-ratio -0.00174*** -0.00181*** -0.00172*** -0.00182*** 
(Total trade) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Union density -0.00386*** -0.00391*** -0.00341*** -0.00363*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Left cabinet -0.00005 -0.00010 -0.00003 0.00002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Social Expenditures -0.01793** -0.01984** -0.01644* -0.01959** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
Index of coordination 0.55339*** 0.59456*** 0.51566*** 0.55600*** 
(Hall Gingerich) (0.066) (0.074) (0.102) (0.059) 
Index of dualisation 0.01483*** 0.01560*** 0.01373*** 0.01335*** 
(lagged) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Replacement rate -0.00707*** -0.00654*** -0.00606*** -0.00702*** 
(first year) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Employment incentives and 
rehabilitation programmes 
0.36249*** 0.34625*** 0.29997*** 0.32172*** 
(Spending as % of GDP) (0.046) (0.056) (0.064) (0.050) 
Consumer price index 0.00331    
Spending on R&D (business sector)  -0.00409   
Public sector employees (% total 
employees) 
  -0.00443  
Manufacturing sector (first 
difference) 
   0.03006 
Constant 2.09705*** 2.12875*** 2.18723*** 2.21947*** 
Observations 107 96 100 100 
Number of id 10 10 9 9 
Country FE No No No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared within 0.43 0.45 0.46 0.47 
R-squared between 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
R-squared overall 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Columns 12 to 14 test whether including the share of self-employed, 
involuntary part-timers and temporary employment affects the results. My measure of 
wage inequality is for full-time dependent employees only, so it is important to control 
for the share of workers not covered by my dependent variable. None of my results are 
affected and only the (negative) coefficient for the share of involuntary part-time 
workers is statistically significant.76 
Last but not least, columns 15 to 17 display the results when including a proxy 
for the extent of immigration, the share of the female labour force and a control of unit 
labour costs. My findings concerning the effect of coordination, dualisation, ‘bad 
ALMPs’ and replacement rate are unchanged. Throughout columns 2 to 17, the 
substantive results for my independent variables therefore remain stable. In line with 
my hypotheses, total social expenditures and union density have a negative impact on 
inequality77 whereas economic coordination is positively associated with economic 
inequality. Dualisation and ‘bad ALMPs’ are associated with higher inequality 
throughout, whereas high unemployment benefit replacement rates reduce inequality. 
  
                                                 
76
 Note that when including temporary work, the dualisation index has to be dropped since it is 
composed of temporary employment. 
77
 Except in column 3 where bargaining coverage is included and the coefficient for total social public 
spending loses statistical significance. 
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Table 16 (continued): Stepwise inclusion of additional controls 
Column (12) (13) (14) 
GDP growth rate 0.02368* 0.02726** 0.02778** 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) 
Rate of Unemployment  -0.00632 0.00387 0.00960 
(% of Civilian Labour Force) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) 
Trade-to-GDP-ratio -0.00194*** -0.00156*** -0.00231*** 
(Total trade) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Union density -0.00387*** -0.00395*** -0.00300*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Left cabinet -0.00010 0.00000 0.00049 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Social Expenditures -0.01753** -0.01271* -0.03768*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) 
Index of coordination 0.56872*** 0.47943*** 0.34987*** 
(Hall Gingerich) (0.070) (0.064) (0.094) 
Index of dualisation 0.01480*** 0.01453***  
(lagged) (0.005) (0.004)  
Replacement rate -0.00692*** -0.00599*** -0.00904*** 
(first year) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Employment incentives and 
rehabilitation programmes 
0.36902*** 0.32500*** 0.50698*** 
(Spending as % of GDP) (0.056) (0.044) (0.069) 
Self-employment (% of civilian 
employment) 
0.00386   
Share of involuntary part-timers 
(total employment) 
 -0.02748**  
Share of temporary employment (% 
Dependent employment)  
  0.00179 
Constant 2.06456*** 1.91668*** 2.78138*** 
Observations 107 99 112 
Number of id 10 10 10 
Country FE No No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared within 0.44 0.51 0.35 
R-squared between 0.99 0.99 0.96 
R-squared overall 0.91 0.92 0.87 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 16 (continued): Stepwise inclusion of additional controls 
Column (15) (16) (17) 
GDP growth rate 0.02417* 0.02617** -0.00791 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.006) 
Rate of Unemployment  -0.00364 0.00005 -0.00524 
(% of Civilian Labour Force) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) 
Trade-to-GDP-ratio -0.00157*** -0.00179*** -0.00108 
(Total trade) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
Union density -0.00402*** -0.00397*** -0.00366*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Left cabinet -0.00006 0.00007 0.00036 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Social Expenditures -0.01757* -0.01868** -0.00553 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) 
Index of coordination 0.56757*** 0.55773*** 0.42472*** 
(Hall Gingerich) (0.076) (0.068) (0.120) 
Index of dualisation 0.01500*** 0.01395*** 0.01289** 
(lagged) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Replacement rate -0.00714*** -0.00718*** -0.00630** 
(first year) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Employment incentives and rehabilitation  0.35833*** 0.38973*** 0.26010*** 
programmes (Spending as % of GDP) (0.049) (0.052) (0.044) 
Civilian labour force females % of pop 15-64 0.00086   
 (0.003)   
Unit Labour Cost  0.00888*  
  (0.005)  
Inflows of foreign population by nationality   0.00072 
(lagged once)   (0.006) 
Constant 2.03406*** 2.05980*** 1.82396*** 
Observations 107 107 51 
Number of id 10 10 8 
Country FE No No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared within 0.44 0.45 0.57 
R-squared between 0.99 0.99 1.00 
R-squared overall 0.91 0.91 0.98 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 17 summarises how the key results hold when different variables are 
included. Three sets of robustness checks are also undertaken. First, I run a jack-knife 
analysis (stepwise country exclusion) on my EU10 sample using the baseline model 
(i.e.: equivalent to column 4, Table 14). This shows that the key results for dualisation, 
‘bad ALMPs’, replacement rate, union density and total social expenditures are robust 
to the exclusion of any one country in my sample (see Table A3.1 in appendix). 
Second, since changes in wage inequality are slow moving, I run the analysis 
replacing annual observations by a 3 year period average. Column 4 in Table A3.2 (in 
appendix) shows that this does not affect the sign or significance of my main 
variables. Note further that including fixed effects in this smaller sample (maximum 
65 observations) does not affect the coefficient of dualisation nor of ‘bad ALMPs’ 
(column 3). In columns 5 to 10, I test for the stability of these results to the inclusion 
of other relevant economic and structural factors in (educational attainment, size of 
manufacturing sector, imports from emerging market economies, consumer price 
index, size of manufacturing and public sector, and spending on research and 
development) as well as institutional factors (statutory minimum wage, union 
centralisation, bargaining coverage). My main results are unchanged. 
Third, I rerun the analysis using different measures for two of the key 
independent variables: coordination and dualisation. For coordination, I rely on the 
wage coordination index developed by Visser (2009), which ranges from zero - low 
coordination - to five - high coordination (see Table A3.3 for details on this variable). 
My previous index of dualisation was calculated by dividing the share of temporary 
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work by the EPL for temporary work. Instead, I now standardise and rescale from 1 to 
10 both EPL for temporary workers and the share of temporary work in total 
employment. The results using wage coordination and this new index dualisation are 
the same as before, as shown in Table A3.4 in the appendix. I also carry out a standard 
jack-knife robustness analysis, shown in Table A3.5 in the appendix, to investigate the 
impact of any specific country on my results. The results concerning labour market 
dualisation are sensitive to the exclusion of Germany. This was not the case when 
using the dualisation index that attributed lower weight to EPL of temporary work 
(Table A3.1). Given the measurement problems associated with EPL indices, more 
confidence can be attributed to the index that gives a lower weight to the EPL index. 
Recall further measuring only the ‘quantitative dimension’ of dualisation by testing 
the effect of the size of the temporary work sector also yielded similar results.  
One therefore faces a trade-off between choosing an indicator that has greater 
conceptual validity and one that has greater empirical validity. On the one hand, 
measuring both the quantitative (share of temporary work sector) and qualitative 
(EPL) dimensions of dualisation seems conceptually warranted. On the other hand, the 
qualitative dimension of dualisation (EPL index) suffers from more severe 
measurement problems. The dualisation index that only gives a more limited weight to 
the index EPL strikes a good balance between excluding the index all together and 
giving greater weight the EPL of the temporary work sector.  
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Table 17: Summary stability of results when additional factors are included 
Effect on:  Included 
variable 
Coordination Dualisation Union 
density 
Replacement 
rate 
Bad 
ALMPs 
Left parliament  0 +++ +++ --- --- +++ 
Left cabinet (4y MA) 0 +++ +++ --- --- +++ 
Left Cabinet 0 +++ +++ --- --- +++ 
Imports from EMEs 
--- +++ +++ --- --- +++ 
Total trade with 
EMEs --- +++ +++ --- --- +++ 
Union centralisation 0 +++ +++ --- --- +++ 
Bargaining coverage 0 +++ +++ --- --- +++ 
Minimum wage 
dummy -- +++ +++ --- --- +++ 
Relative minimum 
wage -- +++ +++ --- --- +++ 
EPL regular workers 0 +++ +++ --- --- +++ 
Educational 
attainment 0 +++ +++ --- --- +++ 
Consumer Price 
Index 0 +++ +++ --- --- +++ 
Spending on R&D 0 +++ +++ --- --- +++ 
Share employees in 
public sector  0 +++ +++ --- --- +++ 
Share employees in 
manufacturing sector 0 +++ +++ --- --- +++ 
Share of self-
employment 0 +++ +++ --- --- +++ 
Share of involuntary 
part-timers -- +++ +++ --- --- +++ 
Share of temporary 
employment 0 +++ excluded --- --- +++ 
Civilian labour force 
females % of pop 15-
64 
0 +++ +++ --- --- +++ 
Unit Labour Cost + +++ +++ --- --- +++ 
Inflows of foreign 
population 0 +++ ++ --- -- +++ 
Note: +++-, ++, + positive effect at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels; ---, --, - negative effect at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels; 0 no significant effect. EMEs stand for Emerging Market 
Economies. All variables’ sources and definitions can be found in Table A3.3 in the appendix. 
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4.3. The effect of coordination 
Together these results strongly rule out an important causal force of economic 
drivers alone. My results also suggest that economic coordination has a positive effect 
on inequality, contradicting the expectations of VoC, but consistent with Germany’s 
high wage inequality. To test whether this positive effect is contingent on the strength 
of labour and the presence of mitigating institutions (Hypothesis 3b), I create two 
separate interaction terms between coordination on the one hand, and union density 
and the presence of minimum wage regulations on the other.  
The results for these two interaction terms are reported in Table 18. Column 1 
and 2 show that economic coordination has a more positive effect on inequality where 
union density is low and where there are no national statutory minimum wage 
regulations in place in the country. These results explain why France’s coordination 
was consistent with egalitarian outcomes whereas coordination may have resulted in 
higher inequality in Germany and Denmark. The marginal effect of coordination78 on 
inequality is .195 (p-value 0.018) when there is no national statutory minimum wage 
regulation as in Germany but -0.17 (p-value 0.006) where there is a minimum wage 
regulation such as in France.  
  
                                                 
78
 These marginal effects were calculated using the margin command in Stata on the following 
regression: “quietly xtreg w5010 gdpgr ur ud man leftc tss l.dua c.minimum##c.hi  i.year, vce (cluster 
id)”/// “margins , dydx(hi) at( (mean) _all minimum=(0(1)1))”. 
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Table 18: The contingent effect of Coordination and its mediating role 
Column (1) (2) 
GDP growth rate -0.00107 0.00634 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
Rate of unemployment  -0.02719*** 0.00108 
(% of Civilian Labour Force) (0.007) (0.007) 
Manufacturing employees  0.02972*** 0.00957 
(% of total employees) (0.011) (0.009) 
Left cabinet 0.00037 0.00003 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Total public social expenditures -0.00830 -0.02009*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
Index of dualisation 0.00772*** 0.00601*** 
(lagged) (0.003) (0.002) 
Index of coordination 0.54021** 0.19515** 
 (0.259) (0.083) 
Union density 0.00770* -0.00469*** 
 (0.004) (0.000) 
Union density *Index coordination -0.01799***  
 (0.006)  
Minimum wage dummy  0.09343*** 
  (0.026) 
Minimum wage*Index coordination  -0.36707*** 
  (0.047) 
Spending on R&D   
(Business sector)   
Spending on R&D* Index of coordination   
   
Wage share    
(% of GDP)   
Wage share * Index of coordination   
   
Constant 1.11730*** 1.94175*** 
Observations 136 136 
Number of id 13 13 
Country FE No No 
Year FE Yes Yes 
R-squared within 0.28 0.33 
R-squared between 0.77 0.91 
R-squared overall 0.80 0.87 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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These findings are also consistent with the fact that CMEs such as Sweden that 
have a strong and encompassing union movement do have low levels of inequality. 
Indeed, the marginal effect of coordination on inequality is 0.344 (p-value 0.047) 
when union density is 20% (cf. Germany in 2005) but -0.552 (p-value 0.004) when 
union density is 60%.79 
Last but not least, recall that I argue in the second paper that replaceability is 
higher where coordination is low. The implication of the second paper therefore is that 
dualisation should have a more detrimental effect on inequality in low coordination 
countries than in high coordination countries. I test whether the effect of dualisation 
on inequality is indeed mediated by the level of coordination. The results of the 
regression including an interaction effect between dualisation and coordination is 
shown in table AA3.1 in appendix A3.2. Calculating the marginal effect of the 
interaction term confirms, consistent with my argument about replaceability, that a 
large temporary work sector has more adverse effects on inequality in low 
coordination countries than in high coordination countries (see table AA3.2 in 
appendix A3.2). 
 
                                                 
79
 These marginal effects were calculated using the margin command in Stata on the following 
regression: “quietly xtreg w5010 gdpgr ur open man leftc tss l.dua c.ud##c.hi  i.year, vce (cluster id)” /// 
“margins, dydx(hi) at( (mean) _all ud=20 hi=0.9)” /// “margins , dydx(hi) at( (mean) _all ud=60 
hi=0.9)”. 
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Conclusion 
This paper has investigated the political, institutional and economic 
determinants of inequality between median and bottom gross earnings deciles. The 
cross-national variation in this type of inequality across Western Europe seemed at 
odds with the main approaches in comparative political economy. Whereas the VoC 
literature had underscored the potential for CMEs to be as efficient as LMEs while 
achieving more egalitarian outcomes, Germany is now in some respects more unequal 
than the UK. Similarly, the PR approach stresses the successful egalitarian 
achievements of social democratic Scandinavian countries. However, by 2005 
Denmark had become more unequal than France, and Norway more unequal than 
Belgium (Table 12). 
To solve this puzzle, this paper has argued that one needs to distinguish 
between the degree of coordination of an economy, the effect of social democratic 
parties in government as well as the policies they support, and the degree of 
inclusiveness and strength of unions. More specifically, three sets of hypotheses were 
tested. First, I tested the effect of labour market dualisation on inequality, and 
convincingly show that dualisation is associated with higher inequality. In other 
words, a growing unregulated temporary work sector also has adverse effects on 
inequality between permanent workers. Increased dualisation between insiders and 
outsiders therefore also exacerbates inequality between insiders. 
Second, I argue that stronger unions and the control of the government are 
associated with lower inequality. While convincing evidence was found for unions, no 
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empirical support was found for the left. This is consistent with a general trend 
towards activation, where governments of different political leanings converge on a 
similar activation agenda and dualisation (Emmenegger et al., 2012; Rueda, 2007), 
where the left increasingly disregards the interests of precarious workers.  
I followed the PR approach in contending that welfare state policies are 
conducive to lower inequality. Policies that are traditionally associated with social 
democrats, such as high replacement rates have a mitigating impact on the wage 
inequality by increasing the reservation wages of low income workers. Similarly, 
institutions such as statutory national minimum wage do play a key role in reducing 
inequality. However, this article departed in one crucial respect concerning 
recommodifying weflare state policies. I argue that the shift of the welfare state away 
from decommodifying policies such as unemployment benefits and towards 
recommodifying policies such as employment incentives should be detrimental to 
wage inequality. In line with this expectation, my findings show that spending on 
employment incentives and rehabilitation have a robust positive effect on wage 
inequality.  
The third set of hypotheses concern economic coordination. In contrast to VoC 
literature, I argue that economic coordination is likely to increase inequality because it 
increases the productivity and bargaining power of median income workers much 
more than of low income workers. Furthermore, the effect of economic coordination 
on inequality is negative only where unions are strong and encompassing and/or in the 
presence of national minimum wage regulations.  
  
 
206
Overall my findings therefore qualify in important respects the effect of PR 
and VoC on inequality. This paper demonstrates that the link between coordination, 
welfare state spending and egalitarianism is not straightforward. Wage inequality at 
the low end of the income distribution is shown to be driven mostly by political and 
institutional – rather than economic – factors. The fact that coordination can actually 
increase inequality in the absence of inclusive institutions or interest groups has two 
sets of broader implications for further research. First, this calls for a reconsideration 
of the link between coordination and the degree of egalitarianism. Second, 
disentangling the effects of coordination on outcomes from those of inclusiveness may 
shed new light on the relationship between efficiency and equality.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
“The precariat is not a class-for-itself, partly because it is at war with itself. 
One group in it may blame another for its vulnerability [...]. A temporary low-
wage worker may be induced to see the ‘welfare scrounger’ as obtaining more 
[…] at his or her expense. […] Tensions within the precariat are … 
preventing them from recognising that the social and economic structure is 
producing their common set of vulnerabilities.” 
   Standing (2011) The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class. 
 
 
This thesis has analysed the political economy determinants of labour market 
policies targeted at outsiders in Western Europe and their consequences for inequality 
between insiders in the median and bottom income deciles. European political 
economies have undergone profound changes in the last three decades with wide-
ranging implications for their labour markets. These changes have been driven by 
external pressures such as globalisation in trade and finance as well as European 
integration, and internal shifts such as deindustrialisation and socio-economic changes. 
As a result, the share of labour market outsiders has risen across Western 
European countries and the prevailing consensus concerning the appropriate 
macroeconomic and labour market policy tools have been challenged. The growing 
number of outsiders has increased the political and economic salience of labour 
market policies and institutions that target them. The main approaches in comparative 
political economy continue to explain the cross-national variation in traditional labour 
market policies such as unemployment benefits and EPL of regular workers.  
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However, the literature’s ability to explain labour market policies that target 
outsiders in Europe became more limited as the interests and conditions of insiders 
and outsiders diverged. This thesis has therefore investigated the political and 
institutional determinants of labour market policies targeted at outsiders and their 
consequences for inequality between insiders. Outsiders are heterogeneous in their 
preferences and interests, therefore this broader question was tackled in three separate 
articles united by their focus on labour market outsiders and embedded in the 
emerging literature on dualisation, policy dualism and divides (Emmenegger et al., 
2012). Each article has addressed its own research question and presented a self-
contained and empirically tested argument.  
The first paper looked at the political and institutional determinants of different 
ALMPs targeted at unemployed workers. In the second paper, a regulatory labour 
market policy was considered by taking the case of EPL of temporary workers. Both 
articles shared a focus on government policy choices concerning outsiders and paid 
particular attention to the interactions between institutions and partisanship.  The third 
paper shifted the focus to the labour market outcomes of insiders, by investigating the 
determinants of inequality between workers in the median and bottom deciles of the 
income distribution. 
The rest of this concluding chapter is organised as follows. I first briefly 
summarise the findings of each paper. I then identify a number of broader 
contributions to the comparative political economy literature and discuss some 
potential avenues for further research. 
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1. Summary and findings of each paper 
1.1. Paper 1 - Partisanship, welfare regimes and ALMPs in Europe 
The first article was motivated by conflicting theoretical expectations 
concerning the role of left-wing parties in explaining cross-national differences in the 
level of spending on ALMPs. This raised the question of how left-wing parties in 
governments affect spending on ALMPs. I argued that one should look at distinct 
ALMPs separately since they have different economic effects and hence distinct 
political determinants. Political parties are also likely to be influenced by the welfare 
regime in which they are located when choosing which ALMPs they prefer. 
Through an in-depth qualitative investigation of what different political parties 
have done across Europe and applying a quantitative regression analysis of the 
determinants of spending on different ALMPs in a sample of fifteen Western 
European countries, the paper yielded three main findings. First, the left does not 
promote policies such as employment incentives and rehabilitation because these have 
adverse effects on labour market insiders. This finding is consistent with the 
expectation of the insider-outsider literature that left-wing parties should not promote 
policies that benefit outsiders. 
Second, the left in continental European welfare states was more favourable to 
direct job creation schemes than the right because these schemes benefit both insiders 
and outsiders. Thus, the left can indeed expand policies that benefit outsiders if they 
are also consistent with insiders’ interests. However, in Scandinavia where there is 
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more capacity to expand the public sector and the labour movement is more inclusive, 
the left is reluctant to create temporary jobs for outsiders.  
Third, training schemes are important for the efficiency of the economy and 
hence are driven by non-partisan dynamics, most notably the welfare state regime in 
which the government makes policy choices. Governments of all political stripes that 
are in welfare regimes that have coordinated market economies such as Scandinavia 
have more incentives to spend more on training. 
 
1.2. Paper 2 - Partisanship, coordination and EPL for temporary workers in Europe 
By solving the puzzle of the surprisingly good fate of temporary workers in 
France, the second article addressed the broader question of what determines 
temporary work regulations across Europe, how this affects permanent workers’ 
welfare, and how this in turn creates the potential for cross-class coalitions between 
temporary and permanent workers. Whereas most European countries have been 
deregulating temporary work in the last three decades to find flexibility at the margin 
and address their competitiveness and unemployment problems, France went in the 
opposite direction. 
I argue the left in France has an incentive to re-regulate the temporary work 
sector because permanent and temporary workers have overlapping interests in 
protecting temporary work. The high degree of interest overlap in turn results from the 
greater ability of employers to substitute permanent by temporary workers. 
Specifically, low wage coordination, general skills and the educational profile of 
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temporary work makes it easier for employers to use temporary workers. The fear of 
replaceability of permanent workers is higher; therefore they support policies that 
make it less attractive for employers to replace them by temporary workers. 
The argument was tested using both a small N in-depth analysis of the French 
reforms of temporary work regulations and large N logistic regression analyses. After 
showing that permanent workers in France report higher fear of replacement, findings 
from a regression analysis showed that replaceability is indeed higher when skills are 
more general and wage coordination is lower. In turn, wage coordination is a strong 
predictor of government choices to deregulate or re-regulate temporary work, and the 
effect is especially strong where the left is in power. Last but not least, the study of 
French reforms of temporary work EPL demonstrates that the French socialist party 
did indeed tighten temporary work regulations in the last three decades to prevent 
replaceability. 
 
1.3. Paper 3 - Power resources, coordination and wage inequality in Europe 
In the third paper, the focus shifted to explain labour market outcomes and the 
effects of ALMPs and temporary work deregulation on these outcomes were analysed. 
The case of wage inequality between median and bottom income deciles workers 
represents a puzzle because previously egalitarian countries such as Germany and 
Denmark were shown to have become much more unequal. The fact that German 
inequality was, by 2005, higher than in the UK and that Danish inequality had become 
higher than in France, seems at odds with the expectations of the two main approaches 
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in comparative political economy. The Power Resource approach and the VoC 
literature would have us expect that inequality should be lower in Germany than in the 
UK and lower in Belgium and France than in Denmark. 
Using a panel data regression analysis, the paper argues that solving this 
puzzle requires a disentanglement of the positive and negative effects of both welfare 
state policies and economic coordination. More specifically, while decommodifying 
policies do indeed reduce inequality, recommodifying policies such as employment 
incentives have adverse effects on inequality. Similarly, the deregulation - and 
increased share of temporary work - has adverse effects on inequality between 
permanent workers. 
Moreover, where economic coordination becomes less inclusive, low income 
workers are excluded from its beneficial egalitarian effects. Thus, economic 
coordination is associated with lower inequality only in high union density countries 
or where the government intervenes in the labour market through minimum wage 
regulations. The findings therefore identify the conditions under which the 
expectations of Power Resource approach and the VoC literature continue to hold. 
Lastly, by considering the impact of the dependent variables of the first and 
second articles of this thesis, the findings from the third paper demonstrate the 
distributive relevance of these dependent variables. Specifically, spending on 
employment incentives and increased labour market dualisation are associated with 
greater inequality. The results from the third article also further confirm the argument 
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made in the first paper that employment incentives have adverse effects on wage 
inequality between insiders in the median and bottom income deciles. 
 
2. Four broader contributions 
By confronting the main theories in comparative political economy with the 
emerging phenomenon of dualisation and the rise of outsiders, several new research 
avenues open up. Considered together, the arguments and findings of the three papers 
lead to four broader contributions to the existing literature.  
First, the three articles point to the relevance of systematically investigating the 
link between the determinants of dualisms in welfare state policies and how these in 
turn influence the extent of divisions between workers. Second, they contribute to a 
better understanding of the interplay between the interests of actors such as left-wing 
parties and institutions such as welfare regimes in determining labour market policies. 
Consistent with the expectations of historical institutionalism, countries’ institutions 
such as coordination and welfare regimes both constrain and determine actors’ 
preferences.  
A third broader contribution is that the welfare state may not always be in the 
interests of labour and it therefore cannot be assumed that the left necessarily spends 
more on all welfare state policies, regardless of their actual effects. Conversely, right-
wing parties’ interests may be consistent with certain welfare state policies. Seen in 
this light, further research should investigate whether enduring welfare state spending 
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is driven by the fact that all parties can find ‘something they like’ rather than the 
traditional lock-in and feedback effects of policies. Finally, the findings of this thesis 
suggest that the relation between economic coordination and egalitarianism is more 
complex than is often recognised with theoretically important consequences for the 
relation between efficiency and equity in Europe. 
 
2.1. Dualisation, dualism and divides 
Dualisation is a multi-dimensional process, where one should distinguish 
between the analysis of its process, the policy dualism that results and the divisions 
that this generates (Emmenegger et al., 2012). This thesis has taken as its starting 
point that distinct dimensions of dualisation need to be considered separately. 
The findings from the second and third papers show the analytical value of 
distinguishing between the determinants of policy dualism and the effect this dualism 
may have on the divide between workers that emerge. Specifically, the second paper 
shows that temporary work deregulation depends on the choice of political parties 
operating under different institutional contexts. The third paper in turn uncovers the 
impact of temporary work deregulation on wage inequality between median and 
bottom income deciles. The extent to which insiders are affected by the working 
conditions of outsiders therefore determines policy choices that may have significant 
implications for distributive outcomes among insiders. Thus, this thesis confirms that 
there are linkages between different spheres of the economy as well as between 
developments in the labour market and policies (cf. Palier and Thelen, 2010). 
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Moreover, when analysing the determinants and consequences of dualisation, 
the interests of insiders and outsiders cannot be assumed to be constant across various 
policy domains. As the first and third papers show, certain policies are consistent with 
both insiders and outsiders’ interests whereas others may be detrimental to insiders. 
The preferences of left-wing parties for policies will in turn be influenced by the 
particular impact of the policy under consideration. Like the seminal research of 
Rueda (2007), the findings of this thesis emphasise the relevance of insiders’ 
preferences and show that the left does not necessarily support all labour market 
policies.  
However, the findings of this thesis also suggest that the overlap between 
insiders and outsider preferences is potentially larger than assumed by earlier 
literature. Future research should further investigate the political and institutional 
determinants of cross-national variation in policy dualism and how this in turn shapes 
the evolution and diversity of divides in Western Europe. Last but not least, further 
research should investigate the extent to which political parties respond to the 
demands and preferences of insiders and outsiders and how they exploit insider-
outsider divides strategically in the electoral arena.80 
 
                                                 
80
 At the time of writing, new promising research projects are currently emerging to fill this gap (see for 
instance the work of the ECPR Political Economy standing group which recently hosted a workshop on 
“Socio-Economic Inequalities and Political Cleavages in Post-Industrial Societies” convened by Jose 
Fernandez Albertos, Silja Hausermann, and Achim Kemmerling in March 2013 in Mainz, Germany). 
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2.2. Actors, institutions and labour market policies 
A second theme that runs through the three articles concerns the continuing 
relevance of political parties, despite the various pressures that governments are 
subjected to (Boix, 1998; Garrett, 1995; Bonoli, 2008; Cameron, 1984; Hibbs, 1977). 
In contrast to some literature that contends partisan differences are fading (e.g. Huber 
and Stephens, 2001), my analysis of the recent period shows partisanship continues to 
matter.  
Indeed, the findings of both the first and second paper demonstrate that 
partisanship continues to matter even for – the ‘hard case’ of – specific policy outputs 
that target outsiders such as spending on different ALMPs and temporary work 
deregulation. In addition, the relevance of partisanship is not merely limited to supply-
side policies as shown by the significant effect of the left on direct job creation 
schemes in the first paper (cf. Boix, 1998). To the extent that welfare state policies 
continue to affect important distributional outcomes, the relevance of political 
contestation for office therefore remains.  
Moreover, consistent with the expectations from the institutionalist literature, 
the preference and ability of political actors are crucially shaped by the institutional 
context in which they operate and how it shapes the preferences of their constituents. 
Thus, the policy choices of left-wing parties are contingent on both the welfare 
regimes and the degree of economic coordination of the countries in which they are 
located. The findings of the articles suggest these latter institutions affect both the 
scope and preferences of core left-wing constituents towards labour market policies. 
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Throughout this thesis, the focus on interests and institutions followed loosely 
a historical institutionalist approach (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Hall, 1997; Steinmo et 
al., 1992). Indeed, the findings suggest that institutions do not merely act as 
constraints but also shape the interests and preferences of actors. For instance, the 
pressure to find flexibility at the margin is mediated by how institutions shape the 
effects of reforms on the electorate (cf. temporary work deregulation in the second 
article).  
In some cases where policies have important efficiency implications (e.g. 
training in the first article) the institutional structure even fully determines actors’ 
choices. Thus, the extent to which employers and the left are ‘protagonists’ or 
‘consenters’ of welfare state policies (Korpi, 2006) depends on the specific policy 
under consideration. Further research should therefore further analyse the conditions 
under which institutions constrain, shape or fully determine actors’ choices.  
 
2.3. Welfare state expansion is not always in the interests of the Left 
The findings from the first and second paper also shed new light on two claims 
generally associated with the Power Resource approach (Huber and Stephens, 2001; 
Korpi, 1983; Korpi and Palme, 2003; Huo et al., 2008): (1) that welfare state policies 
are in the interests of labour, and; (2) that they are therefore supported by left-wing 
parties. In contrast to the first claim, the third paper demonstrates that some labour 
market policies such as employment incentives may have detrimental effects on wage 
inequality because they recommodify labour. As a consequence, such policies are not 
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necessarily in the interest of labour, and hence may actually be opposed by left-wing 
parties.  
Thus, left-wing parties may not favour all welfare state policies and this is not 
only because they are increasingly constrained by external pressures such as 
globalisation, nor only because they are indifferent to the interests of outsiders. 
Conversely, even right-wing political parties may actually promote the expansion of 
the welfare state in certain policy domains. Previous literature has emphasised the role 
of Christian democrat support for the development of the welfare state in Europe (Huo 
et al., 2008; Castles, 1994; Castles, 1989; Castles and Obinger, 2007; Kersbergen, 
1995). Employment incentives schemes may on the other hand be supported by right-
wing parties because they are consistent with their market-enhancing agenda. In 
countries where the welfare state is well-developed and the left is strong, right-wing 
political parties may also have an incentive to spend more on the welfare state to 
“compensate for the lack of public trust” in their policy agenda (Jensen, 2010: 282). 
However, opposing welfare state expansion may be much harder for the left 
than opposing retrenchment. This is because right-wing parties are able to play 
outsiders against insiders and frame policies such as in-work benefits as ‘progressive’ 
because they prima facie benefit low income workers.81 If this is true, the overall 
resilience of welfare state spending attributed to path dependence by the new politics 
of the welfare state (e.g. Pierson, 2001) may in fact be driven by the right’s preference 
                                                 
81
 I have shown elsewhere that this was for instance the case in France with the recent adoption by the 
conservatives of an in-work benefit scheme (Vlandas, 2013c). 
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for different welfare state policies rather than outright retrenchment. Further research 
should examine other recent instances of welfare state expansion undertaken by the 
right, such as in-work benefits, and the implications this has for the resilience of 
welfare states in Europe. 
 
2.4. Coordination and egalitarianism 
A final broader contribution that emerges from the third paper of this thesis is 
that one should distinguish between the coordinating as well as efficiency improving 
functions of institutions, from their effects on egalitarian outcomes which depend 
crucially on institutions’ inclusiveness. Where coordination becomes less inclusive it 
may actually increase inequality between segments of the economy that are 
coordinated and those that are not. In other words, non-inclusive coordination may not 
only have adverse effects on efficiency (cf. Calmfors and Driffill, 1988) but also on 
equality. 
This finding echoes Thelen’s (2012) and Swank’s et al. (2008: 8) recent 
contributions that emphasise the necessity to conceptually distinguish between 
coordination and solidarity or egalitarianism. Thelen’s framework further suggests that 
capitalism may evolve along both dimensions so that lower coordination can occur 
while equality increases; and conversely, continued coordination may involve falling 
levels of solidarity. 
As an illustration of how this argument may be a worthwhile avenue for future 
research, one can compare the evolution of unemployment rates on the one hand, and 
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wage inequality between the median and bottom earnings deciles in Europe on the 
other. One can distinguish between four cases or potential paths along two 
dimensions: the degree of efficiency of an economy as captured by the unemployment 
rate, and the degree of egalitarianism as captured by wage inequality.  
For instance, Germany has become more unequal but remained as efficient 
between 1994 and 2007: wage inequality between the median and bottom income 
deciles increased from 1.71 to 1.93, while unemployment barely moved from 8.49% to 
8.71%.82 By contrast, over the same period France and the UK seem to have become 
both more efficient and more egalitarian: inequality decreased from 1.59 to 1.47 in 
France and from 1.83 to 1.81 in the UK while unemployment fell from 10.83% to 
7.94% in France and from 9.61% to 5.3% in the UK. Some countries such as Finland 
and Denmark became more efficient but marginally less egalitarian: inequality rose 
from 1.4 to 1.45 while unemployment fell from 16.63% to 6.86% in Finland, while in 
Denmark inequality rose from 1.47 to 1.55 while unemployment fell from 6.9% to 
4%.83 
Using Thelen’s (2012: 146) conceptualisation, Germany therefore seems to 
have retained its “strategic employer coordination” while becoming more dualised and 
less inclusive, whereas France has undertaken a strategy of embedded flexibilisation 
combining liberalisation and higher equality. Thus, distinguishing between the degree 
of coordination and the inclusiveness of coordinating institutions may help make sense 
                                                 
82
 Source: OECD Labour Force Statistics (2008). 
83
 Note data for wage inequality in Denmark is missing for 1994; the closest available year is 1996. 
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of the movements of European countries along various efficiency-equality paths, for 
instance in terms of unemployment and wage inequality. The relation between 
coordination and inclusiveness and how this determines various measures of 
inequality and performance would also represent a worthwhile avenue for further 
research. 
 
Conclusion 
The diversity in labour market policies, institutions and outcomes has been and 
will remain an important topic of inquiry for comparative political economy.  
European labour markets have undergone profound changes in the past three decades. 
Most notably, the share of outsiders has risen tremendously across Western European 
countries, which has resulted in a number of challenges to existing institutions and 
political organisations. Policies and institutions targeting insiders and outsiders can no 
longer be assumed to be driven by similar political dynamics nor can they be assumed 
to be equally conducive to the interests of insiders and outsiders.  
The labour market position of outsiders is undermining the ability of welfare 
states to cope effectively with the risks that individuals face. Resilient and large-scale 
unemployment is putting strain on unemployment insurance systems designed to cope 
with transitory risks. The growth of temporary workers with discontinuous 
attachments to the labour market undermines the logic of social insurance, as these 
workers are unlikely to work sufficiently to be eligible to these benefits. This new 
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‘reserve army’ of precarious workers also challenges the ability of unions to organise 
the disadvantaged workers and, as a result, the power resources of labour. 
This thesis has confronted the main approaches in comparative political 
economy with this reconfiguration of labour markets. More specifically, the three 
papers in this thesis have addressed the overarching question of the political as well as 
institutional determinants of outsiders’ conditions and their consequences for the 
extent of inequality between insiders. As the previous sections make clear, taking 
labour market dualisation seriously yields a number of theoretical contributions and 
suggests fruitful avenues for further research. 
Welfare state policies and economic coordination are no longer automatically 
in the interests of labour – if indeed they ever were. While having a large welfare state 
and a highly coordinated economy may be conducive to – or even necessary for the 
achievement of – labour’s interests, these are clearly not sufficient conditions. 
Whether welfare state policies recommodify or decommodify labour and the degree of 
inclusiveness of economic coordination are crucial intermediary factors to take into 
account. The conditions under which different welfare state policies and structures of 
economic coordination are conducive to labour’s interests will need to be further 
investigated. 
Perhaps not surprisingly then, the left does not support all welfare state 
policies and right-wing political parties may have an interest in increasing 
expenditures on recommodifying policies, rather than pushing for outright 
retrenchment. Seen in this light, the resilience of the welfare state is a direct 
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consequence of partisan differences concerning the design of welfare states rather than 
its level of spending per se or the mere presence of policy feedback, path dependence 
and institutional lock-in effects that the literature has traditionally emphasised.  
Moreover, parties of the left – and potentially even of other ideological stripes 
– are increasingly forced to navigate this new electoral environment. We still know 
comparatively little about the extent to which political parties of the left specifically 
respond to the needs of outsiders and whether this indeed clashes with insiders’ 
preferences. A fruitful emerging research agenda entails looking at the political supply 
by various parties to different outsider groups and how this political supply in turn 
affects various policy outputs when parties take control of the government. 
While it is important to conceptually differentiate between insiders and 
outsiders, it does not follow that these groups of workers necessarily have 
contradicting interests. The degree of overlap between the interests of insiders and 
outsiders depends crucially on various institutions such as the level of economic 
coordination but also on more structural factors such as workers’ skills. 
Insider-outsider divisions weaken labour’s organisational power not only 
because it creates a drift within labour but also because outsiders belong to a much 
more heterogeneous group than insiders. As a result, as the share of the workforce 
increasingly belongs to the outsider group, labour is significantly weakened. This 
problem is further accentuated by the fact that insider-outsider divisions also entail 
strong centrifugal forces. As the divides between insiders and outsiders grow through 
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a process of heightened labour market dualisation, this in turn exacerbates inequality 
between insiders themselves.  
As the current economic crisis unfolds, unemployment remains high and most 
job creation occurs in temporary contracts. If anything, outsiders are therefore likely to 
become a much larger class. The political and institutional determinants of insider-
outsider dynamics and their consequences for labour market policies and outcomes is 
therefore likely to remain a central line of inquiry for research in comparative political 
economy for the foreseeable future. 
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Appendix 
 
This appendix is separated in three sub-sections where each deals with the first, 
second and third paper, respectively. A list of Tables for each paper is provided at the 
beginning of each paper specific appendix. 
 
I: Appendix paper 1 
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Appendix A1.1 
 
Table A1.1: OECD Description of different ALMPs 
Full name Description 
Direct job creation 
These programmes create additional jobs - usually of community benefit or 
socially useful, and usually in the public or non-profit sector - for the long-term 
unemployed or persons otherwise difficult to place. The majority of the labour 
cost is normally covered by the public finance. Provisions for lifetime sheltered 
work in a non-productive environment should not be included. 
Employment 
incentives 
1. Recruitment incentives are programmes making payments for a limited 
period only to facilitate the recruitment of unemployed persons and other target 
groups into jobs where the majority of the labour cost is covered by the 
employer. They include payments to individuals that are conditional upon the 
take-up of a new job (back-to-work bonus, mobility/relocation allowance or 
similar) only if they are targeted (e.g. restricted to the long-term unemployed). 
2. Employment maintenance incentives are similar but facilitate continuing 
employment, in a situation of restructuring or similar. Generally-available in-
work benefits for low-income groups should not be included. 
Training 
1. Institutional training refers to programmes where most of the training time 
(75% or more) is spent in a training institution (school/college, training centre 
or similar). 
2. Workplace training refers to programmes where most of the training time 
(75% or more) is spent in the workplace. 
3. Alternate training (formerly called Integrated training) refers to programmes 
where training time is evenly split between a training institution and the 
workplace. 
4. Special support for apprenticeship refers to programmes providing incentives 
to employers to recruit apprentices from labour market policy target groups, or 
training allowances for particular disadvantaged groups. 
Public 
Employment 
Services (PES) 
and administration 
1.1 Placement and related services include open information services, referral to 
opportunities for work, training and other forms of assistance, counselling and 
case management of jobseekers, financial assistance with the costs of job search 
or mobility to take up work, and job brokerage and related services for 
employers, if spending on these functions can be separately identified. Services 
provided by the main public employment service and by other publicly-
financed bodies are included. 
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Full name Description 
1.2 Benefit administration expenditure includes the budget of institutions that 
manage the unemployment and early retirement benefits reported in Categories 
8 and 9, if this spending can be separately identified. 
1.3. Other expenditure includes the budget of institutions that provide 
placement and related services (if the relevant spending could not be separately 
reported in Category 1.1 above); institutions that manage labour market 
programmes in Categories 2 to 7 below (except for costs already included in 
these categories); and institutions that administer the benefits in Categories 8 
and 9 below (if these costs could not be separately identified in Category 1.2 
above). However if these institutions’ budgets cover functions that are outside 
the scope of this database (neither placement and related services, nor the 
management of active or passive labour market programmes within the scope of 
Categories 2 to 9), estimated spending on those functions should be excluded. 
Job rotation and 
job sharing 
3.1 Job rotation refers to schemes promoting the full substitution of an 
employee by an unemployed person or a person from another target group for a 
fixed period. 
3.2 Job sharing refers to schemes promoting the partial substitution of an 
employee by an unemployed person or a person from another target group. 
Source: OECD Employment outlook. 
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Table A1.2: Average spending on different ALMPs in each country 
Country Direct job creation 
Employment 
incentives and 
rehabilitation 
Training 
Austria 0.0335 0.0678 0.2165 
Belgium 0.5000 0.2539 0.1604 
Denmark 0.0464 0.7200 0.5300 
Finland 0.2652 0.1817 0.4061 
France 0.2170 0.2000 0.3626 
Germany 0.2043 0.1796 0.4000 
Greece 0.0023 0.0618 0.0695 
Ireland 0.3213 0.0622 0.3826 
Italy 0.0233 0.1650 0.2189 
Netherlands 0.1487 0.6035 0.1778 
Portugal 0.0322 0.1509 0.1878 
Spain 0.0887 0.2017 0.1548 
Sweden 0.1991 0.8283 0.6148 
UK 0.0435 0.0270 0.1670 
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Table A1.3: Dependent variables by country 
Austria Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ALMPs 23 0.4513044 0.1428701 0.26 0.72 
Public Employment Services 23 0.1313043 0.0254602 0.1 0.17 
Training 23 0.2165217 0.0863191 0.1 0.4 
Employment incentives 23 0.0408696 0.0210871 0.01 0.09 
Employment rehabilitation 23 0.0269565 0.0087567 0.01 0.04 
Direct job creation 23 0.0334783 0.0107063 0.01 0.04 
 
      
Belgium Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ALMPs 23 1.147826 0.0703211 1.05 1.31 
Public Employment Services 23 0.1782609 0.0180031 0.15 0.21 
Training 23 0.1604348 0.0234479 0.11 0.21 
Employment incentives 23 0.1247826 0.0978343 0.02 0.37 
Employment rehabilitation 23 0.1291304 0.0190485 0.1 0.17 
Direct job creation 23 0.5 0.1184752 0.34 0.81 
 
      
Denmark Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ALMPs 22 1.51 0.3084832 1.01 1.89 
Public Employment Services 22 0.1727273 0.0977938 0.08 0.33 
Training 22 0.53 0.1959592 0.25 0.85 
Employment incentives 22 0.3863636 0.1203386 0.13 0.69 
Employment rehabilitation 22 0.3336364 0.147827 0.13 0.57 
Direct job creation 22 0.0463636 0.0540322 0 0.18 
 
      
Finland Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ALMPs 23 1.06 0.2991047 0.73 1.63 
Public Employment Services 23 0.1617391 0.0353749 0.1 0.23 
Training 23 0.406087 0.1236468 0.25 0.68 
Employment incentives 23 0.093913 0.0384636 0.04 0.18 
Employment rehabilitation 23 0.0878261 0.0175697 0.05 0.12 
Direct job creation 23 0.2652174 0.1644238 0.07 0.62 
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France Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ALMPs 23 0.9730435 0.2134018 0.6 1.23 
Public Employment Services 23 0.173913 0.0367719 0.13 0.24 
Training 23 0.3626087 0.0597888 0.27 0.48 
Employment incentives 23 0.1421739 0.0732342 0.01 0.3 
Employment rehabilitation 23 0.0578261 0.0073587 0.05 0.07 
Direct job creation 23 0.2169565 0.1203191 0.04 0.4 
 
      
Germany Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ALMPs 23 1.04 0.2671567 0.45 1.49 
Public Employment Services 23 0.2213043 0.0280104 0.18 0.29 
Training 23 0.4 0.143432 0.04 0.66 
Employment incentives 23 0.0634783 0.0199109 0.03 0.11 
Employment rehabilitation 23 0.116087 0.0362741 0.01 0.15 
Direct job creation 23 0.2043478 0.1089131 0.06 0.41 
 
      
Greece Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ALMPs 13 0.23 0.0787401 0.16 0.4 
Public Employment Services 13 0.0815385 0.0315822 0.04 0.12 
Training 22 0.0695455 0.0530478 0.02 0.21 
Employment incentives 23 0.0617391 0.0352462 0.02 0.21 
Employment rehabilitation 23 0 0 0 0 
Direct job creation 23 0.0021739 0.0042174 0 0.01 
 
      
Ireland Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ALMPs 23 0.9904348 0.2266049 0.62 1.35 
Public Employment Services 23 0.1991304 0.0831709 0.12 0.35 
Training 23 0.3826087 0.1735254 0.21 0.72 
Employment incentives 23 0.0591304 0.0439951 0.01 0.13 
Employment rehabilitation 23 0.0030435 0.0047047 0 0.01 
Direct job creation 23 0.3213043 0.1581514 0.08 0.65 
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Italy Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ALMPs 4 0.5375 0.0788987 0.45 0.63 
Public Employment Services 4 0.0875 0.005 0.08 0.09 
Training 18 0.2188889 0.0377124 0.17 0.3 
Employment incentives 18 0.165 0.1168836 0.03 0.42 
Employment rehabilitation 18 0 0 0 0 
Direct job creation 18 0.0233333 0.0232632 0 0.07 
 
      
Netherlands Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ALMPs 23 1.37913 0.1255502 1.08 1.58 
Public Employment Services 23 0.4478261 0.0610482 0.36 0.54 
Training 23 0.1778261 0.0591575 0.09 0.28 
Employment incentives 23 0.0291304 0.0192857 0 0.08 
Employment rehabilitation 23 0.5743478 0.0566349 0.47 0.68 
Direct job creation 23 0.1486957 0.0932886 0.02 0.29 
 
      
Portugal Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ALMPs 23 0.5069565 0.1547853 0.17 0.69 
Public Employment Services 23 0.1208696 0.0292191 0.07 0.18 
Training 23 0.1878261 0.0946744 0.01 0.35 
Employment incentives 23 0.1152174 0.0499881 0.02 0.2 
Employment rehabilitation 23 0.0356522 0.0107982 0.01 0.05 
Direct job creation 23 0.0321739 0.0124157 0.01 0.05 
 
      
Spain Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ALMPs 23 0.6334783 0.1558148 0.33 0.85 
Public Employment Services 23 0.0969565 0.020766 0.06 0.13 
Training 23 0.1547826 0.0448097 0.03 0.23 
Employment incentives 23 0.1791304 0.0935129 0.06 0.34 
Employment rehabilitation 23 0.0226087 0.0054082 0.01 0.03 
Direct job creation 23 0.0886957 0.0303471 0.04 0.13 
 
      
  
 
234
 
Sweden Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ALMPs 23 1.954348 0.5701182 1.12 3.04 
Public Employment Services 23 0.2556522 0.0251949 0.22 0.31 
Training 23 0.6147826 0.2263117 0.18 1.06 
Employment incentives 23 0.516087 0.1555266 0.37 0.88 
Employment rehabilitation 23 0.3121739 0.0863374 0.18 0.45 
Direct job creation 23 0.1991304 0.1898543 0 0.58 
 
      
UK Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ALMPs 23 0.4678261 0.187664 0.22 0.84 
Public Employment Services 23 0.2208696 0.0771016 0.13 0.4 
Training 23 0.1669565 0.1372931 0.02 0.41 
Employment incentives 23 0.0130435 0.005588 0.01 0.03 
Employment rehabilitation 23 0.013913 0.0049901 0.01 0.02 
Direct job creation 23 0.0434783 0.0859497 0 0.28 
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Table A1.4: Description of independent variables 
Name of variable Description Source 
Harmonised 
Unemployment 
rate 
The harmonised unemployment rates shown in this Table give the numbers of unemployed persons as a 
percentage of the civilian labour force. Civilian labour force consists of civilian employees, the self-
employed, unpaid family workers and the unemployed. The definitions of employment and unemployment 
conform with the definitions adopted by the 13th Conference of Labour Statisticians (generally referred to as 
the ILO guidelines) with the exception that employment and unemployment estimates are based on labour 
force surveys which cover only private households and exclude all people living in institutions. Under these 
guidelines the unemployed are persons of working age who, in a specified period, are without work and are 
both available for and are actively seeking work. The Statistical Office of the European Communities 
(Eurostat) gave a more precise definition of unemployment through the Commission Regulation (EC), 
no.1897/2000 in September 2000. Details about this new definition and its implementation are available on 
Eurostat Internet site: http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/.   
OECD Annual Labour 
Force Statistics 
database. 
 
GDP growth 
Period covered: 1960-2008. 
Missing: Australia: 1991; Germany: 2002; Greece: 1990; Italy: 2003; New Zealand: 
1990; Spain: 1979; Luxembourg and Portugal: 2008. 
Source: Until 1970: OECD Economic Outlook, various years; 1971 onwards: 
OECD Factbook 2010: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics - Online 
Version, http://new.sourceoecd.org/ (Download: 2010-06-11). 
Note: 
UK 1971-1980: data is taken from OECD Factbook 2009. 
Comparative Political 
Data Set I, 1990-2008 
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Name of variable Description Source 
Cabinet 
composition 
Cabinet composition (Schmidt-Index): (1) hegemony of right-wing (and centre) parties (gov_left=0), (2) 
dominance of right-wing (and centre) parties(gov_left<33.3), (3) balance of power between left and 
right/centre (33.3<gov_left<66.6), (4) dominance of social-democratic and other left parties(gov_left>66.6), 
(5) hegemony of social-democratic and other left parties (gov_left=100).Calculations of authors based on 
gov_right1, gov_cent1, and gov_left1.Period covered: 1990-2008. Missings: Bulgaria 1993/94 (non-party 
government), Italy 1995 (caretakergovernment). Information was not available for Romania 1990 and 
Slovenia1992. Source: Own calculations according to Schmidt (1992). 
Comparative Political 
Data Set III, 1990-2008 
Trade Union 
density 
Trade union density corresponds to the ratio of  wage and salary earners that are trade union members, 
divided by the total number of wage and salary earners (OECD Labour Force Statistics). Density is calculated 
using survey data, wherever possible, and administrative data adjusted for non-active and self-employed 
members otherwise. 
OECD and J.Visser, 
ICTWSS database 
(Institutional 
Characteristics of 
Trade Unions, Wage 
Setting, State 
Intervention and 
Social Pacts: 
http://www.uva-
aias.net/) 
 
Employment 
protection 
legislation overall 
Additional costs for collective dismissals: most countries impose additional delays, costs or notification 
procedures when an employer dismisses a large number of workers at one time. This measure includes only 
additional costs which go beyond those applicable for individual dismissal. It does not reflect the overall 
strictness of regulation of collective dismissals, which is the sum of costs for individual dismissals and any 
additional cost of collective dismissals 
OECD Employment 
database 
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Name of variable Description Source 
Coordination of 
wage bargaining 
5 = economy-wide bargaining, based on a) enforceable agreements between the central organisations 
of unions and employers affecting the entire economy or entire private sector, or on b) government 
imposition of a wage schedule, freeze, or ceiling. 
4 = mixed industry and economy-wide bargaining: a) central organisations negotiate non-enforceable 
central agreements (guidelines) and/or b) key unions and employers associations set pattern for the 
entire economy. 
3 = industry bargaining with no or irregular pattern setting, limited involvement of central 
organizations and limited freedoms for company bargaining. 
2 = mixed industry- and firm level bargaining, with weak enforceability of industry agreements 
1 = none of the above, fragmented bargaining, mostly at company level ; note - before 1990: West Germany 
ICTWSS database 
Openness 
(Import of goods and services + export of goods and services at current price in national currency) / Gross 
domestic product at current market prices  (UVGD) in national currency 
OECD Main Economic 
Indicators database 
Deindustrialisation 
Following Iversen and Soskice; deindustrialization. 100 minus the sum of manufacturing and agricultural 
employment as a percentage of the working-age population. - OECD, Labour Force Statistics (Paris: OECD, 
various years). 
OECD Structural 
Analysis Database and 
Labour Force Statistics 
Deficit 
Annual deficit (government primary balance) as a percentage of GDP. 
Period covered: 1970-2008. 
Missing: Denmark: 1970; Luxembourg and Switzerland: 1970-89; New Zealand 
1970-85; Portugal: 1970-76. 
Source: OECD, OECD Economic Outlook Database, Economic Outlook: 
Annual and quarterly data, Vol. 2009, release 03, http://new.sourceoecd.org/ 
(Download: 2010-02-03). 
Comparative Political 
Data Set I, 1990-2008 
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Table A1.5: Summary of the determinants of ALMPs 
 
Author                                                  
and                                                                                                               
Independent variables
Swank 
(2007)
Van Vliet 
and
Koster
(2008)
Bonoli
(2008)
Franzese 
and Hays 
(2006
Rueda 
(2006)
Rueda 
(2007)
Huo et 
al 
(2008)
Armingeon 
(2006)
Swank and 
Martin 
(2001)
Martin 
and 
Swank 
(2004)
Swank 
and 
Martin 
2010
Dahlstrom, 
Lindvall, 
Rothstein 
(2009)
Gaston and 
Rajaguru 
(2004)
Traxler 
and 
Berndt 
(2009)
Boix 
(1998)
Unemployment - - + - + 0 + - + 0 + 0 0 n +
Openness + 0 + + + + 0 n + - +(a) + 0 n n
Deindustrialisation + n n + n n n n n + 0 n n n n
EU + + n n n n n + n n n n n n n
EMU n - n n n n n n n n n n n n n
Left + 0 - 0 0 - + 0 + + + 0 0 0 +
Right n - +(b) 0(c) n n 0(c) n n n -(c) +(c) n n n
Unions n n n 0 + 0 n n n n n + + + +(l)
Employer n n n n n n n n + + + n n n n
GDP growth + - n n - - n + n n n - n 0 n
GDP level n + 0 - n n + n - 0 - 0 n n n
Coordination +(d) +(e) n n 0(g) 0 n n +(i) +(i) + or - (k) +(j) n +(g) n
Public social expenditures n n + +(f) n n n n n n n n n n n
Debt n +(h) n n - -(h) n n n n n - - OR + n n
Employment protection n n n n - 0 n n n n n n n n n
Notes + = positively significant; - = negatively signifciant; 0 = not significant; n = not considered (g) Bargaining centralisation or coverage
(a) Capital mobility but not significant with trade openness (h) Government deficit
(b) Religious parties in government found significant (i) Employer coordination
(c) Christian democratic parties (j) Bargaining coordination 
(d) Only sector coordination found significant; national coordination insignificant (k) Macrocorporatism
(e) tripartite council variable found significant (l) Organisational power of labour index partly 
(f) Government consumption based on unionisation of labour force
Legend Where Variable is positively (+) or negatively (-) significant in at least one specification; 0 implies variable was not significant; n suggests it was not considered in the study
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Table A1.6: Stationarity tests of dependent variables 
 
Note: the stata command that used is “xtunitroot ips”. 
 
The null hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected for employment incentives and rehabilitation as well as for training. However, it is not rejected for Direct 
Job Creation. 
 
 
Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test for: ALMPs (a)
Public Employment 
services (a) Training
Employment 
incentives
Employment 
rehabilitation (b)
Direct Job 
creation
  Number of panels 14 14 15 15 13 15
 Avg. number of periods 22.21 22.21 22.53 22.6 22.92 22.6
Pvalue 0.6275 0.7931 0.2999 0.2731 0.7253 0.3754
P-value (with time trend) 0.7602 0.0115 0.0404 0.0982 0.0049 0.6625
P-value (first difference) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hypotheses: Ho: All panels contain unit roots
Ha: Some panels are stationary 
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Figure A1.1: The evolution of partisanship in EU15 
 
 
 
Table A1.7: Hausman test results for regression with each dependent variable 
Employment incentives and rehabilitation 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(22) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) =  0.11 
Prob>chi2 =      1.0000   
   
Direct job creation  
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(22) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) = 1.80 
Prob>chi2 = 1.0000   
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Table A1.8: F-test results for country dummies 
F-test on country dummy 
Employment incentives and rehabilitation 
chi2( 10) =10895.54 
Prob > chi2 =  0.0000 
Direct job creation  
chi2( 11) = 1849.46  
Prob > chi2 =  0.0000 
Training  
chi2( 11) = 1391.58  
Prob > chi2 =  0.0000 
 
 
Table A1.9: Results of Heteroskedasticity tests for regression with each dependent 
variable 
Employment incentives and rehabilitation  
Likelihood-ratio test                            
(Assumption: . nested in heterosupplyfe) 
LR chi2(13) =    268.95 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
Direct job creation  
Likelihood-ratio test                                   
(Assumption: . nested in heterodemandfe)    
LR chi2(13) =    338.66 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
Training  
Likelihood-ratio test                                   
(Assumption: . nested in heteroHKfe) 
LR chi2(13) =    138.14 
Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
Note: Null hypothesis of homoskedastic disturbances is rejected for supply, demand and training 
ALMPs. 
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Table A1.10: Results of Auto-correlation tests for regression with each dependent 
variable 
Employment incentives and rehabilitation 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation  
F(  1,      13) =     55.077   
Prob > F =      0.0000   
Direct job creation 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation  
F(  1,      13) =    229.393   
Prob > F =      0.0000   
Training 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation  
F(  1,      13) =    176.615   
Prob > F =      0.0000   
Note: Null hypothesis of no autocorrelation is rejected for all three cases. 
 
Table A1.11: Results of cross-sectional tests for regression with each dependent variable 
Cross-sectional dependence     
Employment incentives and rehabilitation  
Pesaran's test of cross-sectional independence =    -0.871, Pr = 1.6162 
Direct job creation  
Pesaran's test of cross-sectional independence =    -0.647, Pr = 1.4822 
Training  
Pesaran's test of cross-sectional independence =    -1.878, Pr = 1.9396 
Note: Null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence across panels is rejected. 
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Table A1.12: Employment incentives and rehabilitation – robustness to inclusion of 
other variables 
Variable included 
Union 
density 
Employment 
Protection 
Legislation 
Wage 
coordination 
Spending on 
Passive Labour 
Market 
Programmes as 
% of GDP 
Government 
partisanship -0.0330*** -0.0328*** -0.0319*** -0.0253** 
Minimal welfare regime 
dummy -0.3776** -0.4402*** -0.4237*** -0.3329*** 
Continental welfare 
regime dummy -0.2345 -0.2990*** -0.2947*** -0.2702*** 
Minimal*partisanship 0.0321** 0.0310** 0.0302** 0.0217* 
Continent*Partisanship 0.0309** 0.0310** 0.0295** 0.0219* 
Harmonised 
Unemployment (lagged 
one period) 0.0011 0.0014 0.0018 -0.0077* 
GDP growth (lagged 
one period) 0.0012 0.0012 0.0008 0.0026 
Union density 0.0011    
Employment Protection 
Legislation  0.0363**   
Wage coordination   0.0179  
Spending on Passive 
Labour Market 
Programmes as % of 
GDP    0.0740*** 
Constant 0.4402** 0.4513*** 0.4602*** 0.4525*** 
N 242 242 242 241 
r2 0.2938 0.3031 0.3149 0.357 
Note: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; Inclusion of union density (positive significant effect), Employment 
Protection Legislation (positive significant effect – in contradiction with Rueda’s finding), wage 
coordination (no significant effect) and passive labour market programmes (positive significant effect) 
does not affect my results for the regression of Supply ALMPs.  
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Table A1.13: Direct Job creation – robustness to inclusion of other variables 
Variable included 
Union 
density 
Employment 
Protection 
Legislation 
Wage 
coordination 
Spending on 
Passive Labour 
Market 
Programmes as 
% of GDP 
Government partisanship -0.0229** -0.0217** -0.0214** -0.0183** 
Minimal welfare regime 
dummy 0.1600** -0.0617 -0.064 -0.0357 
Continental welfare 
regime dummy 0.3184*** 0.0895 0.0772 0.0894 
Minimal*partisanship 0.0260*** 0.0241** 0.0228** 0.0181* 
Continent*Partisanship 0.0244** 0.0235** 0.0229* 0.0191* 
Harmonised 
Unemployment (lagged 
one period) 0.0032 0.0031 0.0046 0.0008 
GDP growth (lagged one 
period) -0.0054** -0.0056** -0.0056** -0.0042* 
Union density 0.0052***    
Employment Protection 
Legislation  -0.0242*   
Wage coordination   0.0142*  
Spending on Passive 
Labour Market 
Programmes as % of GDP    0.0319** 
Constant -0.2955*** 0.1172 0.0146 0.0328 
N 242 242 242 241 
r2 0.2856 0.2633 0.265 0.265 
Note: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; Inclusion of union density (positive significant effect), Employment 
Protection Legislation (negative significant effect), wage coordination (positive significant effect) and 
passive labour market programmes (positive significant effect) does not affect my results for the 
regression of Demand ALMPs. 
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Table A1.14: Training – robustness to inclusion of other variables 
Variable included 
Union 
density 
Employment 
Protection 
Legislation 
Wage 
coordination 
Spending on 
Passive 
Labour 
Market 
Programmes 
as % of GDP 
Government 
partisanship 0.0068 0.0072 -0.0214** 0.0121 
Minimal welfare 
regime dummy -0.2986*** -0.3064*** -0.064 -0.2537*** 
Continental welfare 
regime dummy -0.1794*** -0.1874*** 0.0772 -0.1826*** 
Minimal*partisanship -0.0141 -0.014 0.0228** -0.0212* 
Continent*Partisanship -0.012 -0.0125 0.0229* -0.0181 
Harmonised 
Unemployment (lagged 
one period) 0.0106*** 0.0106*** 0.0046 0.0058* 
GDP growth (lagged 
one period) -0.0066** -0.0067** -0.0056** -0.0057** 
Union density 0.0003    
Employment 
Protection Legislation  -0.0138   
Wage coordination   0.0142*  
Spending on Passive 
Labour Market 
Programmes as % of 
GDP    0.0412** 
Constant 0.3501*** 0.3959*** 0.0146 0.3285*** 
N 241 241 242 241 
r2 0.3078 0.31 0.265 0.3291 
Note: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; Inclusion of wage coordination (positive significant effect) and 
Passive Labour Market Programmes (PLMPs - positive significant effect) does affect my results for 
the regression of training ALMPs but in different ways for wage coordination and PLMPs. 
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Table A1.15: Jack-knife robustness test stepwise exclusion of countries. 
 
Coefficient 
Regression 
for 
Employment 
incentives 
and 
rehabilitation  
Direct Job 
creation  
 Excluding Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Government 
partisanship Austria -0.0326521 0.026 -0.0222165 0.049 
Minimal* 
partisanship  0.0315733 0.045 0.0241091 0.04 
Continent* 
Partisanship  0.0306076 0.067 0.0252689 0.064 
Government 
partisanship Belgium -0.0323228 0.004 -0.0216148 0.021 
Minimal* 
partisanship  0.0323053 0.011 0.0235996 0.014 
Continent* 
Partisanship  0.0295333 0.027 0.0233223 0.053 
Government 
partisanship Denmark -0.0485346 0 -0.0301766 0.022 
Minimal* 
partisanship  0.0473907 0.001 0.0322633 0.016 
Continent* 
Partisanship  0.0470368 0.002 0.0324229 0.03 
Government 
partisanship Finland -0.0340504 0.005 -0.0214654 0.018 
Minimal* 
partisanship  0.0326076 0.015 0.0222096 0.017 
Continent* 
Partisanship  0.0309926 0.029 0.0211149 0.07 
Government 
partisanship France -0.0320365 0.004 -0.0217241 0.014 
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Coefficient 
Regression 
for 
Employment 
incentives 
and 
rehabilitation  
Direct Job 
creation  
 Excluding Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Minimal* 
partisanship  0.0311738 0.014 0.0240802 0.009 
Continent* 
Partisanship  0.0330889 0.021 0.0298284 0.011 
Government 
partisanship Germany -0.0311954 0.004 -0.0211437 0.02 
Minimal* 
partisanship  0.0295606 0.016 0.0223998 0.015 
Continent* 
Partisanship  0.0265821 0.055 0.0205913 0.106 
Government 
partisanship Greece -0.0327268 0.004 -0.021789 0.02 
Minimal* 
partisanship  0.0310756 0.013 0.0264996 0.007 
Continent* 
Partisanship  0.0312234 0.02 0.0238293 0.045 
Government 
partisanship Ireland -0.0314779 0.005 -0.0191206 0.049 
Minimal* 
partisanship  0.0301023 0.019 0.0198651 0.043 
Continent* 
Partisanship  0.029407 0.031 0.0197457 0.104 
Government 
partisanship Italy -0.032275 0.004 -0.021645 0.013 
Minimal* 
partisanship  0.0344996 0.005 0.0236124 0.009 
Continent* 
Partisanship  0.0299645 0.023 0.0239173 0.036 
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Coefficient 
Regression 
for 
Employment 
incentives 
and 
rehabilitation  
Direct Job 
creation  
 Excluding Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Government 
partisanship Netherlands -0.0299832 0.006 -0.0217073 0.021 
Minimal* 
partisanship  0.0282662 0.024 0.0235497 0.014 
Continent* 
Partisanship  0.0298861 0.026 0.0238498 0.05 
Government 
partisanship Portugal -0.0319424 0.005 -0.0215002 0.023 
Minimal* 
partisanship  0.0282345 0.037 0.0234972 0.019 
Continent* 
Partisanship  0.0300009 0.026 0.0235614 0.049 
Government 
partisanship Spain -0.032359 0.005 -0.0209603 0.023 
Minimal* 
partisanship  0.0303101 0.017 0.0226992 0.017 
Continent* 
Partisanship  0.0322957 0.016 0.0233433 0.047 
Government 
partisanship Sweden -0.0078721 0.683 -0.0100378 0.399 
Minimal* 
partisanship  0.0068492 0.733 0.0117858 0.324 
Continent* 
Partisanship  0.0045667 0.827 0.0093161 0.501 
Government 
partisanship UK -0.0323096 0.004 -0.0215561 0.022 
Minimal* 
partisanship  0.0312721 0.016 0.0229024 0.018 
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Coefficient 
Regression 
for 
Employment 
incentives 
and 
rehabilitation  
Direct Job 
creation  
 Excluding Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Continent* 
Partisanship  0.0302358 0.027 0.0233752 0.05 
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Table A1.16: Results for employment incentives and rehabilitation are robust to 
inclusion of fixed effects 
 Random effects Fixed effects 
Government partisanship -0.0324*** -0.0362*** 
Minimal welfare regime dummy -0.4310*** -0.6776*** 
Continental welfare regime dummy -0.2892*** -0.6393*** 
Minimal*partisanship 0.0312** 0.0312** 
Continent*partisanship 0.0303** 0.0371*** 
Harmonised Unemployment (lagged one 
period) 0.0006 -0.0013 
GDP growth (lagged one period) 0.001 0.0004 
Constant 0.5275*** 0.6887*** 
Observations 242 242 
r2 0.3029 0.77 
Note: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; Fixed effects do not affect significance of results, though R2 
increases to 77%. Net effects of partisanship on Employment incentives and rehabilitation in 
continental Europe becomes slightly positive. Note also that given the results of the Hausmann tests, F-
tests for country inclusions, and the fact that fixed effects are likely highly correlated with welfare 
regime dummies, the results for the fixed effect regression are unreliable.  
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Table A1.17: Results for direct job creation are robust to inclusion of fixed effects 
 Random Fixed 
Government partisanship -0.0217** -0.0225** 
Minimal welfare regime dummy -0.0699 -0.1552* 
Continental welfare regime dummy 0.0814 0.0558 
Minimal*partisanship 0.0236** 0.0253** 
Continent*partisanship 0.0235** 0.0224* 
Harmonised Unemployment (lagged one 
period) 0.0034 -0.0011 
GDP growth (lagged one period) -0.0055** -0.0066*** 
Constant 0.0703 0.1301* 
Observations 242 242 
r2 0.255 0.4427 
Note: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; Fixed effects do not affect results, though R2 increases to 44%. 
 
Table A1.18: Results for employment incentives with and without employment 
rehabilitation 
Variable 
With employment 
rehabilitation 
Without Employment 
rehabilitation 
Government partisanship -0.0324*** -0.0236*** 
Minimal welfare regime dummy -0.4310*** -0.2086*** 
Continental welfare regime dummy -0.2892*** -0.2211*** 
Minimal*partisanship 0.0312** 0.0213** 
Continent*Partisanship 0.0303** 0.0215** 
Unemployment (lagged one period) 0.0006 0.004 
GDP growth (lagged one period) 0.001 0.0011 
Constant 0.5275*** 0.2743*** 
Observations 242 242 
r2 0.3029 0.2182 
Note: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; the results are not dependent on including employment 
rehabilitation in supply ALMPs. 
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Table A1.19: Results for direct job creation and employment incentives with four 
regimes 
Variable 
Employment 
incentives and 
rehabilitation Direct job creation 
Government partisanship -0.0325*** -0.0217** 
Liberal welfare regime dummy -0.5026*** 0.0375 
Southern welfare regime dummy -0.4042*** -0.1065 
Continent welfare regime dummy -0.2892*** 0.0819 
Liberal* partisanship 0.0310** 0.0379*** 
Southern* partisanship 0.0312** 0.0206** 
Continent* partisanship 0.0304** 0.0239** 
Harmonised Unemployment (lagged 
one period) 0.0003 0.0036 
GDP growth (lagged one period) 0.0011 -0.0059** 
Constant 0.5296*** 0.0664 
Observations 242 242 
r2 0.3089 0.2739 
Note: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. Ferrera (1996) suggested that the southern European countries may 
belong to a fourth welfare regime distinct from the liberal, Scandinavian and Bismarckian welfare 
regimes. My main results concerning the effects of partisanship on employment incentives and 
rehabilitation as well as direct job creation in Scandinavia and Bismarckian welfare regimes are 
unchanged by this new clustering. As a dummy, the effect of liberal and southern regimes is similar for 
employment incentives and insignificant for direct job creation. Partisanship has the same effect on 
employment incentives in both the southern and liberal regimes. The effect of partisanship on direct job 
creation is positive in liberal welfare regimes but negative in southern welfare regime. 
  
253 
 
Table A1.20: Results for employment incentives for sub-samples in different time 
periods 
Variable Full sample 1990-1998 1999-2007 
Government partisanship -0.0324*** -0.0392** -0.0058 
Minimal welfare regime 
dummy -0.4310*** -0.4927*** -0.3785*** 
Continental welfare regime 
dummy -0.2892*** -0.3140*** -0.2825*** 
Minimal*partisanship 0.0312** 0.0410** -0.0034 
Continent*Partisanship 0.0303** 0.0336 0.0103 
Harmonised Unemployment 
(lagged one period) 0.0006 -0.0023 -0.0058 
GDP growth (lagged one 
period) 0.001 0.0018 -0.0059 
Constant 0.5275*** 0.6322*** 0.5824*** 
Observations 242 118 124 
r2 0.3029 0.3953 0.5039 
Note: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. The third way entails a greater reliance on market mechanisms to 
reach social objectives. Political parties may therefore have converged towards the median voter. One 
way to test this is to compare the period 1990-1998 with that of 1999-2007. The results indeed suggest 
that partisanship may have lost some significance after 1998, though more systematic tests of this 
would be required to investigate this more thoroughly. 
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Table A1.21: Results for employment incentives and rehabilitation when controlling for 
deindustrialisation and openness 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Government partisanship -0.0324*** -0.0306*** -0.0284*** -0.0235** 
Minimal welfare regime 
dummy 
-0.4310*** -0.3702*** -0.3630*** -0.3701*** 
Continental welfare regime 
dummy 
-0.2892*** -0.2826*** -0.3001*** -0.3117*** 
Minimal*partisanship 0.0312** 0.0286** 0.0276** 0.0232* 
Continent*Partisanship 0.0303** 0.0294** 0.0274** 0.0228* 
Harmonised Unemployment 
(lagged one period) 
0.0006 0.0001 -0.0013 -0.0021 
GDP growth (lagged one 
period) 
0.001 0.0004 -0.0008 0 
Deindustrialisation  0.0075*** 0.0079*** 0.0081*** 
Openness   0.0008** 0.0009** 
Deficit    -0.0058** 
Constant 0.5275*** -0.0151 -0.098 -0.1012 
Observations 242 242 242 242 
r2 0.3029 0.3312 0.3633 0.3823 
Note * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; see Table A1.4 for description and source of deindustrialisation, 
deficit, and openness variables. 
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Table A1.22: Results for direct job creation when controlling for deindustrialisation and 
openness 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Government partisanship -0.0217** -0.0213** -0.0201** -0.0152* 
Minimal welfare regime 
dummy 
-0.0699 -0.0541 -0.0366 -0.0496 
Continental welfare regime 
dummy 
0.0814 0.0837 0.0566 0.0409 
Minimal*partisanship 0.0236** 0.0230** 0.0241** 0.0196** 
Continent*Partisanship 0.0235** 0.0233** 0.0223* 0.0167 
Harmonised Unemployment 
(lagged one period) 0.0034 0.0035 0.0027 0.0035 
GDP growth (lagged one 
period) -0.0055** -0.0056** -0.0068*** -0.0058*** 
Deindustrialisation 
 0.0019 0.0012 0.0012 
Openness 
  0.0017*** 0.0020*** 
Deficit 
   -0.0049*** 
Constant 0.0703 -0.0696 -0.1677 -0.1764 
Observations 242 242 242 242 
r2 0.255 0.2568 0.2857 0.3236 
Note: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; see Table A1.4 for description and source of deindustrialisation, 
deficit, and openness variables. 
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Table A1.23: Results for employment incentives and rehabilitation when controlling for 
deindustrialisation and openness 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Government partisanship 0.0069 0.0092 0.0084 0.0123 
Minimal welfare regime 
dummy 
-0.3111*** -0.3396*** -0.3378*** -0.3458*** 
Continental welfare regime 
dummy 
-0.1923*** -0.2052*** -0.1997*** -0.2099*** 
Minimal*partisanship -0.0143 -0.0175 -0.017 -0.0209* 
Continent*Partisanship -0.012 -0.0146 -0.0137 -0.0175 
Harmonised Unemployment 
(lagged one period) 0.0106*** 0.0098*** 0.0098*** 0.0093*** 
GDP growth (lagged one 
period) -0.0066** -0.0064** -0.0062* -0.0054* 
Deindustrialisation 
 -0.0025 -0.0022 -0.0023 
Openness 
  -0.0002 -0.0001 
Deficit 
   -0.0042* 
Constant 0.3703*** 0.5639*** 0.5586*** 0.5789*** 
Observations 241 241 241 241 
r2 0.3081 0.3359 0.3312 0.3453 
Note: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; see Table A1.4 for description and source of deindustrialisation, 
deficit, and openness variables. 
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Table A1.24: Results when including the Hall Gingerich index of coordination 
Variable Spending on training 
Government partisanship 
-0.0031 
Hall Gingerich index of 
coordination 0.1181* 
Harmonised Unemployment 
(lagged one period) 0.0088* 
GDP growth (lagged one 
period) 
-0.0071** 
Constant 0.1071* 
Observations 225 
r2 0.2427 
Note: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
Source for index of coordination: Hall gingerich (2004: Table page 14). 
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Table A1.25: Results when controlling for spending on passive labour market policies 
Variable 
Employment 
incentives and 
rehabilitation 
Direct job 
creation Training 
Government partisanship -0.0253** -0.0183** 0.0121 
Minimal welfare regime 
dummy -0.3329*** -0.0357 -0.2537*** 
Continental welfare regime 
dummy -0.2702*** 0.0894 -0.1826*** 
Minimal*partisanship 0.0217* 0.0181* -0.0212* 
Continent*Partisanship 0.0219* 0.0191* -0.0181 
Harmonised Unemployment 
(lagged one period) -0.0077* 0.0008 0.0058* 
GDP growth (lagged one 
period) 0.0026 -0.0042* -0.0057** 
Spending on passive labour 
market spending 0.0740*** 0.0319** 0.0412** 
Constant 0.4525*** 0.0328 0.3285*** 
Observations 241 241 241 
r2 0.357 0.265 0.3291 
Note: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01. See Table A1.4 for description and source of passive labour market 
spending. 
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Appendix A1.2: Empirical evidence supporting assumptions made in paper 1 
This appendix presents some empirical evidence for assumptions that I make 
in the theoretical section of my first paper concerning (a) the effects of labour market 
policies on inequality and (b) the preferences of left-wing individuals for different 
labour market policies. 
 
(a) The effects of labour market policies on wage inequality 
To calculate the effects of different labour market policies on wage inequality, 
I run several regressions where the dependent variables capture different forms of 
inequality and my key independent variables capture spending on employment 
incentives, direct job creation and training schemes for unemployed, respectively. The 
two measures of inequality that I choose as my dependent variables are the ratio of the 
median to bottom income deciles and the ratio of the top to bottom income deciles, 
respectively. 
The regression corrects for panel specific auto-correlation and I report panel 
corrected standard errors. I control for the unemployment rate, GDP growth, and 
spending on passive labour market policies. I also test whether the inclusion of 
country and year effects as well as a trend affects the results. The findings are shown 
in Table AA1.1 and suggest that employment incentives increase inequality, whereas 
both direct job creation and training schemes are associated with lower inequality. 
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(b) The preferences of left-wing constituents for labour market policies 
I test in turn preferences for direct job creation, employment incentives, and 
training schemes by relying on various surveys covering a sample of western 
European countries. 
 
Preferences for direct job creation 
As a proxy for views on job creation, I test the determinants of the following 
dependent variable (V25 in the 2006 ISSP survey) which asks respondents their views 
about the following statement: “It is the government responsibility to provide a job for 
everyone”; where respondents have the following possible responses to choose from: 
Definitely should be (coded 1); Probably should (coded 2); Probably should not be 
(coded 3); Definitely should not be (coded 4).  
I run an ordered logistic regression on this dependent variable with robust 
standard errors clustered by country. The sample is composed of a large number of 
respondents in 11 European member countries for which data is available: Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. My key independent variable is whether the 
respondent self identifies as holding left-wing views. Specifically, I create a left 
dummy that is coded 1 if the respondent identifies as centre left, left or far left, and 0 
otherwise. I also include a number of controls for the age, education, gender, and 
occupation of the respondent.  
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The results, presented in Table AA1.2, suggest that being a left-wing 
respondent reduces the likelihood of being in disagreement with the statement that it is 
the government’s responsibility to provide a job for everyone. I interpret this as 
consistent with my expectation that left-wing voters are more favourable to direct job 
creation than non-left-wing voters. This result holds when controlling for the gender, 
age, education, and current employment status of the respondent, as well as for 
country fixed effects. The age of the respondent has no - stable - significant effect, 
while being unemployed, in education and female also makes it less likely that the 
respondent disagrees with job creation. Being in part-time work has no statistically 
significant effect. 
Preferences for employment incentives 
To test the partisan determinants of people’s preferences for employment 
incentives, I rely on the 2001 Eurobarometer survey (56.1). The sample is composed 
of citizens of the EU, aged 15 and over, residing in the following 15 European 
member states: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom. 
As a proxy for preferences on employment incentives, my dependent variable 
captures respondents’ response to the statement: “The unemployed should be forced to 
take a job quickly, even if it is not as good as their previous job”; where respondents 
can choose from: strongly agree (coded 1), slightly agree (coded 2), neither agree nor 
disagree (coded 3), slightly disagree (coded 4), strongly disagree (coded 5). This 
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question captures both the preference for incentivising the unemployed to return to 
work and whether this should be done at the expense of job quality. The key 
independent variable is a self-placement of respondents along a ten points left-right 
scale. For simplicity I have recoded this variable into a dummy variable that takes 
value 1 if the respondent holds left-wing views (interpreted as locating themselves 
between 1 and 4 on the 10 points scale), and value 0 otherwise. 
I run an ordered logistic regression on this dependent variable with robust 
standard errors clustered by country. The results, presented in Table AA1.3, suggest 
that left-wing respondents are more likely to disagree with forcing unemployed to take 
jobs. I use this as proxy of the extent to which left constituents want to incentivise the 
unemployed to return to employment. This result holds when controlling for the age, 
gender, occupation, education (age at which finished education), and income of the 
respondent. I include country fixed effects throughout. Temporary workers and – 
surprisingly – more educated respondents are also more likely to disagree with the 
statement. Older respondents are less likely to disagree. 
Preferences for training schemes 
To test the partisan determinants of people’s preferences for training schemes, 
I rely on the 2001 Eurobarometer survey (56.1). The sample is composed of citizens of 
the EU aged 15 and over residing in the following 15 European member countries: 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
263 
 
The dependent variable is respondents’ response to the statement “The 
unemployed should be given the time and opportunity to improve their education and 
skills”; where they can choose from: strongly agree (coded 1), slightly agree (coded 
2), neither agree nor disagree (coded 3), slightly disagree (coded 4), or strongly 
disagree (coded 5). The key independent variable is a self-placement of respondents 
along a 10 points left-right scale. I have rescaled this variable to take value 1 where 
respondents hold left-wing views (interpreted as locating themselves between 1 and 4 
on the 10 points scale), and value 0 otherwise. 
I run an ordered logistic regression on this dependent variable with robust 
standard errors clustered by country. The results, presented in Table AA1.4, suggest 
that left-wing respondents are less likely to disagree with providing the unemployed 
with training opportunities. I use this as proxy of the extent to which left constituents 
want left-wing parties in government to spend more on training schemes. This result 
holds when controlling for the age, gender, occupation, education (age at which 
finished education), and income of the respondent. I also include country fixed effects 
throughout. 
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Table AA1.1: The effect of different labour market policies on inequality 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Ratio of fifth to bottom tenth income 
decile (first difference) 
Ratio of top to bottom income 
decile (first difference) 
Spending on employment  0.13299* 0.15152** 0.16107** 0.33865*** 
incentives and rehabilitation 
(first difference) 
(0.070) (0.075) (0.076) (0.115) 
Spending on direct job  -0.11080* -0.13017** -0.13936*** -0.21679** 
creation schemes (first 
difference) 
(0.067) (0.057) (0.052) (0.100) 
Spending on training schemes  -0.12852*** -0.11613** -0.18398*** 
(first difference)  (0.048) (0.047) (0.064) 
Unemployment rate 0.00197 -0.00907*** -0.00554 -0.01178** 
(first difference) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) 
GDP growth rate 0.00036 -0.00289 -0.00432* -0.00584 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Trend  0.00047 0.00041 0.00092* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Spending on passive labour   -0.02304 -0.05021* 
Market policies (first 
difference) 
  (0.018) (0.026) 
Constant 0.01735 0.01093 0.01655 0.03041 
Observations 170 170 170 170 
R-squared 0.24 0.19 0.19 0.19 
Number of countries 15 15 15 15 
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes No No No 
R-squared 0.2394 0.1893 0.1921 0.1930 
Trend No Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses (with panel specific autocorrelation); *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sources and definition: see appendix to paper 1 and 3. 
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Table AA1.2: Preferences for job creation 
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Left power in cabinet  -0.39156*** -0.39007*** -0.39813*** -0.40712*** -0.43330*** 
dummy (0.128) (0.128) (0.129) (0.131) (0.157) 
Female dummy -0.34796*** -0.35547*** -0.35040*** -0.33008*** -0.30642*** 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.048) (0.068) (0.053) 
Age of respondent  -0.00438*** -0.00019 0.00305 0.00089 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Years of schooling   0.00584*** 0.00942*** 0.00547*** 
 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Reference: Employed, full-
time, main job 
     
Employed, part-time, main job    0.13140 -0.08491 
    (0.165) (0.091) 
Employed, less than part-time    -0.05680 -0.15569 
    (0.152) (0.164) 
Helping family member    0.47424 0.31094 
    (0.511) (0.605) 
Unemployed    -0.71858*** -0.68376*** 
    (0.150) (0.166) 
Student, school, vocational 
training 
   -0.53315*** -0.46444*** 
    (0.172) (0.107) 
Retired    -0.28747*** -0.32701*** 
    (0.096) (0.080) 
Housewife,-man, home duties    -0.35848** -0.36164*** 
    (0.157) (0.062) 
Permanently disabled    -0.69078*** -0.77155*** 
    (0.217) (0.169) 
Other, not in labour force    -0.34824* -0.34901*** 
    (0.184) (0.103) 
Constant cut1 -1.09180*** -1.30803*** -1.05224*** -0.99243*** -1.62883*** 
Constant cut2 0.41366** 0.19853 0.45387* 0.53071** -0.03053 
Constant cut3 1.76490*** 1.54978*** 1.81461*** 1.90474*** 1.38868*** 
Observations 12,590 12,575 11,889 11,743 11,743 
Country No No No No Yes (not 
shown) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 
Note: Ordinal logistic regression, robust clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Source: ZA4700 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP 2006): Role of Government 
IV (Dataset SPSS Portable). 
 
 
  
266 
 
Table AA1.3: Preferences for forcing unemployed to take accept jobs 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Left power in cabinet dummy 0.36817*** 0.36909*** 0.36914*** 0.35931*** 0.34541*** 
 (0.060) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.076) 
Occupation - reference: Self-
employed with employees 
     
Self-employed without employees 0.29226 0.28806 0.28834 0.28944 0.36247* 
 (0.181) (0.180) (0.181) (0.179) (0.215) 
Manager 0.29495* 0.27166* 0.27209* 0.21721 0.17042 
 (0.161) (0.163) (0.164) (0.164) (0.209) 
Foreman or supervisor 0.14453 0.10969 0.10933 0.16363 0.14125 
 (0.130) (0.137) (0.136) (0.128) (0.186) 
Other employee, permanent job 0.09948 0.05448 0.05525 0.12211 0.08239 
 (0.140) (0.148) (0.150) (0.146) (0.201) 
Other employee, temporary job 0.39255** 0.33847* 0.33964* 0.41656** 0.28645 
 (0.170) (0.174) (0.174) (0.172) (0.226) 
Other employee, fixed time period 0.12379 0.05049 0.05186 0.14856 0.18882 
 (0.211) (0.225) (0.228) (0.232) (0.288) 
Other 0.33021 0.28047 0.28168 0.36747 0.47636 
 (0.228) (0.232) (0.235) (0.240) (0.372) 
Age - reference: 15 - 24 years      
25 - 39 years  -0.01155 -0.01125 -0.05109 -0.06757 
  (0.110) (0.111) (0.109) (0.123) 
40 - 54 years  -0.14379 -0.14365 -0.13821 -0.13479 
  (0.127) (0.128) (0.120) (0.130) 
55 years and older  -0.28076* -0.28051* -0.23260 -0.32911** 
  (0.162) (0.163) (0.161) (0.163) 
Female dummy   -0.00533 -0.02388 -0.06417 
   (0.049) (0.049) (0.059) 
Education     0.06127*** 0.07098*** 
    (0.012) (0.014) 
Income quartile – reference: 
Lowest income quartile 
     
Next to lowest income quartile     0.06002 
     (0.102) 
Next to highest income quartile     -0.03473 
     (0.091) 
Highest income quartile     -0.07959 
     (0.109) 
Constant cut1 -0.38209** -0.49551** -0.49699** -0.11099 -0.13319 
Constant cut2 1.23391*** 1.12334*** 1.12187*** 1.51563*** 1.49117*** 
Constant cut3 2.22076*** 2.11132*** 2.10986*** 2.50634*** 2.43687*** 
Constant cut4 3.51685*** 3.40824*** 3.40677*** 3.80473*** 3.78063*** 
Observations 5,928 5,928 5,928 5,928 4,545 
Country (not shown) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Note: Ordinal logistic regression, robust clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Source: Eurobarometer 56.1: Social Exclusion and Modernization of Pension Systems, September-
October 2001.   
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Table AA1.4: Preferences for training schemes for unemployed 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Left power in cabinet dummy -0.22074*** -0.21476*** -0.21473*** -0.21443*** -0.17008** 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.073) 
Occupation - reference: Self-
employed with employees 
     
Self-employed without employees -0.12850 -0.13579 -0.13290 -0.13294 -0.05001 
 (0.135) (0.135) (0.136) (0.136) (0.159) 
Manager -0.11551 -0.12518 -0.12137 -0.12024 -0.07336 
 (0.121) (0.121) (0.123) (0.130) (0.121) 
Foreman or supervisor -0.04730 -0.05607 -0.05713 -0.05837 0.04855 
 (0.194) (0.194) (0.194) (0.189) (0.194) 
Other employee, permanent job -0.00477 -0.02567 -0.01986 -0.02137 0.02129 
 (0.105) (0.108) (0.110) (0.103) (0.114) 
Other employee, temporary job 0.02558 -0.01158 -0.00428 -0.00607 -0.02509 
 (0.166) (0.175) (0.176) (0.172) (0.212) 
Other employee, fixed time period 0.01453 -0.03541 -0.02736 -0.02944 -0.06194 
 (0.178) (0.187) (0.192) (0.180) (0.216) 
Other 0.10202 0.07209 0.08003 0.07845 -0.03107 
 (0.172) (0.175) (0.180) (0.177) (0.214) 
Age - reference: 15 - 24 years      
25 - 39 years  -0.08133 -0.07971 -0.07890 -0.11759 
  (0.096) (0.096) (0.099) (0.118) 
40 - 54 years  -0.17301 -0.17223 -0.17239 -0.24224** 
  (0.107) (0.108) (0.108) (0.120) 
55 years and older  -0.12048 -0.11945 -0.12044 -0.23248* 
  (0.118) (0.119) (0.116) (0.128) 
Female dummy   -0.03265 -0.03229 -0.04409 
   (0.056) (0.055) (0.065) 
Education     -0.00129 -0.00395 
    (0.014) (0.014) 
Income quartile – reference: 
Lowest 
     
Next to lowest income quartile     0.03465 
     (0.113) 
Next to highest income quartile     0.12351 
     (0.167) 
Highest income quartile     0.10002 
     (0.170) 
Constant cut1 -0.58004*** -0.70550*** -0.71399*** -0.72225*** -0.53484*** 
Constant cut2 1.68075*** 1.55673*** 1.54831*** 1.54006*** 1.74462*** 
Constant cut3 3.11389*** 2.98991*** 2.98161*** 2.97336*** 3.11404*** 
Constant cut4 4.49204*** 4.36780*** 4.35952*** 4.35126*** 4.43469*** 
Observations 5,955 5,955 5,955 5,955 4,558 
Country  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Note: Ordinal logistic regression, robust clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Source: Eurobarometer 56.1: Social Exclusion and Modernization of Pension Systems, September-
October 2001.   
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Next, I run the same model as in Table AA1.4 but with interaction terms 
between three regime types (Scandinavian, Bismarckian, and minimalist) and the 
dummy variable for holding left views. The marginal effect of the left on the 
probability of strongly agreeing with “The unemployed should be given the time and 
opportunity to improve their education and skills” is only significantly positive in 
Bismarckian and Scandinavian welfare regimes (see table AA1.5 below). Thus, in 
liberal market economies, left and right wing constituents do not have different 
preferences for training schemes. 
Table AA1.5: Preferences for training schemes for unemployed 
Marginal effect of left in dy/dx Standard 
error 
Z P>|z| [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Scandinavian welfare regime .082 .0223831 3.71 0.00 .039 .12 
Bismarckian welfare regime .058 .0229118 2.55 0.01 .013 .103 
Minimalist welfare regime .006 .0170179 0.36 0.71 -.027 .039 
 
Note: this table presents the results of interaction effects calculated using a similar model to 
that presented in table AA1.4 but where the left dummy is interacted with three types of 
welfare regimes, as defined in paper 1. 
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Appendix A1.3: Additional empirical tests with alternative partisan measure 
The left and employment incentives and rehabilitation 
In table AA1.6 I run a regression to assess the effect of the left on spending on 
employment incentives and rehabilitation in all countries. I try two different measures 
of left control of government (share of cabinet seats that are held by the left and the 
share of parliament that is held by the left) in columns 1-2 and columns 3-4 
respectively. Column two runs the model on the dependent variable expressed as a 
first difference whereas columns 1, 3 and 4 run the model on the level of the 
dependent variable. While columns 1 to 3 include only time fixed effects, running the 
model on the full sample without controlling for regime dummies also allows me to 
include country fixed effects in column 4 without risking multicollinearity. Note that 
excluding Sweden from the regression in column 2 does not affect the results. In all 
columns, there is a statistically negative association between the left and spending on 
employment incentives and rehabilitation. 
Next, I look at the effect of the left on employment incentives and 
rehabilitation in continental versus Scandinavian welfare regimes. I therefore run two 
separate regressions on each welfare regime cluster on the first difference of the 
dependent variable using a proxy for the left (’leftpower’) that I code 1 if the left 
controls more than 50% of the cabinet and 0 otherwise. The results (shown in table 
AA1.7) confirm that the effect of the left is negative in both sub-samples and the 
effect is more negative in the Scandinavian than the continental welfare regime, as 
was the case in my baseline results discussed in the core of the paper.  
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I also run a fully interactive model (no constant) to assess more formally how 
the effect of the left on the first difference of my dependent variable is mediated by 
each of my three welfare regimes (the results are shown in table AA1.8).  I then 
calculate the marginal effect84 of left power in parliament in each welfare regime (see 
table AA1.9). Last but not least, I test whether the three interaction terms (one for each 
regime) within the regression are statistically different from one another and reject the 
null hypothesis that they are jointly equal (Prob > F =    0.1961).85 
 
                                                 
84
 Using the following command in stata 12:  
reg d.eireha i.leftpowerparl##i.cont i.leftpowerparl##i.scan i.leftpowerparl##i.min d.ur gdpgr i.year , 
cluster(id) noconstant 
margins, dydx(leftpowerparl) at(cont=0 min=1 scan=0)  
margins, dydx(leftpowerparl) at(cont=0 min=0 scan=1) 
margins, dydx(leftpowerparl) at(cont=1 min=0 scan=0) 
85
 Using the following command in stata 12:  
testparm scan#leftpowerparl cont#leftpowerparl min#leftpowerparl, equal 
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Table AA1.6: The effect of different measures of the left on spending on employment incentives and rehabilitation 
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Spending on 
employment incentives 
and rehabilitation 
(levels) 
Spending on 
employment incentives 
and rehabilitation (first 
difference) 
Spending on 
employment incentives 
and rehabilitation 
(levels) 
Spending on 
employment incentives 
and rehabilitation 
(levels) 
Left cabinet -0.00054* -0.00020**   
(share of cabinet held by left) (0.000) (0.000)   
Left parliament   -0.00316*** -0.00323*** 
(share of parliament held by left)   (0.001) (0.001) 
Rate of Unemployment  -0.00188 0.00066 -0.00113 -0.00093 
(as % of Civilian Labour Force) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) 
GDP growth rate -0.00355 -0.00336* -0.00326 -0.00305 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 0.26343*** 0.02005 0.37175*** 0.37330*** 
 (0.098) (0.013) (0.115) (0.071) 
Observations 324 309 324 324 
Number of id 15 15 15 15 
Country fixed effects No No No Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared within 0.18 0.14 0.19 0.19 
R-squared between 0.00 0.25 0.01 0.01 
R-squared overall 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.00 
Note: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table AA1.7: The effect of the left on employment incentives in Continental and Scandinavian 
welfare regime 
Columns (1) (2) 
Dependent variable Spending on employment incentives 
and rehabilitation (first difference) 
Spending on employment incentives 
and rehabilitation (first difference) 
Sample Continental welfare regime cluster Scandinavian welfare regime cluster 
Left power in cabinet 
dummy 
-0.01361*** -0.01864** 
 (0.002) (0.008) 
Unemployment rate 0.00083 -0.00140 
(lagged once) (0.001) (0.004) 
Union density 0.00038 -0.00006 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth rate -0.00919 -0.00237 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
Constant 0.00936 0.02274 
 (0.031) (0.026) 
Observations 109 87 
Number of id 5 4 
Country FE No No 
Year FE Yes Yes 
R-squared within 0.17 0.48 
R-squared between 0.39 0.97 
R-squared overall 0.19 0.48 
Note: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Left power 
dummy takes value 1 if left controls more than 50% of the cabinet and 0 otherwise. Continental 
Bismarckian welfare regime refers to Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and Netherlands. 
Scandinavian welfare regime refers to Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. 
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Table AA1.8: The effect of the left on employment incentives – interactive model 
Dependent variable Spending on employment incentives and 
rehabilitation (first difference) 
Continental welfare regime .0166 
 (.0131) 
Scandinavian welfare regime dummy .0196 
 (.0137) 
Minimalist welfare regime dummy .0214 
 (.0149) 
Left power in parliament dummy * continental   -.0098 
welfare Regime (.0075) 
Left power in parliament dummy * scandinavian  -.0228*** 
welfare regime (.0071) 
Left power in parliament dummy * minimalist   -.0081** 
welfare regime (.0038) 
GDP growth -.0014 
 .0020 
Unemployment rate .0081 
(first difference) .0056 
Observations 291 
Number of id 15 
Country fixed effects No 
Year fixed effects Yes  
R-squared  0.1547 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Continental 
Bismarckian welfare regime refers to Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands. Minimalist 
welfare regime refers to UK, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece. Scandinavian welfare 
regime refers to Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. 
 
Table AA1.9: Marginal effects of left in different welfare regimes 
Marginal effect of left in dy/dx Standard 
error 
Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Scandinavian welfare regime -.0310 .0070 -4.40 0.00 .0448 -.0171 
Continental welfare regime -.0180 .006 -2.72 0.007 -.0310 -.0050 
Minimalist welfare regime -.0081 .0038 -2.15 0.032 -.0156 -.0007 
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The left and direct job creation 
To further check that the partisan effect on direct job creation does indeed depend on 
the welfare regime in which the left is located, I run two separate regressions in continental 
welfare regime and Scandinavian welfare regime, respectively. The results, shown in table 
AA1.10, confirm that the left is indeed associated with an increase in spending in the 
Continental welfare regime but with a decrease in spending in Scandinavian welfare regime. 
Note that excluding Sweden from the regression in column 2 does not affect the results. Last 
but not least, consistent with my explanation, the left is indeed associated with more public 
sector employees as % total employees in Scandinavian but not continental welfare regime 
(see table AA1.11). 
Table AA1.10: Effect of the left on direct job creation in different welfare regimes 
Column (1) (2) 
Welfare regime cluster Continental  Scandinavian 
Dependent variable Spending on direct job 
creation (first difference) 
Spending on direct job 
creation (first difference) 
Left power in parliament dummy 0.02148* -0.03089** 
 (0.011) (0.013) 
Unemployment rate -0.00260** -0.00412* 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
GDP growth 0.00723 -0.01520*** 
 (0.007) (0.004) 
Constant 0.03510 -0.00058 
 (0.033) (0.047) 
Observations 110 87 
Number of id 5 4 
Country fixed effects No No 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
R-squared within 0.35 0.52 
R-squared between 0.58 0.69 
R-squared overall 0.36 0.49 
Note: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Continental 
Bismarckian welfare regime refers to Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and Netherlands. 
Minimalist welfare regime refers to UK, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece. Scandinavian 
welfare regime refers to Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. 
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Table AA1.11: Effect of the left on direct job creation in different welfare regimes 
Column (1) (2) 
Welfare regime Scandinavian welfare regime 
cluster 
Continental welfare regime 
cluster 
Dependent variable Public sector employees as % total employees 
(first difference) 
Left power in parliament dummy 0.21003*** -0.01965 
 (0.068) (0.087) 
Unemployment rate 0.02962* -0.01724 
(lagged) (0.018) (0.017) 
Union density -0.03825*** 0.00093 
 (0.007) (0.002) 
GDP growth -0.13187*** -0.14352* 
 (0.042) (0.080) 
Constant 3.77356*** 0.78277*** 
 (0.091) (0.204) 
Observations 81 134 
Number of id 3 5 
Country fixed effects No No  
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
R-squared within 0.74 0.65 
R-squared between 0.38 0.18 
R-squared overall 0.72 0.64 
Note: robust clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Continental 
Bismarckian welfare regime refers to Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and Netherlands. 
Minimalist welfare regime refers to UK, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece. Scandinavian 
welfare regime refers to Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. 
Source: Data on share of public sector employees taken from the OECD statistics website. 
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The left and training schemes 
Table AA1.12 confirms that the left, using a different measure of left control of the 
government that the one I relied on in the core of the paper, is not associated with more or 
less spending on training, regardless of the welfare regime under consideration. 
Table AA1.12: Effect of the left on training schemes in different welfare regimes 
 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Welfare regime cluster All three All three Continental Minimal Scandinavian 
Dependent variable Spending on training 
schemes (levels) 
Spending on training schemes (first difference) 
Left power in  0.01876 0.00264 -0.00792 0.00309 0.02589 
cabinet dummy (0.025) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.022) 
Unemployment rate 0.00964 -0.00059 -0.00093** -0.00080 0.00307 
 (0.008) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
GDP growth -0.00829 -0.00112 0.01028 -0.00041 -0.00759 
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.010) (0.001) (0.010) 
Constant 0.16050 0.01017 0.01174 -0.00193 -0.01366 
 (0.099) (0.008) (0.016) (0.006) (0.018) 
Observations 338 322 110 125 87 
Number of id 15 15 5 6 4 
Country fixed effects No No No No No 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared within 0.19 0.08 0.29 0.14 0.28 
R-squared between 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.83 
R-squared overall 0.02 0.08 0.28 0.14 0.26 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table AA1.13: Effect of the left on employment incentives and rehabilitation – Jacknife robustness checks 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable Spending on employment incentives and rehabilitation (first difference) 
Left power in  -0.01696*** -0.01735*** -0.01731*** -0.01696*** -0.01244*** -0.01816*** -0.01536*** 
cabinet dummy (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
Unemployment rate 0.00071 0.00066 0.00050 0.00071 0.00050 0.00091 0.00077 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Union density 0.00008 0.00007 0.00004 0.00008 0.00003 0.00012 0.00011 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth -0.00403* -0.00384* -0.00330 -0.00403* -0.00305 -0.00407 -0.00362 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Constant 0.01462 0.01348 0.01827 0.01462 0.01441 0.01412 0.00849 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.021) (0.018) 
Observations 291 270 269 291 270 269 269 
Number of id 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Country FE No No No No No No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared within 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.16 
R-squared between 0.29 0.29 0.26 0.29 0.28 0.33 0.38 
R-squared overall 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.16 
Note: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table AA1.13 (continued): Effect of the left on employment incentives and rehabilitation – Jacknife robustness checks 
Column (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Dependent variable Spending on employment incentives and rehabilitation (first difference) 
Left power in  -0.01679*** -0.01797*** -0.01542*** -0.01744*** -0.01696*** -0.01839*** -0.01696*** -0.01896*** 
cabinet dummy (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Unemployment rate 0.00076 0.00075 0.00097 0.00072 0.00071 0.00049 0.00071 0.00089 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Union density 0.00006 0.00008 0.00008 0.00007 0.00008 0.00001 0.00008 0.00007 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth -0.00409* -0.00433* -0.00705** -0.00423 -0.00403* -0.00386* -0.00403* -0.00440 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Constant 0.01515 0.01539 0.02263 0.01544 0.01462 0.02359 0.01462 0.01341 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) 
Observations 269 285 269 274 291 269 291 269 
Number of id 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Country FE No No No No No No No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared within 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.16 
R-squared between 0.31 0.21 0.38 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.36 
R-squared overall 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.16 
Note: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Appendix A2.1: List of interviews and composition of EPL for temporary workers 
 
Table A2.1: List of interviews carried out in summer 2011 
Organisation Interviewee 
Union 
Confédération générale du travail (CGT): confederal 
representative 
Union 
Confédération française démocratique du travail (CFDT): 
confederal representative 
Union 
Confédération française démocratique du travail (CFDT): head 
of service federation  
Union 
Confédération générale du travail (CGT): representative from 
unemployed group  
Union 
Confédération générale du travail (CGT): representative interim 
federation  
Union 
Confédération française de l'encadrement - Confédération 
générale des cadres (CGC-CFE): confederal representative 
Employer organisation 
Mouvement des Entreprises de France (MEDEF) : 
representative responsible for employment and social affairs 
Employer organisation 
Confédération Générale des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises 
(CGPME): conferederal representative 
Employer organisation 
Professionnels de l'intérim, services et métiers de l'emploi 
(PRISME): Representative 
Government Civil servant from Employment ministry  
Government Civil servant from Work ministry  
 
Note: During a fieldwork in France in the summer 2011, semi-structured interviews were carried out 
with various union and employer representatives as well as civil servants. The question concerned 
changes in labour market policies that target labour market outsiders. 
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Table A2.2: EPL for temporary workers – breakdown of aggregate index 
Countries 
Valid cases 
for use of 
fixed-term 
contracts 
Maximum 
number of 
successive 
fixed-term 
contracts 
Maximum 
cumulated 
duration of 
successive 
fixed-term 
contracts 
Types of 
work from 
which 
temporary 
work agency 
employment 
is legal 
Restrictions 
on number 
of renewals 
of temporary 
work agency 
contracts 
Maximum 
cumulated 
duration of 
successive 
temporary 
work agency 
contracts 
Austria 1 5 0 1.5 2 0 
Belgium 1 2 2 3 4 5 
Denmark 1 5 2 0 2 0 
Finland 4 5 0 0 2 0 
France 4 4 4 3 4 3 
Germany 0 2 1 1.5 4 0 
Greece 6 2 3 0 4 4 
Ireland 1 0 1 0 2 0 
Italy 2 4 0 1.5 4 0 
Netherlan
ds 
0 3 0 0.75 4 1 
Norway 4 5 1 3 4 1 
Portugal 2 2 1 3 4 5 
Spain 3 3 3 3 4 6 
Sweden 1 0 5 0 2 4 
UK 0 0 1 0 2 0 
Notes: Values in 2007, higher scores mean more stringent regulations. 
Source: OECD index construction and values for France can be accessed at: 
http://www.oecd.org/employment/employmentpoliciesanddata/42740190.pdf 
http://www.oecd.org/employment/employmentpoliciesanddata/42746050.pdf 
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Appendix A2.2: Determinants of replaceability 
Table A2.3: Skill specificity of different occupations 
Description of occupational group 
Number of unit 
groups within 
ISCO 
classification 
Share in 
ISCO 
classification 
Empirical share in labour 
force 
Absolute 
skill 
specificity 
ISCO 
skill-
level 
Relative 
skill 
specificity   
 (Relative skill 
specificity) / 
StDv   
      female male total total       
1 "Legislators, senior officials and 
managers" 33 0.085 5.34 10.53 8.31 10.24 4 2.56 0.94 
2 "Professionals" 55 0.142 13.62 12.19 12.73 11.13 4 2.78 1.03 
3 "Technicians and associate 
professionals" 73 0.188 16.23 12.66 14.28 13.17 3 4.39 1.62 
4 "Clerks" 23 0.059 22.24 6.92 13.36 4.44 2 2.22 0.82 
5 "Service workers and shop and 
market sales workers" 23 0.059 21.37 7.58 13.44 4.41 2 2.20 0.81 
6 "Skilled agricultural and fishery 
workers" 16 0.041 2.96 5.41 4.41 9.35 2 4.67 1.72 
7 "Craft and related trades workers" 70 0.180 4.23 23.79 15.50 11.64 2 5.82 2.14 
8 "Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers" 70 0.180 3.95 12.45 8.82 20.45 2 10.23 3.77 
9 "Elementary occupations" 25 0.064 10.01 8.37 9.07 7.11 1 7.11 2.62 
SUM 388 1 99.94 99.90 99.92  StDV 2.71 1 
Source: Iversen, Torben, and David Soskice (2001) and Cusack, Thomas, Torben Iversen, and Philipp Rehm (2006).
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Notes and sources of Table A2.3 
 
Empirical share in 
labour force 
This is referred to as "Share of labour force" in Iversen & Soskice 
(APSR 2001). Here calculated from labour force surveys (not the 
ISSP 1996 survey, as in Iversen & Soskice APSR 2001), as a grand 
mean over all country-years in the sample. This means, roughly, 
that the shares are calculated with data from the following countries: 
Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany (East and 
West separately), Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA from about 1985 to 
about 2000. Numbers do not sum to 100 because of rounding errors. 
Absolute skill 
specificity (total) 
= (Share in ISCO classification) / (Empirical share in labour force, 
total) 
 
 
ISCO skill-level 
ILO does not assign an "ISCO skill-level" to ISCO88-1d group "1" 
(Legislators, senior officials, managers). We assign the highest 
"ISCO skill-level" (4) to this group. See 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/isco88/publ3.htm. 
This measure is referred to in Iversen & Soskice (APSR 2001) as 
"ISCO level of skills" 
 
Relative skill 
specificity   =  (Absolute skill specificity / ISCO-skill level) 
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Appendix A2.3: Determinants of temporary work regulation 
Table A2.4: Determinants of temporary work regulations - Alternative regression method 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Flexibilisation 
temporary agency 
work 
Flexibilisation 
fixed-term contracts 
Flexibilisation new 
contracts 
Flexibilisation of all types of temporary 
work (temporary agency work, fixed-term 
contracts and new contracts) 
      
Strictness of employment protection 0.25490*** 0.10190 0.00964 0.36644** 0.40991** 
(overall, lagged once) (0.083) (0.100) (0.063) (0.138) (0.154) 
Coordination Dummy  0.13712* 0.13688*** 0.10860* 0.38260** 0.35679** 
(0 low coordination, 1 high coordination) (0.075) (0.044) (0.055) (0.149) (0.165) 
Left Power  0.03728 -0.05959 0.00111 -0.02121 -0.30287 
(1 if left controls > 50% of cabinet seats) (0.065) (0.068) (0.040) (0.104) (0.215) 
Share of temporary employment 0.00014 -0.01539 0.00090 -0.01435 -0.01305 
(% dependent employment, lagged once) (0.006) (0.014) (0.005) (0.019) (0.020) 
Total Trade 0.00040 -0.00007 -0.00231 -0.00198 -0.00384 
(Trade-to-GDP-ratio, lagged once) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Rate of Unemployment  0.02849*** 0.02078 0.00433 0.05360*** 0.04849*** 
(% of Civilian Labour Force, lagged once) (0.009) (0.016) (0.006) (0.016) (0.014) 
Coordination* Left Power     0.36599 
     (0.217) 
Constant -1.13866*** -0.31748 0.12296 -1.33318 -1.28529 
Observations 269 269 269 269 269 
Number of id 14 14 14 14 14 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared within 0.17 0.08 0.12 0.17 0.18 
R-squared between 0.00 0.35 0.01 0.05 0.04 
R-squared overall 0.02 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.06 
Note: Regression method is XTREG with robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table: Marginal effects using results from column 2 
Coordination Party Margin P-value 
Low Right -0.2072 0.108 
Low Left -0.5101 0.020 
High Right 0.1498 0.006 
High Left 0.2126 0.001 
Note: Using results from column 2 in Table A2.4, calculated using the margins 
command in Stata 11. 
 
Table A2.5: The determinants of EPL for temporary workers – cross-sectional regression 
Column (1) (2) 
Perceived ease of replacement 0.14278*** -0.28355** 
(dummy) (0.047) (0.145) 
Temporary sector 0.06023** 0.02452 
(share of total employees) (0.026) (0.023) 
Wage coordination index 0.25692 0.48852*** 
(From 0 to 5) (0.170) (0.148) 
Left power 0.03129** -0.11942** 
(mean last 30 years) (0.015) (0.051) 
Repaceability*Left power  0.01209*** 
  (0.004) 
Constant -3.04070** 2.12771 
Observations 12 12 
Number of id 12 12 
Country FE No No 
Year FE No No 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Generalized least squares to correct for heteroskedasticity (hence 
no R2).  
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Table A2.6: Regression on changes in EPL for temporary workers 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4a) (4b) 
Dependent variable First difference in EPL of temporary workers Flexibilising (-1) Tightening (1) 
Replaceability 0.00418***     
 (0.001)     
Coordination dummy  -0.10095*** -0.06663* 0.85148 14.22254*** 
  (0.034) (0.038) (1.849) (0.778) 
Left power dummy   0.05536* -12.14018*** 17.93043*** 
   (0.032) (2.629) (0.760) 
Coordination*left   -0.08937*** 13.40176*** -18.26805*** 
   (0.029) (2.612) (1.940) 
Temporary work 0.00313 0.00618** 0.00633** 0.08056 -0.17999* 
(lagged) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.056) (0.101) 
Unemployment rate -0.00809* -0.00826 -0.00753 0.27454** -0.30046 
(lagged) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.121) (0.211) 
Openness (a) 0.00033 0.00100* 0.00095 -0.02299 -0.00581 
(lagged) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.029) (0.049) 
Constant -0.01142 0.00917 -0.01126 -20.20755*** -31.90931*** 
Observations 289 289 289 289 289 
Number of countries 16 16 16 16 16 
Country FE No No No Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No No 
R-squared within 0.11 0.11 0.11 n.a. n.a. 
R-squared between 0.27 0.28 0.29 n.a. n.a. 
R-squared overall 0.12 0.12 0.13 n.a. n.a. 
Note: Columns (1) to (3) ordinal logistic regression, columns (4a) and (4b) multinomial logistic regression, both with robust standard errors in 
parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (a) Openness is not lagged for the multinomial logistic regressions (i.e.: column 4a and 4b) as this results 
in the variance matrix being non-symmetric or highly singular. Similarly, note that for Multinomial logistic regression only country dummies are 
included because including time dummies results in the variance matrix becoming non-symmetric or highly singular. 
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Table A2.7: Marginal effect of left control of government in different coordination 
regime 
Probability(EPL temporary workers is increased) dy/dx P-value 
Low coordination  0.2698182 0.000 
High coordination -0.0036453 0.825 
Probability(EPL temporary workers is reduced)   
Low coordination -0.1642466 0.523 
High coordination  0.0633261 0.000 
Note: marginal effects are computed using the results of column 3 in Table A2.6. 
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Table A2.8: The determinants of temporary work regulations - no time controls 
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable Temporary 
agency work 
Fixed term 
contracts 
New contracts Sum change in temporary work fixed 
term contracts and new contracts 
Strictness of employment protection 2.29651*** 0.32715 -0.76584 0.58091 0.66680 
(overall, lagged once) (0.699) (0.603) (0.714) (0.509) (0.518) 
Coordination Dummy  1.69768* 1.11207*** 15.61460*** 1.49215*** 1.30448*** 
(0 low coordination, 1 high coordination) (1.029) (0.293) (0.937) (0.162) (0.258) 
Left Power  0.48898 -0.21489 -0.21235 -0.24308 -1.53278*** 
(1 if left controls > 50% of cabinet seats) (0.791) (0.336) (0.832) (0.406) (0.323) 
Share of temporary employment 0.02165 -0.11126 0.05290 -0.03907 -0.02636 
(% dependent employment, lagged once) (0.092) (0.080) (0.084) (0.051) (0.049) 
Total Trade 0.03251 0.01820 -0.06075 0.01699 0.01359 
(Trade-to-GDP-ratio, lagged once) (0.024) (0.024) (0.062) (0.015) (0.014) 
Rate of Unemployment  0.31751*** 0.15385 0.22239*** 0.21152*** 0.18324*** 
(% of Civilian Labour Force, lagged once) (0.097) (0.105) (0.066) (0.073) (0.063) 
Coordination * Left power     1.68563** 
     (0.724) 
Constant cut1 4.25093 1.08733 -18.71828*** -0.95264 -1.36015 
Constant cut2 12.66382*** 6.80753** 32.75232*** 1.67743 1.29217 
Constant cut3    6.82490*** 6.55576*** 
Constant cut4    8.15820*** 7.89006*** 
Constant cut5    9.85787*** 9.59110*** 
Observations 269 269 269 269 269 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Ordinal logistic regression with robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
290 
 
 
Table A2.9: The determinants of temporary work regulations - no time controls and no country fixed effects 
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Temporary Fixed term New Sum change in temporary work 
Dependent variable work contracts contracts fixed term contracts and new contracts 
      
Coordination Dummy  1.30815** 1.08636*** -0.13728 1.07163*** 0.60369 
(0 low coordination, 1 high coordination) (0.514) (0.229) (1.285) (0.280) (0.447) 
Left power  0.40031 -0.01171 -0.08749 -0.08836 -1.15420*** 
(1 if left controls > 50% of cabinet seats) (0.472) (0.303) (0.838) (0.248) (0.343) 
Employment Protection Legislation  0.25395* 0.44657*** 0.18456 0.33744*** 0.28557** 
(overall, lagged once) (0.132) (0.112) (0.492) (0.130) (0.126) 
Share of temporary employment  -0.15200*** -0.14364*** -0.07342 -0.14359*** -0.14431*** 
(% dependent employment, lagged once) (0.033) (0.022) (0.050) (0.019) (0.019) 
Rate of Unemployment  0.09369** 0.07723* 0.16584** 0.09779*** 0.08619*** 
(as % of Civilian Labour Force, lagged once) (0.042) (0.041) (0.068) (0.026) (0.024) 
Total Trade  -0.01554** -0.00606* -0.00926 -0.01072** -0.01127** 
(Trade-to-GDP-ratio, lagged once) (0.006) (0.003) (0.016) (0.004) (0.005) 
Coordination * Left Power     1.35734** 
     (0.612) 
Constant cut1 -4.59704*** -2.23348*** -4.98577*** -5.30984*** -6.02329*** 
Constant cut2 2.51305*** 3.25286*** 3.58637* -2.69505*** -3.39296*** 
Constant cut3    2.19347*** 1.56368*** 
Constant cut4    3.48728*** 2.85978*** 
Constant cut5    5.16583*** 4.53718*** 
Observations 269 269 269 269 269 
Fixed effects No No No No No 
Cubic trend No No No No No 
Log pseudo-likelihood -88.37 -135.25 -54.29 -190.61 -189.15 
Pseudo R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.08 
Note: Ordinal logistic regression with robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A2.10: Marginal coefficients from Table A2.9 column (5) 
Party Coordination Deregulating Re-regulating 
Right Low 0.056*** 0.110*** 
Left Low 0.0201*** 0.244*** 
Right High 0.0907*** 0.068*** 
Left High 0.105*** 0.057*** 
 
Table A2.11: The determinants of temporary work regulations - regression with 3 years 
moving average controls 
Columns (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable Sum change in temporary work 
 fixed term contracts and new contracts 
   
Coordination Dummy  1.19867*** 0.95345*** 
(0 low coordination, 1 high coordination) (0.385) (0.296) 
Left power  -0.47270 -2.37274*** 
(1 if left controls > 50% of cabinet seats) (0.445) (0.803) 
Employment Protection Legislation  1.34248** 1.39307** 
(overall, lagged once) (0.609) (0.625) 
Share of temporary employment  -0.06321 -0.07277 
(% dependent employment, lagged once) (0.097) (0.089) 
Unemployment rate 0.15296 0.16766* 
(3 years moving average) (0.110) (0.091) 
Openness -0.02308 -0.01963 
(3 years moving average) (0.030) (0.028) 
Coordination * Left power  2.35549*** 
  (0.895) 
Constant cut1 -1.38093 -1.10661 
Constant cut2 1.23606 1.55107 
Constant cut3 6.39179 6.87056* 
Constant cut4 7.74434** 8.22797** 
Constant cut5 9.47598** 9.95992*** 
Observations 269 269 
Fixed effects i Yes Yes 
Cubic trend ii Yes Yes 
Log pseudo-likelihood -184.26 -181.26 
Pseudo R-squared 0.10 0.12 
Notes: Ordinal logistic regression with robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1; (i) Fixed Effects not shown; (ii) Cubic trend refers to the inclusion of a trend a squared trend and 
a cubic trend as recommended by Carter and Signorino (2010). 
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Table A2.12: The determinants of changes in temporary work regulations - inclusion of various measures of union strength 
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable Sum change in temporary work fixed term contracts and new contracts 
       
Wage coordination index  0.46644*** 0.49049*** 0.51544*** 0.60590** 0.81173** 0.73265** 
(from 1 to 5) (0.148) (0.190) (0.178) (0.259) (0.331) (0.298) 
Left power  -0.10924 -0.19321 -0.09421 -0.82163* -0.77335* -0.81272* 
(1 if left controls > 50% of cabinet seats) (0.284) (0.326) (0.304) (0.488) (0.456) (0.480) 
Employment Protection Legislation  0.38342* 0.44716 0.36089* 1.28856** 1.42619* 1.29544** 
(overall, lagged once) (0.209) (0.274) (0.192) (0.649) (0.757) (0.566) 
Share of temporary employment  -0.13699*** -0.13331*** -0.13786*** -0.06854 -0.05427 -0.07188 
(% dependent employment, lagged once) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.153) (0.145) (0.139) 
Rate of Unemployment  0.07869*** 0.08901** 0.07081** 0.28662*** 0.22181*** 0.26076*** 
(% of Civilian Labour Force, lagged once) (0.029) (0.042) (0.033) (0.085) (0.073) (0.092) 
Total Trade  -0.01568*** -0.00815 -0.01496*** -0.03158 -0.01947 -0.02123 
(Trade-to-GDP-ratio, lagged once) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.022) (0.027) (0.022) 
Union density 0.00483   -0.02516   
 (0.009)   (0.059)   
Bargaining coverage  -0.01896**   -0.07035***  
  (0.008)   (0.024)  
Union centralisation   -0.62472   -12.65254*** 
   (0.998)   (2.500) 
Constant cut1 -4.68871*** -5.36152*** -5.05646*** -1.07317 -4.77909 -10.62693*** 
Constant cut2 -2.27515*** -2.94910*** -2.64503*** 1.41886 -2.29535 -8.12506** 
Constant cut3 2.73308*** 1.86777*** 2.36018*** 7.04712** 2.98247 -2.37239 
Constant cut4 3.94346*** 3.08489*** 3.57336*** 8.34518*** 4.27514 -1.05205 
Constant cut5 5.64342*** 4.79012*** 5.27609*** 10.13115*** 6.05263 0.74676 
Observations 236 221 236 236 221 236 
Log pseudo-likelihood -166.55 -164.23 -166.63 -154.46 -154.31 -152.11 
Pseudo R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.15 0.13 0.16 
Fixed effects (i) Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Cubic trend (ii) Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Note: Ordinal logistic regression with robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (i) Fixed Effects not shown; (ii) 
Cubic trend refers to the inclusion of a trend a squared trend and a cubic trend as recommended by Carter and Signorino (2010). 
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Table A2.13: The determinants of changes in temporary work regulations – Alternative measures of coordination 
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Flexibility of fixed term contracts, agency work and new contracts 
Left power  -0.09891 -0.25652 -0.26295 -0.29768 
(1 if left controls > 50% of cabinet seats) (0.281) (0.382) (0.427) (0.455) 
Employment Protection Legislation  -0.00553 0.55988 0.36044 0.34763 
(overall, lagged once) (0.187) (0.532) (0.585) (0.589) 
Share of temporary employment -0.12049*** -0.04506 -0.04090 -0.04083 
(% dependent employment, lagged once) (0.020) (0.054) (0.051) (0.052) 
Rate of Unemployment  0.13144*** 0.24799*** 0.21559*** 0.22092*** 
(as % of Civilian Labour Force, lagged once) (0.029) (0.056) (0.077) (0.083) 
Total Trade  -0.00527* 0.01245 0.01550 0.01601 
(Trade-to-GDP-ratio, lagged once) (0.003) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
Hall Gingerich index of coordination 2.30031***    
(from 0 to 1) (0.611)    
Wage coordination index   0.82239***   
(from 1 to 5)  (0.193)   
Rights of works councils    1.54604**  
(From 0 to 3)   (0.619)  
Status of works council     1.28353** 
(From 0 to 2)    (0.547) 
Constant cut1 -4.46766*** 0.46147 1.64389 -0.39721 
Constant cut2 -1.89529*** 3.08883 4.26380 2.22673 
Constant cut3 3.02345*** 8.29166*** 9.36034*** 7.32958*** 
Constant cut4 4.33750*** 9.63541*** 10.68318*** 8.65242*** 
Constant cut5 5.90796*** 11.35033*** 12.36701*** 10.33605*** 
Observations 247 269 269 269 
Fixed effects (i) No (ii) Yes Yes Yes 
Log pseudo-likelihood -175.07 -182.80 -185.81 -185.63 
Pseudo R-squared 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.10 
Note: Ordinal logistic regression with robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (i) Fixed Effects not shown; 
(ii) Hall Gingerich index is time invariant and would therefore be fully collinear with country fixed effects.  
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Table A2.14: The determinants of changes in temporary work regulations – Alternative 
measures of openness 
Columns (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable Sum change in temporary work fixed-term 
contracts and new contracts 
Coordination Dummy  1.43210*** 1.27010*** 1.39807*** 
(0 low coordination, 1 high coordination) (0.323) (0.298) (0.306) 
Left power  -0.54520 -0.60954 -0.56352 
(1 if left controls > 50% of cabinet seats) (0.463) (0.494) (0.468) 
Employment Protection Legislation  1.57884** 1.66837** 1.65780** 
(overall, lagged once) (0.766) (0.795) (0.798) 
Share of temporary employment -0.09584 -0.11731 -0.10933 
(% dependent employment, lagged once) (0.104) (0.099) (0.103) 
Rate of Unemployment  0.29950*** 0.28354*** 0.29787*** 
(% Civilian Labour Force, lagged once) (0.087) (0.089) (0.088) 
Imports from Emerging and developing  0.15376   
economies (% of GDP) (0.101)   
Exports to Emerging and developing   0.41404***  
economies (% of GDP)  (0.155)  
Trade to and from Emerging and    0.13907** 
developing economies (% of GDP)   (0.068) 
Constant cut1 1.48418 1.65007 1.62219 
Constant cut2 4.13747 4.32204 4.28386 
Constant cut3 9.49128*** 9.69880*** 9.66036*** 
Constant cut4 10.85854*** 11.07110*** 11.02802*** 
Constant cut5 12.60157*** 12.82682*** 12.77454*** 
Observations 269 269 269 
Fixed effects i Yes Yes Yes 
Cubic trend ii Yes Yes Yes 
Log pseudo-likelihood -179.61 -178.22 -178.95 
Pseudo R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Note: Ordinal logistic regression with robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1; (i) Fixed Effects not shown; (ii) Cubic trend refers to the inclusion of a trend a squared trend and 
a cubic trend as recommended by Carter and Signorino (2010). 
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Table A2.15: The determinants of changes in temporary work regulations – Alternative measures of left strength 
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Flexibility of fixed-term contracts, agency work and new contracts 
Coordination Dummy  1.29763*** 1.24221*** 0.94886* 1.04183** 
(0 low coordination, 1 high coordination) (0.341) (0.368) (0.495) (0.422) 
Employment Protection Legislation  1.19110 1.31284** 1.50738* 1.57231** 
(overall, lagged once) (0.770) (0.653) (0.813) (0.714) 
Share of temporary employment  -0.08006 -0.06183 -0.09617 -0.07426 
(% dependent employment, lagged once) (0.106) (0.097) (0.104) (0.099) 
Rate of Unemployment  0.24323*** 0.24899*** 0.27708*** 0.28152*** 
(as % of Civilian Labour Force, lagged once) (0.085) (0.074) (0.070) (0.067) 
Total Trade  -0.02168 -0.01401 -0.01684 -0.00844 
(Trade-to-GDP-ratio, lagged once) (0.026) (0.021) (0.026) (0.022) 
Share of cabinet seats controlled by the left -0.00712    
 (0.007)    
Share of cabinet seats controlled by the left   -0.00262   
(3 years moving average)  (0.005)   
Share of parliamentary seats controlled by the left   -0.06287**  
Share of parliamentary seats controlled by the left     -0.04687 
(3 years moving average)    (0.031) 
Constant cut1 -1.25830 -0.54363 -3.81646 -1.77559 
Constant cut2 1.32273 2.09176 -1.23725 0.86572 
Constant cut3 6.78116 7.36800** 4.32857 6.23324* 
Constant cut4 8.07431* 8.73647** 5.63650 7.61043** 
Constant cut5 9.82038** 10.48270*** 7.40307 9.36795** 
Observations 255 269 255 269 
Fixed effects (i) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cubic trend (ii) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log pseudo-likelihood -167.72 -181.15 -165.93 -179.82 
Pseudo R-squared 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.12 
Note: Ordinal logistic regression with robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (i) Fixed Effects not shown; 
(ii) Cubic trend refers to the inclusion of a trend a squared trend and a cubic trend as recommended by Carter and Signorino (2010).  
296 
 
 
Table A2.16: Jack-knife robustness checks – country exclusion 
Country excluded Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece 
Dependent variable Flexibility of fixed-term contracts, agency work and new contracts 
        
Coordination Dummy  1.28368*** 1.25308*** 1.32029*** 1.32507*** 1.33072** 1.40310*** 0.79140*** 
(0 low coordination, 1 high coordination) (0.380) (0.361) (0.389) (0.362) (0.530) (0.406) (0.283) 
Left power  -0.52459 -0.53696 -0.75665 -0.49939 -0.54108 -0.47354 -0.85769 
(1 if left controls > 50% of cabinet seats) (0.459) (0.533) (0.479) (0.487) (0.502) (0.454) (0.563) 
Employment Protection Legislation  1.30417** 1.30530** 1.45278** 1.31991** 2.01361** 1.17504* 1.08869* 
(overall, lagged once) (0.644) (0.626) (0.727) (0.648) (0.866) (0.671) (0.559) 
Share of temporary employment  -0.06724 -0.08110 -0.07135 -0.06389 0.01463 -0.06239 -0.21614*** 
(% dependent employment, lagged once) (0.102) (0.100) (0.109) (0.099) (0.107) (0.102) (0.074) 
Rate of Unemployment  0.26126*** 0.27267*** 0.28507*** 0.27633*** 0.24696*** 0.25823** 0.33364*** 
(%Civilian Labour Force, lagged once) (0.092) (0.101) (0.100) (0.094) (0.092) (0.114) (0.125) 
Total Trade  -0.01394 -0.00335 -0.00601 -0.00820 -0.02592 -0.01411 -0.03354* 
(Trade-to-GDP-ratio, lagged once) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.021) (0.026) (0.020) 
Constant cut1 45.19736** -1.29075 1.25408 0.27482 2.23536 -0.62346 -3.92605 
Constant cut2 47.84500** 1.35308 3.91100 2.82339 4.78760 1.93257 -1.27928 
Constant cut3 53.09039*** 6.55180* 9.15957*** 8.10131** 10.15311** 7.43278** 4.26575 
Constant cut4 54.43055*** 8.01533** 10.43248*** 9.47206*** 11.60368*** 9.10980*** 5.67342** 
Constant cut5 56.17865*** 10.23092** 12.19452*** 11.21599*** 13.28058*** 10.30499*** 7.32649*** 
Observations 257 247 247 259 247 247 247 
Fixed effects (i) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Ordinal logistic regression with robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (i) Fixed effects not show here, 
refers to both country effects and the inclusion of cubic time controls as recommended by Carter and Signorino (2010).  
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Table A2.16: Jack-knife robustness checks (continued) 
Columns Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden UK 
Dependent variable Flexibility of fixed-term contracts, agency work and new contracts 
        
Coordination Dummy  1.39583*** 1.50513*** 1.31246*** 1.16110*** 1.39858*** 1.34355*** 1.38614*** 
(0 low coordination, 1 high coordination) (0.425) (0.526) (0.364) (0.380) (0.407) (0.384) (0.373) 
Left power  -0.53606 -0.33989 -0.55377 -0.46058 -0.89550* -0.55878 -0.33366 
(1 if left controls > 50% of cabinet seats) (0.464) (0.377) (0.458) (0.472) (0.514) (0.476) (0.453) 
Employment Protection Legislation  1.26117* 1.95985*** 1.40511** 1.35990* 1.18362 1.39996** 1.63338** 
(overall, lagged once) (0.735) (0.755) (0.679) (0.734) (0.725) (0.674) (0.768) 
Share of temporary employment  -0.05238 -0.04969 -0.06272 -0.05042 -0.06265 -0.06650 -0.09635 
(% dependent employment, lagged once) (0.100) (0.104) (0.102) (0.120) (0.126) (0.103) (0.097) 
Rate of Unemployment  0.26405** 0.24692*** 0.25485*** 0.23014*** 0.37309*** 0.26896*** 0.28126*** 
(%Civilian Labour Force, lagged once) (0.116) (0.083) (0.092) (0.087) (0.089) (0.095) (0.070) 
Total Trade  -0.01750 -0.01534 -0.01082 -0.01105 0.00302 -0.01016 -0.01273 
(Trade-to-GDP-ratio, lagged once) (0.032) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.022) 
Constant cut1 -0.00732 2.19194 -0.18945 0.11288 1.02298 0.48338 2.50502 
Constant cut2 2.60180 4.79823 3.07217 2.60543 4.09136 3.03546 5.05685 
Constant cut3 7.71873** 10.22325** 8.25038** 8.04896** 9.59190*** 8.44423** 10.37263*** 
Constant cut4 9.09385** 11.54533*** 9.62359*** 9.30813** 10.93501*** 9.78348*** 11.71947*** 
Constant cut5 10.83932*** 13.75115*** 11.37068*** 11.05494*** 12.67995*** 11.53362*** 13.48661*** 
Observations 248 247 248 248 249 259 247 
Fixed effects (i) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Ordinal logistic regression with robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (i) Fixed effects not show here, refers 
to both country effects and the inclusion of cubic time controls as recommended by Carter and Signorino (2010).  
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Table A2.17: Stepwise inclusion of variables 
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable Flexibility of fixed-term contracts, agency work and new contracts 
Employment Protection Legislation  0.70884** 0.62624* 0.63173* 0.53329 0.69229* 0.78906* 
(overall, lagged once) (0.294) (0.378) (0.360) (0.381) (0.417) (0.469) 
Coordination Dummy  1.29930*** 1.37759*** 1.39814*** 1.41100*** 1.40511*** 1.40423*** 
(0 low coordination, 1 high coordination) (0.198) (0.208) (0.195) (0.187) (0.249) (0.238) 
Left share of cabinet -0.00336 0.00159 0.00151 0.00084 0.00049 0.00048 
(3 years moving average) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Share of temporary employment   -0.03948 -0.04201 -0.04353 -0.04202 -0.04377 
(% dependent employment, lagged once)  (0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.051) (0.051) 
GDP growth   -0.05464 -0.08203 -0.10307 -0.11322 
   (0.090) (0.094) (0.108) (0.119) 
Rate of Unemployment     0.10383* 0.09618* 0.12096 
(3 years moving average)    (0.054) (0.051) (0.085) 
Unit labour costs     -0.05065 -0.04725 
(3 years moving average)     (0.056) (0.058) 
Total Trade       0.01106 
(3 years moving average)      (0.025) 
cut1 -2.37710* -3.17755** -3.31452** -3.21876** -2.96537* -1.74432 
cut2 0.23409 -0.57958 -0.71553 -0.61520 -0.36524 0.85364 
cut3 5.16777*** 4.40423*** 4.27322*** 4.41786*** 4.67575*** 5.89283** 
cut4 6.62816*** 5.71939*** 5.58992*** 5.74168*** 6.00402*** 7.22510** 
cut5 8.30553*** 7.40805*** 7.27948*** 7.43574*** 7.70401*** 8.92819*** 
Observations 308 269 269 269 269 269 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Ordinal logistic regression with robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Appendix A2.4: Qualitative section on France 
 Table A2.18: Educational profile of temporary workers in comparative perspective 
Highest 
level of 
education 
 
Country 
Employment 
contract 
unlimited or 
limited 
duration 
Lower 
secondary 
education 
completed 
(ISCED 2) 
Upper 
secondary 
education 
completed 
(ISCED 3) 
Post-
secondary 
non-tertiary 
education 
completed 
(ISCED 4) 
Tertiary 
education 
completed 
(ISCED 5-
6) 
Austria Unlimited 14.3 68.6 8.4 8.5 
 Limited 32.3 51 7.6 8 
Belgium Unlimited 18 38 0 33.5 
 Limited 23.5 39.9 0 29.5 
Germany Unlimited 6.8 64 6.6 21.5 
 Limited 15.3 55.6 6.8 20.3 
Denmark Unlimited 15.7 35.8 0 47.8 
 Limited 16.1 30.6 0 50.8 
Spain Unlimited 18 17.7 10.9 26.3 
 Limited 25.3 17.6 10.4 19.1 
Finland Unlimited 11.1 35.2 0 33.9 
 Limited 16.8 42.3 0 27.2 
France Unlimited 10.4 42.3 0 31.4 
 Limited 12.3 48.4 0 26.2 
UK Unlimited 20.7 11.3 0 47.1 
 Limited 22.6 10.4 0 45.2 
Ireland Unlimited 12.9 22.5 0 54.2 
 Limited 17.7 21.5 0 45.9 
Netherlands Unlimited 29.6 27.1 8.5 26.5 
 Limited 26.4 28.1 5.6 29.9 
Source: European Social Survey, wave 2006. 
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Table A2.19: Partisan preferences among workers with limited and unlimited contracts  
 Political Party / Type of contract Unlimited Limited No contract 
PC (Parti Communiste) 3.22 6.99 2.16 
LCR (Ligue Communiste) 2.05 2.14 2.33 
LO (Lutte Ouvrière) 1.79 5.05 1.93 
Sum of votes for extreme left parties 7.06 14.18 6.42 
 
PRG (Parti Radical de Gauche) 1.92 2.08 3.82 
PS (Parti Socialiste) 36.53 38.33 30.87 
Divers gauche 1.04 0 1.49 
Les Verts 5.29 5.91 2.81 
Autres mouvements écologistes 1.21 0.94 0 
Sum of votes for left leaning parties 45.99 47.26 38.99 
 
Nouveau Centre 1.06 0.84 0 
UDF (l'Union pour la Démocratie Française)-
MoDem (Mouvement démocrate) 6.81 6.74 3.95 
Sum of votes for centre right parties 7.87 7.58 3.95 
 
UMP (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire) 29.4 22.69 46.27 
MPF (Mouvement pour la France) 0.4 0 2.23 
Divers droite 1.68 2.39 0 
CPNT (Chasse, Pêche, Nature, Traditions) 1.55 0.86 1.39 
Sum of votes for right-wing parties 33.03 25.94 49.89 
Extreme right parties (FN, Front National) 2.7 2.25 0 
Total votes for the left 53.05 61.44 45.41 
Total votes for the right 43.6 35.77 53.84 
Other votes 0.21 0.85 0 
Blanc 2.66 1.92 0.75 
Nul 0.47 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 
Source: European Social Survey (round 4), own calculations. 
Note: Party voted for in last national election (first round of the election), share of respondents voting 
for different parties by types of contracts. 
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Table A2.20: Partisan preferences among workers in different occupational groups 
 Political party 
Legislators, 
senior officials 
and managers Professionals 
Technicians 
and associate 
professionals Clerks 
Service workers 
and shop and 
market sales 
workers 
Craft and 
related 
trade 
workers 
Plant and 
machine 
operators and 
assemblers 
Elementary 
occupations 
LCR (Ligue Communiste) 0 0.77 4.18 3.93 0.54 1.01 3.18 0 
LO (Lutte Ouvrière) 0 1.66 1.31 0 4.21 3.11 1.37 5.58 
PC (Parti Communiste) 2.6 2.2 3.71 3.89 3.13 6.31 6.06 2.91 
EXTREME LEFT 2.6 4.63 9.2 7.82 7.88 10.43 10.61 8.49 
PS (Parti Socialiste) 14 39.53 38.03 34.89 30.09 25.94 30.2 46.53 
PRG (Parti Radical de 
Gauche) 
1.84 1.32 1.65 4.12 1.86 1.71 7.31 1.49 
Les Verts 2.35 8.63 3.97 3.46 5.78 5.3 4.25 4.67 
Autres mouvements 
écologistes 
1.81 0.93 1.9 1.01 0 0.91 2.85 0 
Divers gauche 0 1.16 0.9 0.48 0 0.48 2.91 1.75 
LEFT 20 51.57 46.45 43.96 37.73 34.34 47.52 54.44 
Nouveau Centre 0.95 0.49 0.71 1.69 0 3.33 0 1.32 
UDF (l'Union pour la 
Démocratie Française)-
MoDem (Mouvement 
démocrate) 
14.14 9.04 5.58 2.8 2.35 12.66 4.41 1.9 
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 Political party 
Legislators, 
senior officials 
and managers Professionals 
Technicians 
and associate 
professionals Clerks 
Service workers 
and shop and 
market sales 
workers 
Craft and 
related 
trade 
workers 
Plant and 
machine 
operators and 
assemblers 
Elementary 
occupations 
CENTRE RIGHT 15.09 9.53 6.29 4.49 2.35 15.99 4.41 3.22 
UMP (Union pour un 
Mouvement Populaire) 
56 30.76 31.79 26.63 39.18 30.04 29.04 19.11 
Divers droite 0.93 1.75 0.77 4.37 1.35 2.14 0 0.82 
CPNT (Chasse, Pêche, Nature, 
Traditions) 
0 0 1.83 2.45 1.71 0.87 1.33 2.44 
MPF (Mouvement pour la 
France) 
1.17 0.42 0 0 1.82 0 0 1.03 
RIGHT 58.1 32.93 34.39 33.45 44.06 33.05 30.37 23.4 
EXTREME RIGHT - FN 
(Front National) 
1.43 0.47 1.73 4.57 4.33 1.44 4.12 5.32 
TOTAL LEFT 22.6 56.2 55.65 51.78 45.61 44.77 58.13 62.93 
TOTAL RIGHT 74.62 42.93 42.41 42.51 50.74 50.48 38.9 31.94 
Autres 0 0.38 0.35 0 0 0 1.49 0 
Blanc 2.78 0 1.18 5.72 3.65 3.06 1.47 5.14 
Nul 0 0.49 0.42 0 0 1.69 0 0 
Source: European Social Survey (round 4), own calculations. 
Note: Party voted for in last national election (first round), share of respondents voting for different parties by occupation. 
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Table A2.21: Notes and sources for Table 10 
(1) Source for employment status by occupations: European Social Survey data pooled 2, 3 4 
rounds (i.e.: for surveys carried out in years 2004, 2006 and 2008). Note: own calculations 
using cross-tabulation of respondents’ employment status and isco occupations. 
(2) Source for fear of replacement by occupation: ISSP (2005). Note: own calculations using 
cross-tabulation of respondents’ fear of replacement and isco occupations. 
(3) Source: European Social Survey (round 4, year 2008), own calculations. Note: Party voted 
for in last national election (first round), share of respondents voting for different parties by 
occupation (for all results see Table A2.20). 
(4) Source for votes by employment status: European Social Survey (round 4, year 2008). Note: 
Party voted for in last national election (first round of the election), share of respondents voting 
for different parties by types of contracts (pooled across all occupations). Own calculations 
using cross-tabulation of last vote and employment status (for full results see Table A2.19). 
(5) Source: European Social Survey (round 4, year 2006). Note: this level of education refers to 
ISCED 3 level and refers to those that have only completed upper secondary education and so 
does not include respondents that have completed upper secondary and tertiary level education. 
Results for other countries available in Table A2.18. 
General note: Left includes votes for the following parties in France: French communist party, 
socialist party, the radical party, communist revolutionary league (Ligue Communiste 
Revolutionaire - LCR), Workers’ struggle (Lutte Ouvrière - LO), and various green parties. 
Detailed results of cross-tabulation available from in Table A2.19 and Table A2.20. 
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Appendix A2.5: Testing effect of share of craft workers 
Table A2.22: The effect of the share of craft workers on reregulation of temporary work 
sector 
Dependent variable Sum change in temporary work, fixed term contracts and 
new contracts 
EPL overall 0.72874*** 
(lagged) (0.279) 
Left power dummy -0.09697 
 (0.588) 
Temporary work -0.17123*** 
(lagged) (0.049) 
Openness -0.00213 
(lagged) (0.006) 
Unemployment rate 0.21904*** 
(lagged) (0.063) 
Craft and related trades 6.68843** 
(share of total labour force) (3.388) 
Upper Secondary 0.01559 
(share of  (0.010) 
Constant cut1 -2.24942 
Constant cut2 0.30383 
Constant cut3 5.00742*** 
Constant cut4 6.74354*** 
Observations 139 
Country fixed effects No 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Source: Dependent variables coded using the fRDB database. Share of craft workers calculated using 
European labour force survey broken down by occupation. 
Note: All dependent variables are scaled following the FRDB convention, that is increases in the 
dependent variable refer to reforms that introduce more flexibility (i.e.: reduce regulations and/or 
protection of temporary work). Ordinal logistic regression with robust standard errors (clustered by 
country) in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix A3.1 
Table A3.1: Jack-knife robustness checks – stepwise country exclusion 
Excluding Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Ireland Netherlands Norway Sweden UK 
GDP growth rate 0.02313 0.03000* 0.02593* 0.02115** 0.00405 0.02891** 0.02205* 0.02397* 0.02281* 0.02289 
Rate of Unemployment -0.00424 -0.00339 0.00617 -0.00735 0.00743 -0.00827 -0.00843* -0.00676 -0.00234 -0.00998 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) 
Trade-to-GDP-ratio  -0.00164 -0.00181*** -0.00211*** -0.00151*** -0.00093** -0.00204*** -0.00130*** -0.00176*** -0.00179*** -0.00192*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Union density -0.00382*** -0.00416*** -0.00324*** -0.00303*** -0.00336*** -0.00391*** -0.00454*** -0.00367*** -0.00389*** -0.00401*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Left cabinet -0.00005 -0.00018 -0.00003 0.00025 0.00016 -0.00024 -0.00023 -0.00000 -0.00007 0.00012 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Total Public Social  -0.01763 -0.01794* -0.02605*** -0.02380** -0.01984*** -0.01488* -0.01301** -0.01915** -0.02144* -0.01565* 
Expenditures (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) 
Index of coordination 0.55930*** 0.55899*** 0.56071*** 0.64140*** 0.08781 0.48519*** 0.60663*** 0.56569*** 0.56455*** 0.47575*** 
Hall Gingerich (0.096) (0.068) (0.054) (0.080) (0.187) (0.089) (0.068) (0.070) (0.068) (0.150) 
Dualisation 0.01476*** 0.01453*** 0.01235*** 0.01523*** 0.00966*** 0.01158*** 0.01893*** 0.01431*** 0.01372** 0.01595*** 
(lagged) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
Replacement rate  -0.00708*** -0.00721*** -0.00668*** -0.00792*** -0.00189 -0.00814*** -0.00641*** -0.00671*** -0.00721*** -0.00827*** 
(unemployment 
benefits, year 1) 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Bad ALMPs 0.35379*** 0.36471*** 0.37034*** 0.38895*** 0.20953* 0.41211*** 0.37185*** 0.32096*** 0.37038*** 0.37788*** 
(Spending on 
employment incentives 
and rehabilitation) 
(0.103) (0.073) (0.061) (0.076) (0.108) (0.058) (0.067) (0.051) (0.049) (0.054) 
Constant 2.09634*** 2.11881*** 2.18769*** 2.18889*** 2.08490*** 2.19050*** 1.93700*** 2.14360*** 2.19054*** 2.25479*** 
Observations 102 94 101 89 94 103 90 100 101 89 
Number of id 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Country FE No No No No No No No No No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared overall 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.96 0.92 0.93 0.90 0.90 0.89 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
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Table A3.2: Sample with 3 years period average 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GDP growth rate 0.01513 0.00358 0.00643 0.02858** 0.02535** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) 
Rate of Unemployment  -0.00845 -0.01175 -0.01067 -0.00455 -0.01183** 
(% Civilian Labour Force) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Trade-to-GDP-ratio -0.00085 -0.00177 -0.00243 -0.00162*** -0.00133*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Union density -0.00392*** 0.00327 0.00199 -0.00372*** -0.00407*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Left cabinet 0.00021 0.00012 0.00015 0.00048 0.00058 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Social Expenditures -0.01396 -0.00724 -0.01279 -0.02152*** -0.01811*** 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) 
Index of coordination 0.33333 (omitted) (omitted) 0.52236*** 0.37454*** 
 (0.265)   (0.077) (0.060) 
Dualisation index 0.01708** 0.00657** 0.00652** 0.01185*** 0.01055*** 
(temporary work/EPL 
temporary work) 
(0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Bad APLMPs    0.24041* 0.37602*** 0.33843*** 
(employment incentives and 
rehabilitation) 
  (0.113) (0.055) (0.051) 
Replacement rate    -0.00803*** -0.00686*** 
(1st year unemployment)    (0.001) (0.000) 
Manufacturing sector     0.01168** 
(% total employees)     (0.005) 
Constant 1.83604*** 1.81831*** 1.96748*** 2.27011*** 2.04369*** 
 (0.263) (0.467) (0.372) (0.126) (0.186) 
Observations 65 65 65 51 48 
Number of id 14 14 14 14 13 
Country FE No Yes Yes No No 
Year FE Yes No No Yes Yes 
R-squared within 0.34 0.27 0.30 0.51 0.56 
R-squared between 0.84 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.99 
R-squared overall 0.73 0.01 0.01 0.92 0.93 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A3.2 (continued): Sample with 3 years period average 
Column (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
GDP growth rate 0.01106 0.02795* 0.02723 0.02896** 0.02735* 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) 
Rate of Unemployment  -0.00261 -0.00605 -0.00217 -0.00571 -0.00377 
(% Civilian Labour Force) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) 
Trade-to-GDP-ratio  -0.00149*** -0.00145** -0.00162*** -0.00159*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Union density -0.00432*** -0.00369*** -0.00405*** -0.00352*** -0.00379*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Left cabinet 0.00055 0.00049 0.00056 0.00053 0.00052 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Social Expenditures -0.01867*** -0.02179*** -0.02118*** -0.02156*** -0.01876*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Index of coordination 0.55882*** 0.55279*** 0.47928*** 0.53116*** 0.48453*** 
 (0.062) (0.089) (0.108) (0.089) (0.077) 
Dualisation index 0.01342*** 0.01236*** 0.01070*** 0.01186*** 0.01215*** 
(temporary work/EPL 
temporary work) 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Bad APLMPs  0.35317*** 0.38670*** 0.35861*** 0.37882*** 0.39362*** 
(employment incentives and 
rehabilitation) 
(0.051) (0.058) (0.071) (0.057) (0.053) 
Replacement rate -0.00791*** -0.00807*** -0.00755*** -0.00818*** -0.00838*** 
(1st year unemployment) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Imports from Emerging -0.01919***     
and developing economies (0.004)     
Union centralisation  -0.07903    
  (0.079)    
Statutory Minimum wage    -0.03362   
( 0 1 dummy)   (0.038)   
Educational attainment    -0.00593  
    (0.007)  
Consumer price index     0.01599 
     (0.010) 
Constant 2.20866*** 2.29197*** 2.27037*** 2.32307*** 2.16633*** 
 (0.120) (0.140) (0.119) (0.155) (0.151) 
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 
Number of id 14 14 14 14 14 
Country FE No No No No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared within 0.43 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.51 
R-squared between 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98 
R-squared overall 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A3.2 (continued): Sample with 3 years period average 
Column (11) (12) (13) 
GDP growth rate 0.03144** 0.02887** 0.02729* 
 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.016) 
Rate of Unemployment  -0.00408 -0.00811 -0.00448 
(% Civilian Labour Force) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) 
Trade-to-GDP-ratio -0.00154*** -0.00163*** -0.00162*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Union density -0.00385*** -0.00334*** -0.00377*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Left cabinet 0.00043 0.00060 0.00045 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Social Expenditures -0.02078*** -0.02180*** -0.02278** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) 
Index of coordination 0.54807*** 0.50942*** 0.52246*** 
 
(0.078) (0.093) (0.083) 
Dualisation index 0.01286*** 0.01092*** 0.01170*** 
(temporary work/EPL temporary work) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Bad APLMPs  0.36890*** 0.31615*** 0.36862*** 
(employment incentives and rehabilitation) (0.059) (0.062) (0.049) 
Replacement rate -0.00779*** -0.00731*** -0.00788*** 
(1st year unemployment) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Bargaining coverage -0.00033   
 (0.001)   
Public sector employees  -0.00221  
(% total employees)  (0.004)  
R&D spending   0.01279 
(lagged)   (0.034) 
Constant 2.22990*** 2.34761*** 2.28968*** 
 (0.130) (0.110) (0.173) 
Observations 50 48 50 
Number of id 14 13 13 
Country FE No No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared within 0.52 0.55 0.51 
R-squared between 0.97 0.98 0.97 
R-squared overall 0.91 0.92 0.92 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A3.3: Variables description and source 
Variables Description and source 
Wage inequality at 
the low end of the 
income distribution 
(dependent variable) 
Earnings - dispersion measures - ratio of the 5th-to-1st - where fifth 
(or median) and first deciles are upper-earnings decile limits, unless 
otherwise indicated, of gross earnings of full-time dependent 
employees. (source: OECD Employment and Labour Market 
Statistics). 
Adjusted Bargaining 
Coverage 
(0-100) = employees covered by wage bargaining agreements as a 
proportion of all wage and salary earners in employment with the right 
to bargaining, expressed as percentage, adjusted for the possibility that 
some sectors or occupations are excluded from the right to bargain 
(Visser, 2009). 
GDP growth GDP, volume – annual growth rates in percentage (OECD Main 
Economic Indicators database). 
Unemployment rate Rate of Unemployment as % of Civilian Labour Force (OECD Labour 
Force Statistics). 
Openness Trade-to-GDP-ratio (total trade) - Current prices, current exchange 
rates (OECD Main Economic Indicators database). 
Left share of cabinet Left party cabinet portfolios as a percent of all cabinet portfolios 
(Source: Swank Electoral, Legislative, and Government Strength of 
Political Parties by Ideological Group in Capitalist Democracies, 
1950-2006: A Database). 
Left share of 
parliament 
Left party legislative seats as a percent of all legislative seats (source: 
Swank Electoral, Legislative, and Government Strength of Political 
Parties by Ideological Group in Capitalist Democracies, 1950-2006: A 
Database). 
Union density Union Density, net union membership as a proportion wage and salary 
earners in employment (0-100) = NUM*100/WSEE; where WSEE is 
Wage and Salary Earners in Employment (1- ∞) = employed wage and 
salary workers; and NUM is Net Union Membership (1- ∞) = TUM 
minus union members outside the active, dependent and employed 
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labour force (Source: Visser, 2009). 
Union centralisation Summary measure of centralisation and coordination of union wage 
bargaining, taking into account both union authority and union 
concentration at multiple levels (0-1) = given by √[( Cfauthority* Hcf) 
+ (Affauthority* Haff )], weighting the degree of authority or vertical 
coordination in the union movement with the degree of union 
concentration or horizontal coordination, taking account of multiple 
levels at which bargaining can take place and assuming a non-zero 
division of union authority over different levels (source: Visser, 2009). 
Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) (source: OECD statistic website). 
Education This is the educational attainment of the total population aged 15 and 
over expressed as average years of schooling (Source: CEPS-OECD 
database). 
Minimum wage Recodes Visser’s (2009) 8 scale of minimum wage settings into two: 
the existence (coded 1 – coded 2-8 in Visser’s database) or not (coded 
0 – coded 0-1 in Visser’s database) of a national minimum wage. 
Relative minimum 
wage 
Ratio of minimum wages to median earnings of full-time employees. 
Median rather than mean earnings provide a better basis for 
international comparisons as it accounts for differences in earnings 
dispersion across countries (OECD Labour Force Survey dataset). 
Replacement rate Gross benefit replacement rates data are provided by OECD with one 
observation every two years for each country. In this case the data 
refer to the first year of unemployment benefits, averaged over three 
family situations and two earnings levels. The benefits are a 
percentage of average earnings before tax (Source: CEPS-OECD 
database). 
Employment 
incentives and 
rehabilitation 
1. Recruitment incentives are programmes making payments for a 
limited period only to facilitate the recruitment of unemployed persons 
and other target groups into jobs where the majority of the labour cost 
is covered by the employer. They include payments to individuals that 
are conditional upon the take-up of a new job (back-to-work bonus, 
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mobility/relocation allowance or similar) only if they are targeted (e.g. 
restricted to the long-term unemployed). 
2. Employment maintenance incentives are similar but facilitate 
continuing employment, in a situation of restructuring or similar. 
Generally-available in-work benefits for low-income groups should 
not be included. 
(Source: OECD Employment outlook). 
Employment 
Protection 
Legislation of 
temporary workers 
OECD indicators of employment protection are synthetic indicators of 
the strictness of regulation on dismissals (Source: OECD Employment 
database). 
Employment 
Protection 
Legislation of 
regular workers 
OECD indicators of employment protection are synthetic indicators of 
the strictness of regulation on the use of temporary contracts (Source: 
OECD Employment database). 
Temporary workers Share of temporary employment out of total dependent employees 
(Source: OECD Labour Force Survey Dataset). 
Self-employed 
workers 
Self-employment% of civilian employment (Source: OECD Labour 
Force Survey Dataset). 
Involuntary part-
time workers 
Share of involuntary part-timers in total employment (in percentages; 
source: OECD Labour Force Survey Dataset). 
Manufacturing 
sector 
Manufacturing employees as % of total employees: Proxied by 
category D divided by total employees in all industries (source: 
KLEMS database). 
Public sector Public sector employees as % total employees: Proxied by categories 
L, M, N divided by total employees in all industries (source: KLEMS 
database). 
Spending on 
Research and 
Development 
Research and development (R&D) expenditure statistics performed in 
the business enterprise sector divided by Gross Domestic Product 
(both in 2005 constant prices) (Source: OECD Structural Analysis 
Database). 
Trade from Imports and Exports to emerging and developing countries as % of 
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Emerging and 
Developing Market 
Economies 
GDP (Source: IMF, Department of Trade). 
Index of 
coordination 
Composite index comprising shareholder power, dispersion of control, 
size of stock market, degree of wage coordination, and labour turnover 
(Hall and Gingerich, 2004: 11). 
Public Social 
Expenditures 
Total Public Social Expenditures, expressed as % of GDP (source: 
OECD stats). 
Wage share The annual labour income share is calculated for this database as total 
labour costs divided by nominal output. The term labour income share 
is used as the total labour costs measure relates to compensation of 
employees adjusted for the self-employed (source: OECD Social 
Expenditures database). 
Immigration Total inflows of foreign population in each country (source: OECD 
statistics website). 
Unit Labour cost Unit labour costs measure the average cost of labour per unit of 
output. They are calculated as the ratio of total labour costs to real 
output, or equivalently, as the ratio of average labour costs per hour to 
labour productivity (output per hour). As such, a unit labour cost 
represents a link between productivity and the cost of labour in 
producing output. The data presented in this dataset are an output of 
the OECD System of Unit Labour Cost and Related Indicators which 
produces annual and quarterly unit labour cost measures according to a 
specific methodology to ensure data are comparable across OECD 
countries. (source: OECD Labour Force Survey Statistics). 
Female labour force 
participation 
Civilian labour force of females as % of pop 15-64 (source: OECD 
Labour Force Survey Statistics). 
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Table A3.4: Regression with alternative wage coordination index and different scaling of dualisation 
Columns (1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
GDP growth rate 0.01725 0.02365* 0.02615* 0.02541** 0.02133 0.02349* 
Rate of Unemployment  -0.01733 -0.00267 0.00232 -0.01675*** 0.00171 -0.00240 
Trade-to-GDP-ratio -0.00112 -0.00237*** -0.00267*** -0.00228*** -0.00178*** -0.00237*** 
Union density -0.00455*** -0.00435*** -0.00423*** -0.00464*** -0.00504*** -0.00426*** 
Left cabinet -0.00040 -0.00019 -0.00017 -0.00062** -0.00003 -0.00018 
Public Social Expenditures 0.00833 -0.00864 -0.01062 0.00422 -0.00994 -0.00917 
Wage coordination index 0.05444** 0.05607*** 0.04326** 0.03958*** 0.04528*** 0.05470** 
Alternative index of dualisation (i) 0.31431*** 0.15051** 0.11693** 0.14344*** 0.13112*** 0.14576* 
Replacement rate (first year) -0.00639*** -0.00822*** -0.00814*** -0.00904*** -0.00687*** -0.00829*** 
Spending on Employment incentives 
and rehabilitation (% of GDP) 
 0.34538*** 0.34022*** 0.35354*** 0.31180*** 0.34702*** 
Union centralisation   0.21055*    
Bargaining coverage    -0.00047   
Rescaled 0 1 minimum wage dummy     -0.07672***  
Employment Protection Legislation for 
regular workers 
     0.00436 
Constant 1.75821*** 2.17083*** 2.15263*** 2.13643*** 2.17459*** 2.17997*** 
Observations 107 107 107 104 107 107 
Number of id 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared overall 0.83 0.86 0.86 0.89 0.88 0.86 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (i) This index of dualisation first standardises the share of temporary workers and 
EPL of temporary work and then rescales the variables from 1 to 10 before taking the ratio of temporary work to EPL temporary work 
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Table A3.4: Regression with alternative wage coordination index and different scaling of 
dualisation (continued) 
Columns (8) (9) (10) (11) 
GDP growth rate 0.02285* 0.02443** 0.01250 0.01501 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015) 
Rate of Unemployment  -0.00293 -0.00327 -0.01137 -0.00714 
(% of Civilian Labour Force) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
Trade-to-GDP-ratio -0.00246*** -0.00238***   
(Total trade) (0.001) (0.001)   
Union density -0.00431*** -0.00428*** -0.00528*** -0.00493*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Left cabinet -0.00047  -0.00040 -0.00043 
 (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Social Expenditures -0.00938 -0.00862 0.00584 0.00776 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) 
Wage coordination index 0.05688*** 0.05409*** 0.05078*** 0.05222*** 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) 
Alternative index of dualisation (i) 0.14460** 0.14418** 0.26745*** 0.27497*** 
(lagged, standardised base values) (0.061) (0.065) (0.068) (0.067) 
Replacement rate -0.00829*** -0.00800*** -0.00835*** -0.00844*** 
(first year) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Employment incentives  0.35057*** 0.33908*** 0.21913*** 0.20571*** 
and rehabilitation   (0.062) (0.062) (0.075) (0.071) 
(Spending as % of GDP)     
Left cabinet  -0.00033   
(4 years moving average)  (0.000)   
Imports from Emerging and    -0.01915***  
developing economies   (0.005)  
Trade to and from Emerging and     -0.01242*** 
developing economies    (0.003) 
Constant 2.21931*** 2.17901*** 1.88760*** 1.80154*** 
Observations 107 107 107 107 
Number of id 10 10 10 10 
Country FE No No No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared within 0.28 0.28 0.16 0.18 
R-squared between 0.96 0.96 0.99 0.99 
R-squared overall 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.85 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (i) This index of 
dualisation first standardises the share of temporary workers and EPL of temporary work and then 
rescales the variables from 1 to 10 before taking the ratio of temporary work to EPL temporary work. 
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Table A3.4: Regression with alternative wage coordination index and different scaling of 
dualisation (continued) 
Columns (12) (13) (14) 
GDP growth rate 0.02379* 0.02219* 0.02235 
Rate of Unemployment  -0.00038 0.00022 -0.00520 
Trade-to-GDP-ratio -0.00233*** -0.00237*** -0.00252*** 
Union density -0.00455*** -0.00437*** -0.00443*** 
Left cabinet -0.00018 -0.00006 -0.00006 
Public Social 
Expenditures -0.00951 -0.00973 -0.01037 
Wage coordination index 0.05237*** 0.04934*** 0.06552*** 
Alternative index of 
dualisation  (lagged) (i) 0.14287*** 0.15090** 0.15283* 
Replacement rate (first 
year) -0.00810*** -0.00856*** -0.00757*** 
Employment incentives 
and rehabilitation  
(Spending as % of GDP) 
0.35586*** 0.36930*** 0.27506*** 
Educational attainment 0.00862   
Consumer price index  0.01816***  
Spending on Research 
and Development   -0.00205 
Constant 2.10965*** 2.16239*** 2.20755*** 
Observations 107 107 96 
Number of id 10 10 10 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared overall 0.86 0.87 0.86 
Note: Robust clustered standard errors; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (i) This index of dualisation 
first standardises the share of temporary workers and EPL of temporary work and then rescales the 
variables from 1 to 10 before taking the ratio of temporary work to EPL temporary work. 
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Table A3.4: Regression with alternative wage coordination index and different scaling of 
dualisation (continued) 
Columns (15) (16) (17) (18) 
GDP growth rate 0.02364* 0.03103** 0.02349 0.02649** 
Rate of Unemployment  -0.00522 0.01177 -0.00289 0.00257 
Trade-to-GDP-ratio -0.00274** -0.00184*** -0.00242*** -0.00247*** 
Union density -0.00439*** -0.00433*** -0.00430*** -0.00449*** 
Left cabinet -0.00023 -0.00016 -0.00020 -0.00003 
Public Social 
Expenditures -0.00813 -0.00355 -0.00878 -0.00909 
Wage coordination index 0.05809*** 0.03801*** 0.05588*** 0.05662*** 
Alternative index of 
dualisation (lagged) (i) 0.14018* 0.16360*** 0.15078** 0.12902** 
Replacement rate (first 
year) -0.00810*** -0.00697*** -0.00817*** -0.00831*** 
Employment incentives 
and rehabilitation  
(Spending as % of GDP) 
0.36605*** 0.32246*** 0.34508*** 0.38539*** 
Self-employment% of 
civilian employment 0.00556    
Share of involuntary part-
timers in total 
employment 
 -0.04865***   
Civilian labour force  
females % of pop 15-64   -0.00027  
Unit Labour Cost    0.01075* 
Constant 2.12480*** 1.91840*** 2.19081*** 2.10527*** 
Observations 107 99 107 107 
Number of id 10 10 10 10 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared overall 0.86 0.89 0.86 0.87 
Note: Robust clustered standard errors; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (i) This index of dualisation 
first standardises the share of temporary workers and EPL of temporary work and then rescales the 
variables from 1 to 10 before taking the ratio of temporary work to EPL temporary work. 
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Table A3.5: Jack-knife robustness check using new measures of dualisation and coordination 
Excluded country Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece 
GDP growth rate 0.02365* 0.02174 0.03171* 0.02446 0.02095 0.00774 0.02365* 
 (0.013) (0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.013) (0.005) (0.013) 
Rate of Unemployment as % of Civilian 
Labour Force 
-0.00267 -0.00334 -0.00594 0.00702 -0.00572 0.01346* -0.00267 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) 
Trade-to-GDP-ratio (total trade) -0.00237*** -0.00183 -0.00241*** -0.00273*** -0.00226*** -0.00093* -0.00237*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Union density -0.00435*** -0.00418*** -0.00512*** -0.00384*** -0.00395*** -0.00293*** -0.00435*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Left cabinet -0.00019 -0.00017 -0.00023 -0.00036 -0.00019 0.00036 -0.00019 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Total Public Social Expenditures -0.00864 -0.00601 -0.00455 -0.01045 -0.00870 -0.03028*** -0.00864 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.007) (0.010) 
Wage coordination index 0.05607*** 0.05164* 0.06543*** 0.06482*** 0.06345*** -0.01145 0.05607*** 
(From 1 to 5) (0.019) (0.027) (0.017) (0.017) (0.024) (0.019) (0.019) 
Dualisation index (i) 0.15051** 0.13844** 0.19779** 0.18698*** 0.17363** 0.07174 0.15051** 
(lagged once) (0.063) (0.067) (0.084) (0.055) (0.080) (0.044) (0.063) 
Replacement rate -0.00822*** -0.00856*** -0.00833*** -0.00702*** -0.00891*** -0.00248 -0.00822*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Spending on employment  0.34538*** 0.31634*** 0.28936** 0.28298*** 0.36549*** 0.24844*** 0.34538*** 
incentives and rehabilitation 
programmes 
(0.062) (0.105) (0.120) (0.064) (0.082) (0.086) (0.062) 
Constant 2.17083*** 2.13057*** 2.10428*** 2.02611*** 2.13647*** 2.38431*** 2.17083*** 
Observations 107 102 94 101 89 94 107 
Number of id 10 9 9 9 9 9 10 
Country FE No No No No No No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared overall 0.86 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.94 0.86 
Note: Robust clustered standard errors; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (i) This index of dualisation first standardises the share of temporary workers 
and EPL of temporary work and then rescales the variables from 1 to 10 before taking the ratio of temporary work to EPL temporary work. In other 
words, this index of dualisation is higher the larger the share of temporary workers and the lower the regulation of the temporary work sector.
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Table A3.5: Jack-knife robustness check using new measures of dualisation and coordination (continued) 
 Ireland Italy Netherlands Norway Portugal Spain Sweden UK 
GDP growth rate 0.02561* 0.02365* 0.02062 0.02460* 0.02365* 0.02365* 0.02087 0.02007 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) 
Rate of Unemployment as % of 
Civilian Labour Force 
-0.01765*** -0.00267 -0.01048 -0.00561 -0.00267 -0.00267 0.00106 -0.01188 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) 
Trade-to-GDP-ratio (total trade) -0.00236*** -0.00237*** -0.00156** -0.00251*** -0.00237*** -0.00237*** -0.00257*** -0.00250*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Union density -0.00458*** -0.00435*** -0.00612*** -0.00422*** -0.00435*** -0.00435*** -0.00448*** -0.00366*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Left cabinet -0.00058** -0.00019 -0.00030 -0.00009 -0.00019 -0.00019 -0.00020 0.00042 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Total Public Social Expenditures 0.00327 -0.00864 -0.00273 -0.00925 -0.00864 -0.00864 -0.01404 -0.02154** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.009) 
Wage coordination index 0.04023*** 0.05607*** 0.06855*** 0.06133*** 0.05607*** 0.05607*** 0.06056*** -0.00092 
(From 1 to 5) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
Dualisation index (i) 0.14463** 0.15051** 0.28599*** 0.14286* 0.15051** 0.15051** 0.10830 0.15705** 
(lagged once) (0.062) (0.063) (0.064) (0.087) (0.063) (0.063) (0.078) (0.073) 
Replacement rate -0.00940*** -0.00822*** -0.00765*** -0.00790*** -0.00822*** -0.00822*** -0.00836*** -0.01248*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Spending on employment  0.36411*** 0.34538*** 0.38315*** 0.30665*** 0.34538*** 0.34538*** 0.36986*** 0.45746*** 
incentives and rehabilitation 
programmes 
(0.078) (0.062) (0.081) (0.100) (0.062) (0.062) (0.057) (0.099) 
Constant 2.14765*** 2.17083*** 1.98909*** 2.19587*** 2.17083*** 2.17083*** 2.30640*** 3.00513*** 
Observations 103 107 90 100 107 107 101 89 
Number of id 9 10 9 9 10 10 9 9 
Country FE No No No No No No No No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared overall 0.89 0.86 0.90 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.86 
Note: Robust clustered standard errors; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (i) This index of dualisation first standardises the share of temporary workers 
and EPL of temporary work and then rescales the variables from 1 to 10 before taking the ratio of temporary work to EPL temporary work. In other 
words, this index of dualisation is higher the larger the share of temporary workers and the lower the regulation of the temporary work sector. 
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Appendix A3.2 
 
Table A3.5: The effect of temporary work on inequality mediated by coordination 
Dependent variable Wage inequality between the median and bottom income deciles 
GDP growth 0.0385*** 
 (0.0122) 
Unemployment rate -0.0247** 
(lagged) (0.0103) 
Openness -0.000129 
(lagged) (0.00122) 
Coordination dummy 0.0899 
 (0.112) 
Share of temporary workers 0.0295* 
 (0.0165) 
Coordination dummy* -0.0123 
Share of temporary workers (0.0120) 
Union density -0.00373*** 
 (0.000889) 
Left share of Cabinet -0.00105 
 (0.000762) 
Unemployment benefits -0.0116*** 
Replacement rate in first year (0.00180) 
Spending on employment  0.228* 
Incentives (0.132) 
Constant 2.342*** 
Observations 129 
Number of id 14 
Note: Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table A3.6: Marginal effect of temporary work in different coordination settings 
Marginal effect of share of 
temporary workers in 
dy/dx Standard 
error 
Z P>|z| [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Low coordination countries 0.295 0.0165 1.79 0.074 -0.0029 0.0618 
High coordination countries 0.017 0.0101 1.70 0.089 -0.0026 0.0370 
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